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. STATE INSURANCE FUND 
1216W. STATE GTREET • P.O. BOX 8372Q • BOISE, IDAliO 1!3720.oo« 
PHONE (208) 332·2100 • (BOO) 334·2370 
:MEMORANDUM 
J amos M. AlcOP.l. Manag r 
Subject: 
December 9, 2002 t: 
Dividend Formula fOl' Polic' th Inception Date;; of July.!, 2000 to June 30, 2001 
Loss Adjustment Expense 18% fQr aU policies 
l>l'CmiUlU Size Underwliting Expem~e 
<2,500 100% 
2,501 to 5,000 75% 
5,OOHo 10,000 70% 
10,001 to 20,000 65% 
20,001 to 50,000 65% 
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S'"fATE INSURANCE FUND 
1219 W, STATE STREET • P.o.llOXSS720. BOISE. IDAHO 83720-00« 
PHONE 1200I33N~100. (800) 334·2310 
MEMORANDUM 
na~c.: r)cccmber 11, 2003 
l.i'rOfl1~ JI)YOcs M. Alcorn. Mnnage1' 
Subjc.ct; Dividend Formula for Polici wilh Inc.eption Dates of Jul)!1, 2001 to June 30, 21)02 
Loss Adjus(tn~nt nxpense 18% for all policies 
pj'~.mjum Si"c Underwriting Ex.pense. Retul'1l Pe,rcenlag 0 
<2,500 100% 0% 
2,501 to 5,000 75% 15% 
5,OOlto ~O,OOO 70% ."25% 
10,00) to 40,000 65% 28% 
20,001 to 50,000 65% 32% 
50.001 to \00,000 60% 35% 
.100,001 to 200,000 55% 40% 
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STATE INSURANCE FUND 
1215 W. STATE STREET. P.O. BOX 83720. BO!SE, IDAHO ?3720·00M 
PHONE (208) 332·2100 • (800) 334-2370 
MEMORANDUM 
Date: DccembOl' 17, 2004 
From! James M. Alcorn, Mana er 
Subject: Inception Dates of'July 1, 2002 to June 30, ~003 
Loss Adjustment Bx~enso 18% for nIl policies 
Premium Size Retention Return Percentago 
~~~<21500 . 100% 0% 
.1:/ ;v 2,501 to 5,000' 75% 15% 
, ;51 5,OOlto 10.000 72% 25% 
10,001 to 20,000 67% 28% 
2(),OO 1 to 50.000 67% 32% 
50,001 to 100,000 62% 35% 
100,001 to 200,000 57% 40% 
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STATE INSURANCE FUND 
1215 W. STATE STREET. P.O. Eox 83720. BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0044 
PHONE (208) 332-2100 • (800) 334-2370 
www.IDAHOSIF.ORG 
MEMORANDUM 
James M. Alcorn, Manager. ;' 
Subject: 
December 21, 2005 tr 
Dividend Fonnula for POIici~S Ith Inception Dates of July I, 2003 to June 30, 2004 
Loss Adjustment Expense 18% for all policies 
Premium Size Retention . Return Percentage 
<2,500 100% 0% 
2,501 to 5,000 75% 15% 
5,OOlto 10,000 72% 25% 
10,001 to 20,000 67% 28% 
, 20,001 to 50;000 67% "32% 
50,001 to 100,000 62% 35% 
100,001 to200,OOO 57% 40% 
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LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Sixtieth Legislature 
IN THE SENATE 
SENATE BILL NO. 1166 
BY STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
1 AN ACT 
First Regular Session - 2009 
2 RELATING TO THE STATE INSURANCE FUND; TO PROVIDE LEGISLATIVE INTENT; 
3 REPEALING SECTION 72-915, IDAHO CODE, RELATING TO DIVIDENDS; 
4 DECLARING AN EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING A RETROACTIVE EFFECTIVE 
5 DATE. 
6 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State ofIdaho: 
7 SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. (1) Historically, the State Insurance Fund has 
8 exercised its discretion, pursuant to Section 72-915, Idaho Code, to determine the annual 
9 amount of dividend, if any, a policyholder would receive. 
10 (2) On March 5, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court filed its opinion in Farber v. Idaho 
11 State Insurance Fund, S. Ct. 35144, in which it interpreted Section 72-915, Idaho Code, and 
12 ruled that the State Insurance Fund cannot exercise its discretion in determining how much of 
13 a dividend to pay to each policyholder because the statute requires a pro rata distribution of 
14 dividends to all policyholders. The result of the decision is to require that the State Insurance 
15 Fund pay dividends on policies that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the fund's 
16 ability to reduce premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders. 
17 (3) In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that, if it has become prudent to alter the 
18 statutory language related to the requirements for distribution of dividends, the Legislature is 
19 the appropriate venue for such change. 
20 (4) It was the intent of the Legislature in passing House Bill No. 774, As Amended of 
21 the Second Regular Session of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislature, effective on April 3, 1998, 
22 that the State Insurance Fund should operate like an efficient insurance company, subject to 
23 regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, including the dividend provisions set forth in Chapter 
24 28, Title 41, Idaho Code. The retroactive repeal of Section 72-915, Idaho Code, to April 3, 
25 1998. will conform with that intent. Section 73-10 L Idaho Code, permits such retroactive 
26 repeal as long as it is "expressly so declared" in legislation. 
27 (5) The retroactive repeal of Section 72-915, Idaho Code, will reconcile conflicts in the 
28 existing laws governing the State Insurance Fund and will allow the fund, like other insurance 
29 companies, to issue dividends pursuant to Chapter 28, Title 41, Idaho Code. 
30 SECTION 2. That Section 72-915, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby repealed. 
31 SECTION 3. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby declared to 
32 exist, Section 1 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and after passage and approval, 
33 and Section 2 of this act shall be in full force and effect retroactively to April 3, 1998. 
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LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Sixtieth Legislature First Regular Session - 2009 
Moved by Davis 
-----------------------
Seconded by Cameron ---------------------
IN THE SENATE 
SENATE AMENDMENT TO S.B. NO. 1166 
1 AMENDMENT TO SECTION I 
2 On page 1 of the printed bill, in line 24, delete "April 3" and insert: "January 1 "; in line 
3 25, delete "1998" and insert: "2003"; and following line 29, insert: 
4 "(6) It is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this act shall not apply to 
5 any action filed in a state or federal court of law in the state of Idaho on or before December 
6 31, 2008, and the provisions of this act shall not apply to the aforementioned case of Farber 
7 v. Idaho State Insurance Fund as currently pending with respect to those policy holders paying 
8 annual premiums of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500).". 
9 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 3 




















April 7, 2009 
1:30 p.m. 
Room 117 
Chairman Andreason, Vice Chairman Coiner, Senators Stegner, 
Cameron, Goedde, Lodge, Smyser, Sagness (Malepeai) , and LeFavour 
See attached sign-in sheet. 
The sign-in sheet, testimonies, and other related materials will be retained 
with the minutes in the committee's office until the end of the session and 
will then be located on file with the minutes in the Legislative Services 
Library. 
Chairman Andreason called the meeting to order at 1:48 P.M. 
Relating to Building Codes 
Lee Gagner, spoke in support of H218. Since 1he passage of 2004 
Building Code passage there have been many changes. Through the 
passage of Building Codes in conjunction with the Fire Industry they have 
created standards of ingress and egress requirements out of windows in 
basements, upper levels which have reduced safety issues. Another 
major fire safety improvement was the smoke detectors systems being 
required to be hardwired in new housing. Any code amendments should 
be decided in the Legislature, rather than by the local jurisdictions. Two 
reasons he is supporting the bill: 1) He can not identify the need for the 
bill; and 2) Single-family and duplex dwellings should be exempted. 
Senator Goedde stated there has been a proposal to send this bill to the 
amending order and opt out the single-family and duplex dwellings. Mr. 
Gagner responded that he would be in support of the amendment. 
Senator Goedde moved that H218 be referred to the 14th order for 
amendment. The motion was seconded by Vice Chairman Coiner. The 
motion carried by Voice Vote. 
Relating to the State Insurance Fund 
Senator Goedde, presented S1166, relating to the State Insurance Fund 
(SIF). The purpose of this legislation is to repeal Idaho Code, Section 72-
915, and will serve to offset an adverse decision of the Idaho Supreme 
Court regarding the interpretation of Idaho Code, Section 72-915 which 
SENATE COMMERCE AND HUMAN RESOURCES 
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could subject the SIF to pay dividends on policies that are not financially 
profitable, thereby restricting the SIF's ability to reduce premiums and pay 
dividends to profitable policyholders. The proposed repeal of Idaho Code, 
Section 72-915 will clarify the law regarding the payment of dividends by 
the SIF by making it clear that in passing H77 4aa in 1998, it was the 
intent of the Legislature to have the SI F operate like an efficient insurance 
company subject to regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, including the 
dividend provision set forth in Title 41, Chapter 28, Idaho Code. Repeal of 
the law effective April 3, 1998 is necessary because on that date laws 
were enacted which subjected the SIF to regulation under the Insurance 
Code, Title 41, Idaho Code. This legislation will allow the SIF to issue 
dividends in the same manner as other insurance companies operating 
within the State of Idaho (Attachment A). 
Senator Goedde stated that historically the SIF has exercised its 
discretion, pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 72-915, to determine the 
annual amount of dividend, if any, a policyholder would receive . 
Dividends have never been distributed on a pro rata basis. It was the 
intent of the 1998 Legislature in passing H774aa, effective April 3, 1998, 
that the SIF should operate like an efficient insurance company, subject 
to regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, including the dividend provision 
set forth in Chapter 28, Title 41, Idaho Code. The SIF does not have 
stockholders so dividends are returned to the policyholders. 
On March 5, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court filed its opinion in Farber v. 
Idaho State Insurance Fund in which it interpreted Section 72-915, Idaho 
Code, and ruled that the SIF cannot exercise its discretion in determining 
how much of a dividend to pay to each policyholder, because the statute 
requires a pro rata distribution of dividends to all policyholders. The result 
of the decision is to require that the SIF pay dividends on policies that are 
not financially profitable, thereby restricting the SIF's ability to reduce 
premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders. Senator Goedde 
stated that in making this decision, the Court ignored Idaho Code, Section 
72-901, which requires the SIF to operate as an efficient insurance 
company, and Idaho Code, Section 41-2844, which allows for distribution 
of dividends. The Court interpreted 72-915 in a manner inconsistent with 
other laws governing the SIF and past practices that go back to the1980s. 
Senator Goedde advised that Idaho Code, Section 73-101 specifically 
allows for retroactive enactment of legislation. Repealing Section 72-915, 
Idaho Code, retroactive to April 3, 1998 when H77 4aa was enacted, will 
reconcile conflicts in the existing laws governing the SIF and will allow the 
SIF, like other insurance companies, to issue dividends pursuant to 
Chapter 28, Title 41, Idaho Code. He stated that it is not his intention in 
bringing this bill to circumvent the Supreme Court's decision, and in fact 
the Supreme Court stated in the Farber case that if it has become 
prudent to alter the statutory language related to the requirements for 
distribution of dividends, the Legislature is the appropriate venue for such 
change. 
Currently the judgment against the SIF is estimated at $5 million and 
SENATE COMMERCE AND HUMAN RESOURCES 
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there is potential for another $24 million in additional judgments if this 
legislation is not passed. Large businesses right now support the small '. ~ 
businesses that are written by the SIF. He stated the SIF generally takes 
a loss on policies issued under $1,500. If the SIF does not have the 
discretion to offer dividends and premium deviations to large businesses, 
they will go to the private sector for those benefits, and it will further erode 
the base of the SIF. This could also substantially impact the state 
agencies and public entities insured by the SIF. 
In response to questions of the Committee, Senator Goedde disclosed 
that as a member of the Board of Directors of the State Insurance SIF he 
was named in the Farber lawsuit. However, he was never served nor 
deposed in the case. He called upon Rich Hall, attorney for the SIF to 
respond to a legal question. Mr. Hall stated that the Supreme Court did 
rule in the 2000 case of Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insurance Fund, that 
the Worker's Compensation statutes became a part of the contract of 
insurance between the State Insurance Fund and the policyholder. 
Phillip Gordon, attorney, representing plaintiffs , a class of 30,000 Idaho 
employers, in the Farber case spoke in opposition to 51166. He advised 
that the action was brought because his clients believe that the SIF had 
misinterpreted Idaho Code, Section 72-915 and had departed from its 
traditional historic interpretation of that statute. He stated that up until and 
including the policy year 2000, the SIF had always paid dividends pro rata 
as commanded by the statute. The SIF took the position after the 2000 
policy year that it was the intent of the Legislature that the SIF comply 
with the provisions of the Idaho Insurance Code, Title 41 , Idaho Code. 
However, the Supreme Court held in the 2000 case of Kelso & Irwin, P.A. 
v. State Insurance Fund, that the SIF is not a public mutual insurance 
company. 
The Farber case was filed in 2006 and the Supreme Court decided 
unanimously on March 5, 2009, that Idaho Code, Section 72-915, means 
that if you pay dividends to one, basically you pay them to all pro rata. 
He stated that if this legislation is passed and Idaho Code, Section 72-
915 is repealed there would be no guidance and no statute whatsoever 
that would allow the SIF to pay dividends. He stated that when you 
purchase a contract of worker's compensation insurance with the SIF you 
. get three things: 1) insurance in the event one of your employee's is hurt; 
2) a defense if a lawsuit is brought by an injured employee; and 3) a right 
to share pro rata in dividends. The State and Federal Constitutions have 
provisions forbidding the passage of laws which impair the obligations of 
contracts. Mr. Gordon stated that this legislation impairs the obligations 
of contracts inasmuch as the 2000 Supreme Court decision clearly held 
that Idaho Code, Section 72-915, is part of the contract of insurance 
between the SIF and all of its policyholders. To effect that retroactively 
impairs the obligations of contracts. 
Senator Goedde inquired of Mr. Gordon whether he thought a policy 
holder that spends $150 on a premium and incurs $10,000 in costs in that 
year because of an injured employee should receive a dividend. Mr. 
Gordon responded that it was his understanding that the SIF may 
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consider losses and is not obligated to pay a dividend in that instance. 
However, he could not cite case law to sUbstantiate his position. 
Don Lojek, attorney, also representing plaintiffs, spoke in opposition to 
S1166. He stated that Idaho Code, Section 72-915, was enacted in 1917. 
Under that statute the manager of the SIF has the ability to declare a 
divided if he or she thinks there is a sufficient amount of money to 
support dividends to policyholders. Once the manager declares the 
dividend, then the statute requires that the manager of the SIF distribute 
those dividends on a pro rata basis. He stated that in recent years that 
was changed unilaterally by the SIF without seeking legislative approval. 
The SIF drew a line at $2,500 and said that the employers whose 
premiums were less than $2,500 would receive no dividend whatsoever. 
Dissatisfaction with that policy resulted in the class action lawsuit being 
filed in 2006, and the Supreme Court issued its decision in favor of the 
plaintiff's on March 5, 2009. This case is still in litigation as the SIF has 
filed a motion for a rehearing. He stated that this legislation is premature 
and if passed wiJI leave the SIF without authority to pay dividends. 
In response to questions of the Committee, Mr. Lojek advised that if this 
bill were to pass, the Supreme Court would then have to decide whether 
or not it has any jurisdiction because the statute would be repealed. This 
would likely lead to more litigation. He stated he is unaware of dividend 
policies by other domestic stock and mutual insurance companies, but is 
aware that there are shareholders and stockholders that are entitled to 
dividends under Title 41, Chapter 28, Idaho Code, but stated that the SIF 
is a different kind of entity governed by the State of Idaho and code. 
Senator Cameron stated that his concern with this legislation would be to 
keep the SIF as a viable and responsible entity. He stated he does not 
see this bill as necessarily reversing the decision of the Supreme Court, 
but merely affects the amount of money the SIF would have to payout. 
He inquired whether Mr. Lojek would financially gain should this bill not 
pass, and should the Supreme Court's decision be upheld. Mr. Lojek 
responded that according to its financial disclosure at the end of 2008, 
the SIF had a $198 million surplus. If the policy holders that he and others 
represent prevail, the judgments could be between $10 million and $15 
million. That amount will be governed by the Court below when it 
considers plaintiff's .attorney's fees incurred over the last two and one half 
years. Mr. Lojek was asked if his opposition to this legislation was mainly 
the retroactive nature of this bill. He responded that it was. 
Senator Goedde asked Mr. Lojek to clarify how the SIF is going to pay 
dividends from this day forward if the legislation is adopted without a 
retroactive date. He stated that it was his feeling that the SIF manager 
could use his discretion prospectively to decide whether or not to declare 
a dividend, but that it would open up a constitutional question to go back 
and change contracts. 
Senator Coiner stated that Title 72, Chapter 9, Idaho Code states that 
the SIF shall be deemed a mutual insurer, subject to Idaho Insurance 
Code, Title 41, Idaho Code. Mr. Lojek advised that the 2000 case of 
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Kelso v. State Insurance Fund said that although it kind of looks like the 
SIF is a mutual insurance company, it really is not and therefore it does 
not fit in Title 41, Chapter 28. 
Richard E. Ha", attorney for the SIF, spoke in support of 51166. Mr. Ha" 
advised that the previous statement by Mr. Gordon that prior to the year 
2000, dividends were distributed pro rata was incorrect, and that has 
never really been the case. In the past, losses were taken into account in 
the payment of dividends. The ability of the SIF to offset dividends with 
losses is unclear in the 2009 Supreme Court decision. This could result in 
a dividend distribution to a policyholder who pays a $1,500 premium but 
has a $3 million loss. This does not make sense, but is one of the 
potential problems that has been created by the Supreme Court decision. 
Mr. Hall stated that managing an insurance company right now is a 
tremendous task, and what this decision of the Supreme Court does is 
that it takes away the discretion that would give the SIF the opportunity to 
be able to compete in a viable way with the insurance companies that are 
not regulated in this way. He stated that we need to pass this legislation 
in order to financially protect the SIF. Senator Stegner commented that it 
should not be the role of the Legislature to pass legislation to save 
someone who has gotten themselves into a financial mess. He asked Mr. 
Hall why this should be different. Mr. Hall responded that in this particular 
case the Supreme Court specifically said that if the parties think their 
decision is inappropriate they should go to the State Legislature, which 
was really in effect an invitation to say that this is a type of issue that the 
Legislature ought to deal with. He pOinted out that in this situation we are 
dealing with a State agency which is governed by legislation. The 
decision is based upon a statute that was written in 1917. -The insurance 
code has been changed numerous times since then but this one statute 
has been left on the books. He believes it is of such a significant financial 
impact that it is a reasonable way to handle this particular situation. 
Senator Sagness asked Mr. Hall to expand on the effect not passing this 
legislation will have on the SIF. Mr. Ha" responded that the Supreme 
Court's decision makes it very clear that they feel there should be a pro 
rata distribution based upon premiums paid. They do not mention 
anything with regard to whether or not a loss would be calculated into that 
dividend. He stated that because of all the factors related to how the SIF 
is managed, how dividends are calculated, how premiums are calculated, 
how rates are calculated, and how classifications are made, he is unable 
to give the specifics of what the financial implications will be. He advised 
he does believe they will be significant, and by that he means important 
and very difficult for the SIF to absorb. He confirmed that the cost of 
current judgments and future potential litigation would be between $18 
million and $24 million. 
Senator Cameron made a motion, seconded by Senator Goedde, that 
S 1166 be sent to the floor with a do pass recommendation. 
In discussing his motion, Senator Cameron stated that he participated in 
the 1998 group convened by Governor Batt to update the State Insurance 
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Fund Code. The intent at that time was to try and move the SIF away 
from being a state run program so that it could actively compete and work 
in the market place along side aIJ the other companies that were offering 
worker's compensation insurance. He stated that they did a pretty good 
job, but obviously missed Section 72-915. The question before us today is 
first, what is the role that you want the SIF to play. If you want the SIF to 
still be a viable entity who wiIJ compete ·for business with every other 
carrier you must vote for this bill. The second issue is the retroactive 
nature of the bill. The minimal impact of not passing this legislation is $24 
million. The long range impact is what you do to the SIF. If you make the 
SIF non competitive with other worker's compensation products then you 
have just spelled the doom or the end of which will cause harm to aIJ of 
our constituents who are currently purchasing that product because of its 
competitive pricing. That is the major catastrophe - not the $24 million. 
Senator Stegner made a substitute motion, seconded by Senator 
LeFavour, that S1166 be held in Committee. 
In discussing his substitute motion, Senator Stegner stated that in his 
opinion the Legislature has every right to look at this issue, but we do not 
do it by proposing legislation in the last hours of the session. He stated a 
statewide debate would be more appropriate, not a half hour hearing. 
Senator Goedde stated that this does affect every little policyholder in 
this state. The SIF is their only avenue and if we jeopardize the viability of 
the SIF those $150 policy holders wiff be required to pay $500 to $750 
premiums for the same coverage. He further stated that the interpretation 
of Section 72-915 is in direct conflict with the dividend statute in Title 41 
and that causes a severe problem for the SIF. He urged passage of this 
bill to fix the omission of the 1998 bill. 
The voice vote on the substitute motion to hold the bill in Committee was 
in doubt, and Chairman Andreason requested the secretary take a roll 
caIJ vote. Chairman Andreason, Senators LeFavour, Sag ness, 
Smyser and Stegner voted Aye; total of five. Senators Lodge, 
Goedde, Cameron, and Coiner voted Nay; total of four. The substitute 
motion passed five to four. 
Relating to the State Fire Marshall 
Jeanne Medley, Land Developer, testified stating she was in support of 
H202. The International Fire Code (IFC) has given rural fire chiefs 
absolute control and has taken away democracy and power of the people 
in Idaho County. The local government has no say on how the IFC is 
interpreted and enforced in their county. 
Dean Ellis, President of the Idaho Fire Chiefs Association, stated in 
the interest of time he deferred to Ron Anderson, representing the 
Idaho Fire Chiefs Organization. Mr. Anderson stated the fix that is 
being proposed in H202 does not solve the problem, in fact, it creates 
more problems. Under H202 if the International Fire Code (IFC) is 
adopted, it will take the adoption out of the hands of the State Fire 
MarshaIJ and gives each city and county fire district the ability to adopt the 
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code. Currently, out of 35 cities only 13 of these cities have adopted the 
code. If this legislation were to pass, there would be a great number of 
cities throughout the State where there would be no code in effect. The 
bill takes the authority away from the State Fire Marshall and his 
assistants to inspect anything other than State owned or leased buildings 
or governmental agencies. As a Fire Chief in the City of Meridian along 
with the Chiefs of Boise, Idaho Falls, Wood River and a few-other chiefs 
in this room today, it would take away our ability to inspect other than 
State buildings. Section §41-256 in the State Statute states that every 
fire chief in the State is considered an assistant to the Fire Marshall, and 
will not have the authority to inspect any business. This would mean day 
cares, schools, bars, restaurants, etc. would not be inspected for fire 
safety. The proposed bill creates a number of issues for fire chiefs 
statewide. 
The Fire Chiefs propose that an impartial appeals board be created that 
is not affiliated in any way with the fire department which would act with 
impartiality to fire code enforcement cases. The fire chiefs also propose 
that an interim committee would be created, chaired by the Association of 
Idaho Cities, to bring back legislation next year that will address some of 
these issues. Finally, training be put in place for smaller rural fire 
departments to standardize the application and enforcement of the IFC 
(Attachment B). 
Tim Vargas, Fire Commissioner from Jerome County, State's 
President Fire Commissioners, stated there are a number of reasons 
the Idaho State Fire Commissioner Association (ISFCA) stands opposed 
to H202. The Association feels it takes away local control. Fire 
Commissioners are elected by the taxpayers in their districts and as duly 
elected officials, they are charged with overseeing a budget that will 
guarantee that the equipment and the manpower is in place for fire 
suppression. In addition, we are charged with the duty of enforCing the 
provisions of the International Fire Code as well as fire prevention 
activities within our districts. This bill eliminates the commissioners from 
performing their duties. It would prevent them from plan review on new 
construction for commercial and private properties. The commissioners 
would only be accountable for State owned structures or their political 
subdivisions. They would only have jurisdiction over their own fire 
stations in their district. ISFCA proposes that the Legislature consider a 
State Fire Code Board that would function in much the same manner as 
the State Building Code Board and it may even be possible to have this 
Board service the Fire Code. This Board would adopt the code and write 
the necessary amendments to tailor the code to the needs of Idaho. One 
of the main complaints they hear is how inflexible the code appears to be 
in the enforcement process. The Board would also serve as the appeals 
board for fire code enforcement cases. ISFCA stands prepared to work 
with the interim task force this summer, fire chiefs, Idaho Association of 
Cities, and insurance companies to develop the legislation. They hope to 
bring back a solid bill that will meet the needs of all Idaho citizens 
pertaining to the enforcement of the IFC, fire protection and prevention 
issues that are encountered on a daily basis. 
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April 14, 2009 
1:30 p.m. 
Room 117 
Chairman Andreason, Vice Chairman Coiner, Senators Stegner, 
Cameron, Goedde, Lodge, Smyser, Sagness (Malepeai), and LeFavour 
See attached sign-in sheet. 
The sign-in sheet, testimonies, and other related materials will be retained 
with the minutes in the committee's office until the end of the session and 
will then be located on file with the minutes in the Legislative Services 
·Ubrary. 
Chairman Andreason called the meeting to order at 8:15 a.m. 
Relating to the State Insurance Fund 
Senator Davis stated th~ fiscal impact of this legislation is a substantial 
concern to the State budget. Absent advancement of this legislation will 
require the State to find some economics which the State does not have 
built into the budget. The principle concern of the Committee was the 
impact of current and pending litigation. Senator Davis asked if the 
Committee would consider sending the bill to the floor for possible 
amendment with the commitment to the Committee that together with the 
sponsors of the bill a set of amendments would be written that would not 
adversely impact the current and pending litigation. 
Senator LeFavour inquired about the settlements that had been awarded 
and wanted to make sure the bill would not impact the fund settlements. 
Senator Davis clarified that if there is a lawful claim currently pending 
they would be entitled to pursue whatever remedy. If there has already 
been a settlement, it is not our intent to write any amendments that would 
require any expunging. 
Senator Cameron moved that S1166 be referred to the 14th order for 
amendment. The motion was seconded by Senator Lodge. The motion 
carried by Voice Vote. 
Senator Stegner advised he was aware of the efforts to negotiate this bill 
and to find some remedy that would be agreeable to him, and he finds no 
objection to this action. 
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Relating to the Public Employee Retirement System 
Senator Cameron stated that H231 is designed to fix the problem that 
has occurred with one of the city council members in the City of Jerome. 
A council member who was a former State employee ran for city council 
and he is fine until his number of months serving on the council exceeds 
the number of months he was a State employee. The result would be a 
significant cut in PERSI benefits to that council member. The council 
member would have to resign from his seat on the city council prior to 
that month that would lower his benefits. This legislation could potentially 
impact 100 to 150 active individuals who are elected officials but had 
some previous State service or some other entity that is a PERSI 
participant. 
Senator Cameron walked the Committee through his presentation to 
clarify how the benefit would fluctuate with this public service (Attachment 
A). There are three methods of calculating this split benefit and Senator 
Cameron explained two. Example 1: Shows an individual who has 120 
months of general service and 119 months of elected service, they stayed 
1 month below the PERSI split benefit. Their monthly retirement benefit 
would be $1195. Example 2: Shows an individual who has 119 months of 
general service and 120 months of elected service the retirement benefit 
drops to $605. The proposed change in the bill allows city elected 
officials and others the same split benefit protection as legislators so the 
elected service would not count against their PERSI benefits. We do not 
want to prohibit those that have served either as an employee of the State 
of Idaho, county, city or hospital from being able to serve as an elected 
official. 
Vice Chairman Coiner moved that H231 be sent to the floor with a do 
pass recommendation: The motion was seconded by Senator 
LeFavour. The motion carried by Voice Vote. Senator Cameron will be 
the sponsor of the bill. 
Relating to the Employment Security Law 
Bob Fick, Legislative Affairs, Department of Labor, stated that H248 
before the Committee today takes advantage of a provision in the 
stimulus package that benefits both unemployed workers and 
businesses. Under this proposal the State will adopt three expansions of 
unemployment insurance benefits. Upon certifying to the federal 
government that the State has adopted these expansions the State will 
receive $32.3 million from the Reed Act into the unemployment insurance 
trust fund. The expansions are relatively minor in the grand scheme of 
things: 1) Allows the most recent quarter of wages prior to lay-off to be 
used in calculating benefits if the traditional benefit calculation method, 
which is the first four of the last five quarters, fails to qualify the individual. 
This will cover approximately 8% of claimants. A large number of the 
claimants actually qualify later by waiting an extra quarter; 2) Benefits for 
claimants that work part-time and were laid-off from a part-time job and 
only want to continue to seek a part-time position. Under the current 
formula the system does not care whether you work part-time or full time 
per week. It is set-up to look at how much time you made in the quarter. 
To continue receiving benefits the claimant must be seeking part-time or 
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full time work; and 3) Extended benefits for workers who have exhausted 
all their other benefits and are in a State approved training program. As 
long as they continue with successful progress in the program they can 
receive additional benefits. A number of unemployed workers who are 
covered by the Trade Adjustment Systems Act already are eligible for 
these benefits. This picks up those in State approved training and that is 
the control the State has when it approves this training. It allows the 
workers to receive this extended benefit, and this is less than 1 % of 
claimants. The total cost for all three expansion benefits is $3 million. 
Upon certifying that we have expanded these benefits the State will 
receive $32.3 million into the Reed Act Account. That infusion of cash 
immediately into the trust fund will reduce the amount of money the fund 
will have to borrow later this year when it is depleted. Eventually, once 
the rates adjust themselves, it will mean that rate increases to employers 
will be 10 to 15% less than they would be had the infusion not occurred. 
This legislation has been endorsed from ICAC, AFLO-CIO, small 
business and the Restaurant and Retailers Association. 
Senator Stegner moved that H248 be sent to the floor with a do pass 
recommendation. The motion was seconded by Senator Cameron. The 
motion carried by Voice Vote. Senator Stegner will be the sponsor of 
the bill. 
Relating to Unemployment Benefits 
Bob Fick, Legislative Affairs, Department of Labor, stated that S1214 
allows the State to adopt a formula for triggering federal state extended 
benefits for a longer period than the current formula allows. This is 
provided for in the stimulus bill. The federal state extended benefits have 
been around since World War II. They are up to thirteen weeks of , 
additional benefits for unemployed workers who have exhausted all their 
other benefits. Up until now they have been paid 50% from the State 
Trust Fund and 50% from the federal government. Under the stimulus bill 
the federal government has agreed to pay 100% of those benefits 
through the end of this year and have agreed to allow states to adopt 
triggers on these benefits. Currently the benefits are triggered by the 
insured unemployment rate rising above 5%. The rate rose above 5% 
the beginning of February. It is expected to trigger down below 5% 
about the middle of June. The new formula allowed in the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Stimulus Act) lets the states 
use the seasonally adjusted total unemployment rate. When that rate 
exceeds 6.5% on a three month rolling average the extended benefit 
period triggers on and stays on until the rolling average falls below 6.5%. 
Under the current situation the 6.5% three month rolling average was hit 
the last week of April 1, 2009. It will stay above 6.5% for the rest of this 
year. In cases where the federal government is paying 100% of federal 
state extended benefits the state can use this total unemployment rate 
calculation. As soon as the federal government stops paying 100% they 
will convert back to the more conservative 5% seasonally insured 
unemployment rate. The effect of this is an additional $14 to $20 million 
into the Idaho economy during the second half of 2009. 
Senator LeFavour moved that S1214 be sent to the floor with a do pass 
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recommendation. The motion was seconded by Vice Chairman Coiner. 
The motion carried by Voice Vote. Senator LeFavour will be the 
sponsor of the bill. 
Senator Sagness moved to approve the minutes of March 24, 2009. 
The motion was seconded by Vice Chairman Coiner. The motion 
carried by Voice Vote. 
Senator Smyser moved to approve the minutes of March 26,2009. The 
motion was seconded by Senator Lodge. The motion carried by Voice 
Vote. 
Senator LeFavour moved to approve the minutes of April 2, 2009. The 
motion was seconded by Vice Chairman Coiner. The motion carried by 
Voice Vote. 
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procedures, :according to the best of their Information, knowledge and,belief, respectively. Furthermore, the scope of this attestation by the described officers also 
includes the'related corresponding electronic filing with the NAfC, when required, that is an exact copy (except for formatting differences due to electronic filing) 01 the 
enclosed statement. The electronic filing may be requested by vanous regulators in lieu of or In addition to the enclosed statement. 
Subscribed and sworn 10 before me ~~ 
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00011.6 
Ves I X J No I J 
Idaho State Insurance Fund .el 
L-____________ ~A~SS~E~T~S- ~~==--------._o.=~~ 
1 ___ ~~~~~c~u~~nty~ear--~--~----_r--~P'~norry~ear---
,.. i 2 3 4 
'nnual Slal.menllor Ih. 
Net Admitled 
Assets (C~~~~~ 21 Admltt~:~ssets 
1 1. Bonds (Schedule D)............................................................................................................ .. ............ 479,295,791 .. ....... , .... 479,295,791 .............. 503,123,999 
2. Slacks (Schedule D): 
2.1 Preferred stocks ..................................................................................................... .. ................................. 0 
2.2 Common stocks ....................................................................................................................... .71,487,691 I ................................. .. ............. ; ... 71.487,691 ................. 53,854,771 
3. Mortgage loans on real estate (Schedule B): 
I 3.1 First liens ................................................................................................................ .. ......................................................................... .. ............................... 0 
3.2 Other than flrstliens................................................................................................. .. ................................. . . ................................ 0 
Real estate (Schedule A): 
4.1 Properties occupied by the company (less $ .......... 0 
encumbrances) ........................................................................................................................... 2, 173, 127 ................... 2,173,127 .................. .2,380,879 
4.2 Properties held for the production of income (less $ .......... 0 
encumbrances)........................................................................................................ .. ................................. . . ................................ 0 
4.3 Properties held for sale (less ~. 0 ................................... . .. ........................... , ..... 0 
5. Cash ($ ..... 34,788,521, Soh. E·Part 1), cash eqUivalents ($ .......... 0, 
Sch. E·Part 2) and short·term investments ($ ..... 9,202,396, Seh. DA) ............................................ ..43,990,918 ................ .43,990, ~18 ................. 29,254,796 
6. Contract loans (including $ .......... 0 premlumn 00011°1.5<1) ............................................................. 1.................................... . .................................. . .................................. 0 
7. Other Invested assets (Schedule Ro",01,' .................................................................................. 1 ...................... 933,350 ...................... 933,3"'9 ................... 1 ,079,889 
8. Receivables for •••• "O"UI"III •• ,.'< ....................................................................................................... 1 .................. .3,674,258 .................................... .. ................. 3,674,258 ................... 7,872,984 
9. Aggregate write·ins for 0 o . n.. . ..... 0 
10. Subtotals, cash and Invested assets (Lines 1 to 0.1) ............................................................. 1 .............. 601,555,135 ................................. 0 .............. 601,555,135 .............. 597,567,318 
11. Title plants less $ .......... 0 charged off (for THie insurers onh, . .................................... .................................... .. ............................... 0 ................................... . 
12. Investment Income due and .a"c"c,'ruecl .................................................................................... 1 ................... 4,835,303 .................. .4,B35,303 ................... 5,482,948 
113. Premiums and considerations: 
13.1 UnCOllected premiums and agents' balances In course of collection .................... . ................... 5,158,315 ................... 1,841,274 ................... 3,317,040 ................. ..4,107,108 
13.2 Deferred premiums, agents' balances and installments booked but deferred 
and not yet due (Including $ .......... 0 earned but unbilledp "~relmnr'''urmn·s') ..................... , .. t .......................... 9,784 .......................... 9,764 ........................ 14,336 
13.3 Accrued retrospactive premiums ........................................................................... .. .. ............................... 0 I .................................. .. 
Reinsurance: 
14.1 Amounts recoverable from reinsurers ............................................................................................. 84.327 ........................ 84,327 ........................ 28,920 
14.2 Funds held by or deposited with reinsured ~conm1pnoa"'1101e·S ............................................ I ...................... 396,357 ...................... 396,357 ..................... .464,549 
14.3 Other amounts receivable under reinsurance cc""n"u'''' .. ,·c'ts· .......................................... I .................................. .. .. ............................... 0 
Amounts receivable relating to uninsuredp o"oaro1s' ..................................................................................................... . .. ............................... 0 
6.1 Current federal and foreign Income tax recoverable and "m,h1'ee"rr·p.e·u(MlO"....................... .................................... .. ................................. . ... , ............................. 0 
116.2 Net deferred tax ',"0' .. .. .................................. 1...................................... .. ............................... 0 
17. Guaranty funds receivable or on deposL........................................................................ .................................... .. ............................... 0 
18. Electronic data processing equipment and software .......................................................................... 14,889,199 ................. 14,396,519 ...................... 492,681 ...................... 372,208 
19. Furniture and equipment, Including health care delivery assets ($ .......... 0) ............................................. 89,065 ........................ 89,065 ................................. 0 ................................. 0 
20. Net adjustment In assets and liabilities due to foreign exchange rates ............................................................... . .. ............................... 0 
I 21. Receivables from parent, subsidiaries and affiliates......................................................... .................................... .. ............................... 0 
22. Health care ($ .......... 0) and other amounts receivable...................................................... .................................... .................................... .. ............................... 0 I .................................. .. 
23. Aggregate write·lns for other than Invested assets ........................................................... 1=="" """.i.:t.6lli144~ .. 505*===::!.A!l!!!.001;'!40="'."'. "'. "'. ;.111..@ 2Blldlj .. 3643==.",.", ..:i41,·tlli 140)lli .. 120~ 
I 24. ~:~~:~!=~~I~~~~ ;~::~~~~.~.~~~~~~:.:.~.~.:~~~~~~.~.:~~.~.~~.~.~~~~.~~~~........... . .............. 631 ,631 ,969 1 ................. 16,815,000 .............. 614,816,970 .............. 612,177,507 
25. From S~parate Accounts, Segregated Accounts and Protected Cell Accounts ............... t ................................... .. 
I 26. TOTALS (Lines 24 and 0<;' O~ 1,631,969 ..... ~~ .......... 16,815,000 .............. 614,816,970 I .............. 612,177,507 
.. ............................... f: ..................................... .. 
DETAilS (IF WRITE·INS 
I~:~:: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ................................. 0 I ............ · .................... · .. .. ................................. 0 ................................... .. 
903 .......................................................................................................................... ,.................. .. ................................ .. ................................. 0 
I v998. Summary of remaining write·lns for Line 9.'rom overllow page........................................ .. ............................... 0 ................................. 0 
10999. Totals (Lines 0901 Ihru 0903 Dlus 09981 (Une 9 oho"o' . .., . . 0 '" 0 
................................. 0 ................................. 0 
n.n 
301. Ceded Reinsurance Deposit.............................................................................................. 1700 nnn ................................... . .. ................. 1,706,000 ................... 1 ,342,030 
/2:::: ~:~::: ~~:r~::~:~:~e •.. I~~;::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: .......... : ..... :.:.~: .... :::;: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: .......................... 2,487 .......................... 2,443 ................... 2,417,876 ................... 2.795,647 
00011.? 
Afini.ialS~aii.im&n!foiihe)'ear200soflhij Idaho State Insurance .Fund 




t. Losses (Part2A, Line 35, Column 8) ................................................................... , ............................................................................ : ................... , ... 317,254,569 ................... 323,013,370 
2. Reinsurance payable onpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses (Schedule F, Part 1, Column 6) ................................................................ : .......................... : .................................... . 
3. Loss adjustment expenses (Part 2A, Line 35, Column 9) .... :................................................................................................................ .. ................... 36.813,380 ..................... 36.787,992 
4. Commissions payable, contingent commissions and other similar charges ............................................................................................................................................. c ............................ . 
5. other expenses (excluding taxes, licenses and fees)........................................................................................................................... .. ..................... 7.B43,44i ....................... 2,407,825 
6. Taxes, licenses and fees (excluding federal and foreign Income taxes) ...................................................................................................................... 1,921,692 ....................... 2,302,246 
7.1 Current federal and foreign Income taxes (Including $ .......... 0 on realized capital gains (losses)) ...................................................................................................................................... .. 
7.2 Net deferred tax liability ....................................................................................... , .. , .................................. , ................. ,., .................... ".. • .. , ............. , ... "." ..... , ........ , ............. " ........ , ...•. ,." ....... , 
8, Borrowed money $, .. , ...... 0 and Interest thereon $ .......... 0 .... , .................. ,.,.,.,", ... , ... , ................................................................ , .. , ...... , ., ......... , ... , ............. ,' ....... ,.. .. .......... , ........ ,., ...... ,." ... ,.,. 
9, Unearned premiums (Part 1 A, Line 38, Column 5) (after deducting uneamed premiums for ceded reinsurance of 
$ .......... 0 and including warrenty reserves of $ .......... 0) .............................................................................................................................................. 18.815,096 .................... .25.049,609 
10. Advance premium .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2.661.630 ....................... 2,529.230 
1 t. Dividends declared and unpaid: 
11, 1 Stockhoiders .......................................................................................... :........................................................................................ . ....................................... . 
11.2 Policyholders .................. ; ...................................................................................................................................................... :........ • ........... : ........ 14,045; t36 ..................... 13,58B,21j2 
. 12. Ceded reinsurance premlunis payable (net·of ceding commissions) ............................................................................................... ,... • ...................... 1,494,707 ... : ................... 1,179,234 
13. Funds heid by company under reinsurance ·treaties (Schedule F, Part 3. Column 19)........................................................................ ......................................... .. ...................................... . 
14. Amounts withheld or retained by company for account of olhers ........... , ............................................................ ,................................ .. ....................... .524.968 ......................... 312.159 
15, Remittances and Items not allocated ................................................................................................................ ,.................................... .. ........................ 165, 187 ............................ 31.027 
16, Provision for reinsurance (Schedule·F. Part 7) ......................................... , ............................ , ........................... , ............................... ,... .; ........................ " ...... "..... .. ..................................... .. 
: 17. Net adjustinents In assets alid liabilities due to foreign exchange rates .......... , ........................................................................ , ................. : .......... : .............................................................. .. 
18. Drafts outslanding ..................................................... , ...................................... , ................ , ...................... ' .. ,........................................... ..' ....... , ............. , .. ,............. ., ........... , .......................... . 
19. Payable to parent subsidiaries and affiliates ................. , ....... , ............................... , ............ , ..... ':.......................................................... • .......................... ,.............. .. •• , .............. , .................... . 
20. Payable for securities., •• ,., ........... , ... , ................. , ..... , .............. : ...... ' ................ , ... ,., ................... , ............................... ,............................. .., .................. 11,286.821 ......... , ........... 10.565.139 
21, L1ablilly for amounts held under uninsured plans ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................  
22. Capital noles $ ........... 0 and Interest thereon $ .......... 0 ..... , ... , ... , .... , ................ , ..................... , ........... , ...................... " ........................ ,... .. ................ , .............. ,....... .. ........... , ......................... ,. 
23. Aggregate wrlte·lns for IlablUties ................................................................................................................................................... ,........ .. ............... , ... ..4 049 955 ....................... 351 B 024 
24, Total liabilities excluding protected celillabUities (Lines 1 through 23) .................................................................................................................. ..416,876,685 ................... 421,282.117 
25. Protected celi llablltlies, ............. , ................ :., ................................ , ... : ................ : ... , ................................................................................ , ... , ......... , .. , .......... ' .•....... ,' •• , .• , •. , ....... , .•...• :.,., •• : ...... ,.,. 
26. TotalliablHtIes (Lines 24 and 25) ................ : ............................ : ................................................................. :............................................ .. ............... ..416 876 585 .................. .421282'117..· 
27. Aggregate write-Ins for special surplus funds ................................................................................................................................. ~ ............................................ 0 ...................................... 0 
28, Common capital stock ...................................................................................................... " ............... " ........ " ..... "' ..... " ................. ,, ....................................... , ....................................... ;,~ ...... . 
29. Preferred capital slock. ............................................................................................................................................................................ " .. ; .................................. " ....................................... . 
30. Aggregate wrlte·lns for other than special surplus funds ............................................ " ............ ,.:" ................................. " .... " .............. " .................. " ................ 0 .................................... ,,0 
31. Surplus notes ................. : ....................................... " .................... " ............................................... " ....................................................... " ....... " .............. " ............. " ........................... " .... " ..... . 
32.· Gross paid In and contributed surplus .... , .............. " ....................... , ................ , ................................. ,,, .................................... ,........... .. .............................. ,........ • .............................. , ........ . 
33. Unassigned funds (surplus)., .............. , ............................... , ... , ............................................. ; .......................................... , ............ , ................ ,,, ......... 197,940.384· ................ , .. 190.895.389 
34. Less treasury stock, at cost 
34,1 ....... ; .. 0.000 shares common (value Included In Line 2B $ .......... 0) ............. ; ........................................................................ : .................................................................. " ................. .. 
34.2 .......... 0.000 shares preferred (value Included In Une 29 $ .......... 0) .............. " ..................................................................................... "." ............ " ............... " ................... "." .... "."." 
35. Surplus as regards policyholders (Lines 27 to 33, less 34) (Page 4, Line 39) ....................................................................................... p"""' ..."' ... "' ... "' ...."' .. 1"'9"'7 ",94",0",38""4,+" ..",,,.,,,,, .. ,,,,,,.,,,, .. ,,,.,,,,,,.1,,,90,,,8,,,95,,,3,,,8"'-19 
36. TOTALS (Page 2. L1ne'26, Col. 3), .......... : .................................................... " ................................. i."; ........................... ,.,, .................... ; ................ 614.816.970 ................... 612.177.507 
DETAILS OF WRITE-INS 
2301. Credits Due Policyholders ........................................................................ " ................................................................................................................. .4,049,955 ...................... .3,518.024 
2302. 
2303. 
• ................................................................ , ............................................................. , .......................................................... , ........ , •••• : •••• ~.. ......................................... • .......................... 1 ............ . 
239B. Summary of remaining write-Ins for Une 23 from overflow page.......................................................................................................... • ..................................... 0 ...................................... 0 




............................................................................................................................ : .............................................. ; .................................................................................................................... .. 
2798, Summary of remaining write-Ins for Line 27 from overllow page ........ : ...................................................................... " ... " .......... "" ........................................ " .. 0 ...................................... 0 
2799. Totals (Unes 2701 thru 2703·01us 2798) (Line 27 abovel..." ................................................. " ......................................................... " ........... , ......... , ................. 0 .................................... ,,0 
3001, 
3002 ...................................................................................................... " .. " ......................................................................................................................................................................... : ........... .. 
3003 ........................................................................................................................... " ........................... , ................................................. ; ..... : ................................................................................ .. 
3098. Summary of remelnlng write-Ins for Line 30 from overllowpage ................................................................................................................................................ 0 ......... " ........................... 0 
3099. Tolals (Lines aodl thru 3003 Ius 3098\ fUne 30 above\.. ............................................................. , ....... , ........................ : ..... , .......................... "., ...................... 0 .......... , ........ , .................. 0 
3 
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LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Sixtieth Legislature First Regular Session - 2009 
IN THE SENATE 
SENATE BILL NO. 1166, As Amended 
BY STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
1 AN ACT 
2 RELATING TO THE STATE INSURANCE FUND; TO PROVIDE LEGISLATIVE INTENT; 
3 REPEALING SECTION 72-915, IDAHO CODE, RELATING TO DIVIDENDS; 
4 DECLARING AN EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING A RETROACTIVE EFFECTIVE 
5 DATE. 
6 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State ofIdaho: 
7 SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. (1) Historically, the State Insurance Fund has 
8 exercised its discretion, pursuant to Section 72-915, Idaho Code, to determine the annual 
9 amount of dividend, if any, a policyholder would receive. 
10 (2) On March 5, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court filed its opinion in Farber v. Idaho 
11 State Insurance Fund, S. Ct. 35144, in which it interpreted Section 72-915, Idaho Code, and 
12 ruled that the State Insurance Fund cannot exercise its discretion in determining how much of 
13 a dividend to pay to each policyholder because the statute requires a pro rata distribution of 
14 dividends to all policyholders. The result of the decision is to require that the State Insurance 
15 Fund pay dividends on policies that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the fund's 
16 ability to reduce premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders. 
17 (3) In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that, if it has become prudent to alter the 
18 statutory language related to the requirements for distribution of dividends, the Legislature is 
19 the appropriate venue for such change. 
20 (4) It was the intent of the Legislature in passing House Bill No. 774, As Amended of 
21 the Second Regular Session of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislature, effective on April 3, 1998, 
22 that the State Insurance Fund should operate like an efficient insurance company, subject to 
23 regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, including the dividend provisions set forth in Chapter 
24 28, Title 41, Idaho Code. The retroactive repeal of Section 72-915, Idaho Code, to January 
25 1, 2003, will conform with that intent. Section 73-101, Idaho Code, permits such retroactive 
26 repeal as long as it is "expressly so declared" in legislation. 
27 (5) The retroactive repeal of Section 72-915, Idaho Code, will reconcile conflicts in the 
28 existing laws governing the State Insurance Fund and will allow the fund, like other insurance 
29 companies, to issue dividends pursuant to Chapter 28, Title 41, Idaho Code. 
30 (6) It is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this act shall not apply to 
31 any action filed in a state or federal court of law in the state of Idaho on or before December 
32 31, 2008, and the provisions of this act shall not apply to the aforementioned case of Farber 
33 v. Idaho State Insurance Fund as currently pending with respect to those policy holders paying 
34 annual premiums of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500). 
35 SECTION 2. That Section 72-915, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby repealed. 
36 SECTION 3. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby declared to 
37 exist, Section 1 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and after passage and approval, 
38 and Section 2 of this act shall be in full force and effect retroactively to January 1, 2003. 
0001.1.9 
000203 
Donald W. Lojek ISBN 1395 
LOJEK LAw OFFICES, CHTD 
623 West Hays Street 
PO Box 1712 
Boise, 10 83701 
Telephone: 208-343-7733 
Facsimile: 208-345-0050 
Philip Gordon ISBN 1996 
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988 
GORDON LAW OFFICES 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, 10 83702 
Telephone: 208/345-7100 
Facsimile: 208/345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class 
F I LED 
___ A.M. if;.J P.M 
(leT 1 I a010 
CANYON OOUNty OI.,.J;RK 
D.BUTLER,OEPUTV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and 




THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
JAMES M. ALCORN, in his official 
capacity as its Manager, and WILLIAM 
DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, GERALD 
GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE 
MARTIN, MARK SNODGRASS, 
RODNEY A. HIGGINS, TERRY 
GESTRIN AND MAX BLACK AND 
STEVE LANDON in their capacity as 
members of the Board of Directors of the 
State Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV 09-13607-C 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
DEFENDANTS' 14TH AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANTS' 14TH AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE -1 
000204 
COME NOW, the Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned counsel of record, 
and pursuant to Rule 56(a) , I.R.C.P., move for summary judgment on the Defendants' 
Fourteenth Affirmative Defense. 
This Motion is supported by the Acknowledgment of Service from the Office of 
the Idaho Attorney General and a Memorandum in Support of this Motion, both of which 
are being filed contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED this /1"/4 day of October, 2010. 
GORDON LAW OFFICES 
By ~--<-S ,(6~rv ~ 
Philip Gordon 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
By----,dJJ=--=-=---e:L=---_ 
Donald W. Lojek 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANTS' 14TH AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE-2 
000205 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the lfflday of October, 2010, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument was served on the following by the method indicated 
below, and addressed as follows: 
[] Hand Delivery 
[~U.S. Mail, postage paid 
[] Overnight Express Mail 
[] Facsimile Copy: 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely Duke 
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton PA 
702 West Idaho Street, Ste. 700 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for State Insurance Fund 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANTS'14TH AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE - 3 
000206 
Richard E. Hall 
ISB #1253; reh@hallfarley.com 
Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:\3\3-461.9\PLEADINGS\MSJ-Mtn.doc 
Attorneys for Defendants 
_F ____ ' A.k ~M 0 9M. 
OCT 2 6 2010 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN. DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and 




THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, in his 
official capacity as its Manager, and 
WILLIAM DEAL, WA YNE MEYER, 
GERALD GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE, 
ELAINE MARTIN, MARK 
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. HIGGINS, 
TERRY GESTRIN and MAX BLACK and 
STEVE LANDON, in their capacity as 
members of the Board of Directors of the 
State Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 09-13607-C 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW defendants, The Idaho State Insurance Fund, James M. Alcorn in his 
official capacity as its Manager, and William Deal, Wayne Meyer, Gerald Geddes, John Goedde, 
Elaine Martin, Mark Snodgrass, Rodney A. Higgins, Terry Gestrin, Max Black, and Steve 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
000207 
Landon in their capacity as members of the Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund 
(collectively, "SIF"), by and through their counsel of record Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, 
P .A., and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, hereby move this Court for an order 
dismissing plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial with 
prejudice, on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that SIF is entitled 
to summary judgment as a matter of law on all of plaintiffs' claims. 
Specifically, SIF is entitled to summary judgment because the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 
bars Plaintiffs' action as the emergency repeal ofI.C. § 72-915 was signed May 6,2009, and was 
made retroactive to January 1, 2003, thereby barring Plaintiffs' action. Furthermore, contrary to 
Plaintiffs' position, the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is constitutional, both under the U.S. and Idaho 
constitutions. 
This motion is based upon the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of James M. Alcorn in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, which are filed herewith, as well as all pleadings and papers on file in this 
action. 
SIF requests oral argument. 
DATED this zr!day of October, 2010. 
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
000208 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the zCe~ day of October, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Donald W. Lojek 
Lojek Law Offices, Chtd. 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintifft 
Philip Gordon 
Bruce S. Bistline 
Gordon Law Offices 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 




U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 




DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
000209 
10/26/10 16:30 FAX 208 395 8585 HALL FARLEY 
.--,---
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I Richard E. Hall 
ISB #1253; reh@haUfadey.com 
Keely E. Duke F I A.k tJh;~ 9.M. 
ISH #6044; ked@hallfarlcy.colll 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BlANTON, P .A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
/OCl 262010 
Post Office Box 1211 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:IJ\3.0461,9\PLSADlNGS\MSJ-Alf·AIcom.cIoc 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THlRD ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNfY OF CANYON 
CDA DAIRY QUEEN, TNC., and 




'tHE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, in his 
official capacity as its Manager, and 
WILLIAM DEAL) WAYNE MEYER, 
GERALD GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE, 
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members of the Board of Directors of the 
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I, James M. Alcorn, being first duly swom, depose and state: 
1. I am the Manager of the SIF and have been since Apn1199S. 
2. I have had extensive experience with the ~ance industry since 1970 as a licensed 
insurance agent and owner of independent pro~ and casualty insurance agencies and 
currently hold the prof~sional designation of Certified Insurance Counselot'-
3. 1 served as the Director of the Idaho DepartIp.ent of Insurance from May 1994 to January 
i 
1995, and as its Deputy Director from January 1995 to December 1995, and then again served as 
Director of the Department from December 1995 until ApriJ of 1998. 
4. My past experience as a licensed insurance" ag~t and Director of the Idaho Department 
of Insurance has caused me to be familiar with the laws regulating the insurance industry and 
insurance industry practices. 
5. As the Manager of-the State Insurance Fund (SIP), I am familiar with its history and its 
, 
day to day operations and am Tequired by law to conduct the business of the SIF and do all things 
I 
convenient and necessary to manage the SIP so that it is run as an efficient insurance company. 
remains actuarlaUy sound and maintains the public purposes for which it was created. 
i 
I 
6. The SIF was created by the Idaho Legislature in 1917 for the purpose of providing a 
stable source of worker's compensation insurance for Idaho employers and their employees. 
I 
I 
7. Idaho Law generally provides tha.t all i Idaho employers must maintain worker's 
compensa.tiQIl insurance coverage for their employees, other than those specifically exempted by 
I 
I.C. §72-212. 
8. Since the enactment of 41-1601 et seq. in 1~61, Idaho's worker's compensation insurance 
rates have been regulated by the Depflrlment of Insurance which approves worker's 
compensation rates based upon the rate filings of an authorized rating organization (National 
AFFIDAVIT OF SAMES M. ALCORN IN SUPPOR.T OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUl\'J1\IlARY 
JUDGMENT - 2 
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Council on Compensation lnsu!ance !Ika NCCl). Idaho is an administered pricing state whlch 
means that the rating organil!:a.ti.on files the entire rate. Companies may file with the Department 
of Insuranoe for approval to dcviate from the filed rate by individual rate or for all rates. 
Companies may also use schedule credits on specific policies. Companies may not use both a 
deviation and scheduled credits. 
9. SIF is currently deviating by 9% from all filed rates. Therefore, the premiums for all SIF 
policyholders are calculated beginning with a rate' 9% below the rates approved by the 
Department of Insurance. This deviation is applied across the board for all policyholders 
regardless of premium Sl2:e or losses occurring on an insurance policy. 
10. Idaho is a competitive state which means that the SIP is not a monopoly and must 
compete for business against the private worker's compensation insut'ance car.riers. 
11. Jdaho also bas a woIker's compeI1Sation assigned risk pool whlch insures employers who 
cannot otherwise secure workers compeIlSation coverage, but employers insuring through the 
assigned risk pool are subject to rates 50% above the standard rate. 
12. Idaho employers are not required to insure through the SIFt they may insure with fl. 
private carrier Or if they are declined coverage by two private caniers and the SIF then coverage 
can be obtained throu.gh the assigned risk pool which is the carrier oflast resort 
13. The SIF has a public purpose to provide worker's compensation iDsumnce to Idaho 
employers and while it is not the insurer of last resort, the SlF maintains an underwriting policy 
that seeks to insure all employers regardless of size so that most Idaho employers who cOuld not 
otherwise obtain coverage through a private carrier COl:lld obtain coverage with the SIP and avoid 
the extra costs associated with acquiring an insurance policy through the assigned risk pool. 





----- ---- -- -- ,.....-..--_._-
14. At, SIF Manager> I am required to Ill!rinta1n the solvency of the SIF and make de~sions 
regarding the level of surplus and reserves n~ed by ~e Fund,to remain actuarially so~d so 
there continues to be a stable and available source of worker's compensation insurance coverage. 
15. The maintenance of adequate surplus and reserv~ is an important aspect ofmanagiug the 
SIF because unlike all other worker's compensation carriers operating in Idaho the Fund is 
prccluded by statute (I.C. §72-901(4») from being a member of the Idaho Insurance' Guaranty 
Association. 
16. The Idaho :Insurance Guaranty Association guaranties payment of insurance benefits in 
the event that an insurance carrier cannot pay its insurance claims or becomes insolvent 
17. All insurers in the state belong to the Idaho ~urance Guaranty Association e]t.cept the 
SIF which is barred by law. 
18. Since the SIP cannot like other carriers rely on'Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association to 
pay benefits in the event of insolvency, the SIF must be managed such that it maintains sufficient 
surplus and reserves to provide Ii stable ongoing source of worker's compensation insurance to 
protect Idaho workers. 
19. The duty of the Manager and the Board of DirEictors to maintain the financial integrity of 
the SIF is panunO'UIlt because if the SIF were to become inSolvent, the availability of worker's 
compensation insurance in Idaho would be. critically jeopardized since the SIF insures 
approximately 36,000 employers, which is approximately 70% of the market Many of whom, 
especially the smaller employers, cannot get coverag~ from other ins\.U"ers whose underwriting 
policies are not as liberal as the SIF. 





I , i 
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20. to operate and manage the St:F and to decide the appropriate 
level of surplus, reserves and ,H",t1"'nrl", has b~ the duty of its Manager and subject to his or her 
discretionary authority. 
, ' 
21. The SIF surplus is lID of the SIF and dividends, if any, are paid from what the 
Manager determines to be that is safely available·after taking into consideration various 
factors including, but not to, present and future SIP operating expenses, the required 
reserves, projected investment market forces, and industry trends. 
22. are not the same as dividends paid by to stockholders of a 
company. SIF dividends are related to o~nership or the sharing of profits. SIP dividends are 
the return of unused premium. 
23. The detennination as whether to declare a dividend, how much, and who will receive 
one is not a science, but is decision niakmg process that. is based upon experi~ce and 
knowledge of the insurance industiy trends, and market forces. 
24. The declaration of a rl1l'<r't1 .... t'I is a multi-step process ~at starts with deciding how much 
surplus is safely available to declared as 11 dividend, then there is a determination as to how it 
.... ""''''l,UlL the cbst of writing an insUrance policy and considering thc 
losses that lIlay have been inCl~ld on the P9licy, 
25. The SIF, through 
continuously since at least 1 
size of the premium talcing 
SIF has always returned 
, 
I . 
previous m~gers and the C~eht Manager, bas issued diVidends 
I 
using essen,tia11y the sam~ dividend fonnula as is used presently, 
! ~ 
a percentage of paid premi~ ;have always differentiated by the 
I 
I 
account th~ losses incurred on, :the insunmce pollcy such that the 
Wier per~tage of paid pr~um to the large policy holders, as 
. , 
I 
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, , ' 
opposed to the smaller sized poHcyholders,; This: is ~nmsterit with workers compensation 
, : , 
insurance industry practices. :: ;: ; 
" . \ 
! ' • I f" 
26. WoIker's compensation ,coverage is! a unique fo~ ,of; insurance in that it provides 
: l'j .' ; , 
unlimited coverage to its policyholder regardless of the p~Utn; sUie. The SIP provides a $300 
: ,I I Ii·, \ 
I ! I : : 
policyholder with the same amount of UPPct cov~ge ~':a ~590,OOO policyholder, but either 
i :1: ,,: 
policy can have extensive losses well abo~e their, ptemium:'~aunt. Losses in excess of a 
• , • I 
I ':. :1 ; 
million dollars on a claim are not unheard of im~ have b~ ~aid 'by the SIF. 
I ': " , 
: ,I !": 
27. The decision to distnoute dividend~ in a eertaifi ~~on during the policy years in 
I I 
question was made by considering and ~eighing all ~e' ~ors set forth above and was 
; . ': ;'. ~ 
consistent with the law, and industry practice, aIld was done witp. the knowledge of the Board of 
, !I ':.: 
I •• : Directors. ,I , ' : 
! :, ':. t 
i : :' ! ' 
28. If the Court were to find that Idaho <pode Section'72-~r~ has not, or cannot, be repealed 
, , 
:' . 
! : II. 1 
as intended by the Jdaho Legislature, the ~IF' Manager ~oU1d! lack the discretion to declare a 
. . : . :'; :;::;1 
d1Vldend that can be safely and properly divitled with regm;6 to prior paid premiums. 
I , !,' ' , 
,I , "II:': 
29. Attached hereto as Exlnbit A is a tnI~ and correct~.Y 6fthe SIF's internal Underwriting 
t ,:i:, t 
Policy which I executed on October 5, 1998,: and wbich. is :stUl ill effect. 
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true ropy of the foregoing document, by the method ,;1nd.ilcat<~ 
the following: 
Donald W. Lojek 
Lojek Law Offices, Chtd. 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys/or Plaintijft 
Philip Gordon 
Bruce S. Bistline 
Gordon Law Offices 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, 10 83702 
Fax No.: (208) 345~0050 
Attorneys for Plaintijft 
:g.: 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES M. ALCORN IN SUPPORT OF DEJFEJ.lmA~ 
JUDGMENT -8 II Il! d ,I, 
;1 ::11 
.' "II 
I, .11 ""'1 ; :; "I 
I i, ·,'d : d ~ I! 
, OI~O ' 'v 
I caused to be served a 
and addressed to each of 
MonON FOR SUMMARy 
141 009/010 
10/26 / 10 16:32 FAX 208 395 8585 HALL FARLEY ItlI 010 / 010 
.----_ .. 




... --- _e. • 
( 
Richard E. Hall 
ISB #1253; reh@hallfarley.com 
Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com 
F I A.k £'09.M. 
OCT 2 6 2010 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
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THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, in his 
official capacity as its Manager, and 
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
GERALD GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE, 
ELAINE MARTIN, MARK 
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. HIGGINS, 
TERRY GESTRIN and MAX BLACK and 
STEVE LANDON, in their capacity as 
members of the Board of Directors of the 
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JUDGMENT 
I, Bryan A. Nickels, being first duly sworn, depose and state: 
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JUDGMENT-l 
00021.9 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Idaho, and am an attorney 
with the law firm of Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., attorneys for defendants in this 
action, and make this Affidavit on my personal knowledge and belief. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the "Memorandum 
Decision Upon Motions for Summary Judgment," filed December 26, 2007 in the matter entitled 
Randolph E. Farber, et ai. v. The Idaho State Insurance Fund, in the District Court for the Third 
District of Idaho, Canyon County, Case No. CV06-7877 (Judge Morfitt and Judge Ryan, 
presiding)("Farber"). 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the "Amendment to the 
Court's Memorandum Decision upon Motions for Summary Judgment," filed February 15,2008, 
in the Farber litigation. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C are true and correct copies of the legislative history, 
engrossed text, and Statement of PurposelFiscal Note regarding the 2009 repeal of I.C. §72-915 
(SB 1166, as amended), as maintained on the Idaho State Legislature website at 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/legislationl2009/S 1166 .htm. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the "Memorandum 
Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Revised Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment," filed 
November 4,2009, in the Farber litigation. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of the "Supplemental 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew Plaintiffs' Revised Second Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, or In the Alternative, Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment," filed September 21, 2009, in the Farber litigation, as was referenced in the 
"Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Revised Second Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment," which is attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT-2 
000220 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of the "Remittitur" issued 
by the Idaho Supreme Court on May 27, 2009, in the Farber litigation. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
Bryan A. Nic 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this CAln4tl. day of October, 2010 . . 
N~~'O~ 
Residing at Boise, Idaho '" _ ~f _ I ~ 
My Commission Expires:_.;;...~-=-_~_..L---'--"~"--_ 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Z~ day of October, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: ' 
Donald W. Lojek 
Lojek Law Offices, Chtd. 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Philip Gordon 
Bruce S. Bistline 
Gordon Law Offices 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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'This matter came on for hearing upon plaintiffs' second motion for summary judgment and 
upon defendants' motion for summary judgment. Presenting oral argument for the plaintiffs was 
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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1 
Bruce Bistline, attorney at law. Presenting oral argument for the defendants was Richard Hall, 
attorney at law. 
The court has reviewed the written briefs submitted on behalf of the parties, the affidavits 
submitted and considered the oral arguments presented and finds as follows: 
PROCEDURAL lDSTORY 
This is a class action law suit. The class is defined as all Idaho employers who pay annual 
premiums of $2,500 or less to the Idaho State Insurance Fund, hereinafter "SIP", for workers 
compensation coverage. The complaint declares that I.C. §72-915 authorizes the SIP manager to 
readjust the rates of a particular class of employment or industry, in other words, to pay dividends. 
Since 2003, the fund has paid dividends to only those subscribers who pay more than $2,500 of 
annual premiums into the fund. 
Plaintiffs allege that those in their class comprise 80 to 95 % of the subscribers to the SIP. 
The number of policies issued by the SIP is claimed to be 29,789 in 2002 and 32,320 in 2003. So 
the class is very large. 
Count I of the complaint calls for the court to use its power to declare the rights, status, and 
other legal relations of parties pursuant to 1. C. § 10-1201, in other words, to make SIP pay dividends 
to the members of the class by Declaratory Judgment. 
Count II of the complaint asks the court to enjoin the defendants from ever again paying out 
dividends to some but not all of the SIP subscribers. 
Count ill asks the court to award damages to the class in the amount that would have been 
paid to them in dividends in previous years. 
The defendants in the case are SIP itself, its manager, James Alcorn and the board of 
directors (nine in number). 
Both sides have filed Motions for Summary Judgment. 
The plaintiffs filed theirs on January 5, 2007 asking the court to rule that I.C. §72-915 is the 
only authority that exists re: dividends paid by SIP and that it provides no discretion to the SIP 
manager to select particular classes of subscriber to receive dividends. Alternatively, if the manager 
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has the discretion to select classes of subscriber, it does not allow the class to be detennined by the 
amount of premium paid. The court has not yet ruled on this motion. 
The defendants filed theirs on February. 13,2007 asking the court to rule that, as a matter of 
law, I.C. §72-915 does allow the SIP manager the discretion to allocate dividends as he deems 
appropriate. Further, that the court needed to resolve issues of standing and the applicable statute of 
limitations to this case. On the latter issues, the court has ruled that the plaintiffs do have standing 
and that the applicable statute of limitations is three years in this case where the gravaman of the 
plaintiffs' claim is a statutory violation. 
Plaintiffs' second motion for summary judgment asks the court for its judicial determination 
that the words set out in the last several lines of 72-915 clearly and unambiguously express a 
legislative intention that any dividend which the manager decides to distribute must be distributed 
in direct proportion to the amount of premium paid in the dividend period by each policy holder. 
The plaintiffs argue that the Court must use the literal meaning of the words of the statute 
unless it would be contrary to other clearly expressed legislative intent or would lead to an absurd 
result. Plaintiffs initially argue that the words set out in the last lines of 72-915 unambiguously 
express a legislative intent relative to the calculus to be used in allocating a dividend and that the 
calculus requires any dividend which the Manager may decide to distribute, must be distributed in 
direct proportion to the amount of premium paid in the dividend period by each policyholder who 
meets the longevity requirement and falls within the classes of employment sharing in the dividend. 
Plaintiffs argue that the following framework is established by 72-915: 
The second sentence of the statute provides for a readjustment process which involves 
crediting back to qualified subscribers excess funds which involves two phases: 
a) the phase leading to the declaring of a dividend 
Step 1: Manager must determine if there are available funds 
Step 2: Manager must determine if those funds may be safely and properly 
divided 
b) the phase in which distribution of the dividend is accomplished. 
Step 1: Manager must determine if he will proceed with a dividend Statute 
provides that having found funds available for division, the Manager may in 
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his discretion proceed with the distribution. 
Step 2: Manager must determine which policyholders are qualified to share 
in the distribution 
• To be a qualified policyholder, a subscriber must be a member of 
"such class" which refers to any class of employment or industry 
as to which there were excess funds 
• Further, the policyholder must satisfY the longevity requirement 
which requires subscription for 6 months or more prior to the 
time of readjustment 
Step 3: Manager shall "credit to each" qualified policyholder their share. 
The use of the following phrase "as he is properly entitled to, having regard 
to his prior paid premiums" demonstrates an intention for the respective 
share of "each" to be calculated solely with reference to the amount of 
premiums paid. 
Plaintiffs further argue that the term "class of employment" cannot, considering the section 
as a whole, rationally be read to allow differentiation between employers based upon the amount of 
the annual premium paid. If "classes of employment" is instead ambiguous, the legislature intended 
the term to refer to employment groupings for rating and accounting purposes and was not intended 
to refer to the amount of premium paid by the employer. 
The defendants counter with their own summary judgment motion arguing that if the court 
considers the entire statutory framework of the SIF, it will see that the legislature clearly and 
unambiguously provided the SIF and its manager the discretion to determine how declared 
dividends should be distributed. By its motion for summary judgment, the defendants want the 
court to declare this to be true as a matter oflaw. 
Defendants argue that the SIF was set up in 1917 to provide workers compensation 
insurance to Idaho employers who could not otherwise get it from private carriers. In order to 
provide the security necessary to insure that payments are made on all deserving claims, the SIF 
must be managed such that it maintains sufficient surplus and reserve totals to provide a stable and 
ongoing source of workers' compensation insurance to Idaho workers. The duty of insuring the 
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financial integrity of the SIF is left to the board of directors and the fund manager. 
They further argue that the decision to pay a dividend to only those subscribers who pay 
premiums in excess of $2,500 is based upon a marketing strategy. That is, the larger accounts are 
generally more profitable and the dividends to them keeps them in the SIF instead of going to 
private insurers and this allows the SIP to fulfill its public policy objective of providing a source of 
insurance for the smaller, less profitable accounts. The defendants declare that providing larger 
policy holders with a larger dividend is a good business practice and is consistent with insurance 
industry standards as well as the statutory mandate of 72-901(3) to run the SIF as an efficient 
insurance company. 
In the end, the court has before it motions for summary judgment filed by both parties each 
asking the court to interpret the meaning ofIdaho Code §72-915. 
FINDINGS OF LAW 
"Statutory construction is a question of law. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 
1103, 1106 (Ct.App.2003). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the Court 
must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. 
Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 
P.2d 214,219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct.App.2000). The 
language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho 
at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the ~urt 
to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d 
at 67. 
When this Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the 
legislative intent and give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. To 
ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but 
also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. Id It 
is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. Slate 
v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646,22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct.App.2001). Construction ofa statute that leads 
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to an absurd result is disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275,92 P.3d 521,525 (2004); State 
v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004); State v. Burtlow, 144 Idaho 455, 163 P.3d 
244,245 -246 (Ct.App., 2007). 
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. Robison v. 
Bateman-Hall, 139 Idaho 207,210, 76 P.3d 951,954 (2003). Because "the best guide to legislative 
intent is the words of the statute itself," the interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal 
words of the statute. In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 824, 828 P.2d 848, 853 (1992); 
accord Mclean v. Maverick Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810,813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). 
Whe~ the statutory language is unambiguous, the Court does not construe it but simply follows the 
law as written. McLean, 142 Idaho at 813, l35 P.3d at 759. The plain meaning of a statute 
therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning 
leads to absurd results. Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264, 266, 92 P.3d 514, 516 (2004). In 
determining its ordinary meaning "effect must be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so 
that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 
308,309 (2006) (quoting In re Winton Lumber Company, 57 Idaho 131, 136,63 P.2d 664, 666 
(1936». 
If the language of the statute is capable of more than one reasonable construction it is 
ambiguous. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84. 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655,658 
(2006). An ambiguous statute must be construed to mean what the legislature intended it to mean. 
Id To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines not only the literal words of the statute, but 
the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its legislative 
history.Id" State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (20 
It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that statutes should not be construed to 
render other provisions meaningless. 
As stated in Westerberg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401, 757 P.2d 664 (1988): 
[O]ur prior cases have held that statutory or constitutional provisions 
cannot be read in isolation. but must be interpreted in the context of 
the entire document. Wright v. Willer, 111 Idaho 474, 476, 725 P.2d 
179, 181 (1986) ('Statutes must be read to give effect to every word, 
clause and sentence. '); Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688, 
690, 692 P.2d 332, 334 (1984), reh'g denied December 31, 1984 
(' We will not construe a staw,te in a way which makes mere 
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surplusage of the provisions included therein.); •.. Bastian v. City of 
Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 307,310,658 P.2d 978, 981 (Ct.App.1983), 
petition for review denied 1983 ('The particular words of a statute 
should be read in context; and the statute as a whole should be 
construed, if possible, to give meaning to all its parts in light of the 
legislative intent.'). 114 Idaho at 403-04, 757 P.2d at 666-67. 
Emphasis added. 
The Court's primary duty in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislative intent 
and purpose of the statute. Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 605, 990 P.2d 1213, 1216 
(1999); Bannock County v. City of Pocatello, 110 Idaho 292, 294, 715 P.2d 962,964 (1986). The 
legislature's intent is ascertained from the statutory language and the Court may seek edification 
from the statute's legislative history and historical content at enactment. Adamson, 133 Idaho at 
605, 990 P.2d at 1216." Idaho Cardiology Associates, P.A. v. Idaho Physicians Network, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 223, 225,108 P.3d 370, 372 (Idaho, 2005). 
A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction. Jen-Rath Co., Inc. v. Kit Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330, 335, 48 P.3d 659, 664 (2002). " 
Ambiguity is not established merely because differing interpretations are presented to a court; 
otherwise, all statutes subject to litigation would be considered ambiguous." Hamilton, 135 Idaho at 
571, 21 P.3d at 893. ''The interpretation should begin with an examination of the literal words of 
the statute, and this language should be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning." Williamson 
v. City of McCall. 135 Idaho 452, 455, 19 P.3d 766, 769 (2001)." Porter v. Board of Trustees, 
Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671, 674 (Idaho,2004). 
ANALYSIS 
In filing their 2nd motion for swnmary judgment, the plaintiffs are seeking a ruling from the 
court on four narrow issues: 
1. that the words of 72-915 clearly and unambiguously express a legislative intent as 
to the "calculus to be used in allocating a dividend." 
2. that the calculus referred to above requires distribution of dividends in proportion to 
premiums paid by the various policyholders; 
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3. that the tenn "class of employment" as used in 72-915 cannot be used to form a 
class based upon amoWlt of premiums paid; 
4. that if the tenn "classes of employment" is ambiguous, then the legislature intended 
the tenn to refer to employment groupings for rating and accoWlting purposes and 
that classes were differentiated by the "hazards" associated with each employment 
grouping so that "rates of premiums" could be fixed and not by the amoWlt of 
premium paid by the employer. 
I.e. § 72-915 provides: 
DIVIDENDS. At the end of every year, and at such other times as the manager in 
his discretion may determine, a readjustment of the rate shall be made for each of 
the several classes of employments or industries. If at any time there is an aggregate 
balance remaining to the credit of any class of employment or industry which the 
manager deems may be safely and properly divided, he may in his discretion, credit 
to each individual member of such class who shall have been a subscriber to the 
state insurance fimd for a period of six (6) months or more, prior to the time of such 
readjustment, such proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to, having 
regard to his prior paid premiums since the last readjustment of rates. 
In filing their motion for summary judgment, defendants are seeking a ruling from the court 
that their interpretation of the meaning of le. §72-915 is the correct interpretation. Specifically: 
1. le. §72-915 Wlambiguously grants the SIF manager the discretionary authority to 
issue dividends as he deems may be "safely and properly divided", or 
alternatively, 
2. I.e. §72-915 is ambiguous and therefore the court must look to other sources to 
determine legislative intent, such as the other statutes within the act which'declare 
that the paramoWlt goal of managing the SIF is achieving and maintaining a 
solvent insurer for the various policy holders. 
The court detennines that plaintiffs' first two issues are intertwined with the whole of 
defendants' motion for summary judgment and will therefore discuss them together. 
Plaintiffs emphasize the language "credit to each individual member of the class" supports 
their argument that the manager, if he declares a dividend, must pay everyone in the class 
something. Further, that from 1917 Wltil 2003, this was interpreted to mean a pro rata distribution 
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to all policyholders. 
Defendants emphasize that whether the statute is determined to be clear or ambiguous, the 
manager has the discretionary authority to exclude the low premium policyholders from the 
dividend distribution. 
The court has considered the analysis of both parties arguing that I.C. §72-915 is clear and 
unambiguous. However, the court cannot make that finding. There are too many different 
interpretations of that statute which can be reasonably made which renders it ambiguous. 
For instance, the language ofI.C. §72-915 states that if the SIF manager deems a dividend 
may be safely made. "he may in his discretion, credit to each individual member . . . such 
proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to, having regard to his prior paid premiums" . 
This could be interpreted to mean what the plaintiffs claim that it means. That is, that if a 
dividend is declared by the fund manager, every subscriber must receive a share of the total amount 
of dividend in direct proportion to the amount of premium that subscriber paid as a percentage of 
the total premiums paid by all subscribers. 
It can also be interpreted to mean that the manager could distribute the dividend as he has 
done in this case because he has decided that giving regard to prior premiums paid, it is the larger 
premium paying subscribers who are properly entitled to receive the dividend. 
A third interpretation could be that every subscriber must receive a portion of the dividend, 
but it does not have to be in direct proportion to the amount of premium the subscriber paid relative 
to the whole. Giving regard to the amount of premiums paid allows for the manager to give the 
subscribers who paid a smaller premium less of a percentage than the larger subscribers. 
All of these interpretations seem reasonable to the court. If the language of the statute is 
capable of more than one reasonable construction it is ambiguous. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille 
Sch Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 804,807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006). It is the opinion of this court that 
the statute is ambiguous. 
Therefore, we turn to the interpretation of I.C. §72-915 which may include analysis of: 
a) the text of the statute itself, or its four comers; and, 
b) the dictionary; 
c) legislative history; 
d) public policy; 
e) reasonableness of proposed construction; 
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f) other statutes within the Act, as well as other relevant statutes 
contained outside the Act; 
g) decisions of sister courts which have resolved the same or 
similar issues; 
h) other relevant extrinsic evidence leading interpretative assistance 
submitted through affidavits, testimony, etc. 
An ambiguous statute must be construed to mean what the legislature intended it to mean. 
To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines not only the literal words of the statute, but the 
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and the legislative 
history. Carrier, supra; State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 163 P.3d 1183 (2007). 
The overriding theme of the Act which creates the State Insurance Fund is the maintenance 
of the Fund's solvency so as to avoid liability on the part of the state and the creation of "an 
independent body corporate politic ... for the purpose of insuring employers against liability for 
compensation under this worker's compensation law. .. I.C. §72-901. 
The powers and duties of the state insurance manager are based upon conducting the 
business of the state insurance fund "and do any and all things which are necessary and convenient 
in the administration thereof: I.C. §72-902. Said manager is appointed by the members of the 
board of directors who have the duty ''to direct the policies and operation of the state insurance fund 
to assure that the state insurance fund is run as an efficient insurance company. remains 
actuarially sound and maintains the public purposes for which the state insurance fund was 
created." I.C. §72-901(3), emphasis added. 
The manager, James Alcorn, in his affidavit, explains his rationale for declaring and issuing 
dividends only to subscribers who have paid an annual premium in excess of $2,500. Essentially, 
he claims that a primary need of the Fund in maintaining solvency is to be able to compete with 
other insurance carriers to retain large employers/subscribers. Accordingly, he, with the approval of 
the members of the board of directors, decided to issue dividends to those larger subscribers only to 
provide them greater incentive to stay with the SIF. 
The plaintiffs argue that there is no basis to conclude that any of the infonnation discussed 
by the manager is his affidavit was known to or within the contemplation of the legislature at the 
time that it acted in 1917. The facts presented to the court in support of plaintiffs' argument are 
contained in the affidavit of George Bambauer. Therein, he declares that when he was employed 
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with the SIP, the amount of dividend distribution was based upon a formula which took into 
account the amount of premiums paid by a policyholder but did not include a minimum premium 
cut off. Nothing in his affidavit addresses the claims of the manager that the decision confonns to 
industry practice and is based upon running the SIP as an efficient insurance business. . The 
defendants' position is not only supported by the affidavit of the SIF manager but also the affidavit 
of their insurance expert, Michael Camilleri. 
It seems to this court that the plaintiffs' argument is based upon the principle that as 
subscribers, they have an interest in the dividend distribution and are entitled to a pro rata share of 
the distribution. Our supreme court has stated that the SIP cannot be analogized to a trust creating 
property rights in policyholders. Rather, the SIF has no fiduciary duties to its policyholders. 
Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. V. Alcorn, et ai, 141 Idaho 388, 401-402, 111 P .3d 73 (2005). 
Other states have adopted dividend distribution practices similar to the method that 
plaintiffs complain about in this case. See Mont. Code Ann. §39-71-2323 (2005) in conjunction 
with Mont. Admin. Rule 2.55.502 (2006) and N.D. Cent. Code § 65-04-19.3 (2005) in conjunction 
with N.D. Admin. Code §92-01-02-55 (2005). That is, the states of Montana and North Dakota 
specifically provide for the exclusion of policyholders who pay smaller premiums from receiving 
dividend distributions. 
Plaintiffs seek a further determination that the term "class of employment" as used in 12-
915 cannot be used to form a class based upon amount of premiums paid and that if "classes of 
employment" is ambiguous, then the legislature intended the term to refer to employment groupings 
for rating and accounting purposes and that classes were differentiated by the "hazards" associated 
with each employment so that "rates of premiums" could be fixed and not by the amount of 
premium paid by the employer. 
The use of the term "class of employment" in 12-915 by its phrasing "any class of 
employment or industry" is ambiguous. By the use of "or", this Court is not convinced that 
plaintiffs' proposed interpretation that it refers to grouping classes based solely on type of industry 
is the only reasonable interpretation. That phrase could reasonably be interpreted to mean that the 
classes could be determined by industry, by size of employer, by premium amounts paid by 
employer, etc. As the term is ambiguous, this Court is free to examine not only the literal words of 
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the statute, but the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and 
the legislative history. 
Therefore, it is this court's conclusion that, as a matter oflaw, the language ofl.C. §72-915, 
in context with the directives of other statutes set forth in the Act, the laws of our sister states and 
the decisions of our supreme court, allows the fund manager, with approval of the board of 
directors, to distribute the dividends in the manner they have adopted since 2003. 
The defendants' counsel is directed to prepare an order of summary judgment consistent 
with this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this 2" 1ay of J)eUf41Jer , 2007. 
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The Court, upon reviewing the proposed order for summary judgment submitted by the 
defendants and the arguments of the parties relating to that proposed order and the plaintiffs' 
AMENDMENT TO TIlE COURT'S 1 
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request for a Rule 54(b) certificate, has reconsidered the language set forth in that decision and 
finds that the final two paragraphs need to be amended in order to more clearly conform to the 
Court's opinion. The language of those paragraphs in the Memorandum Decision of December 26, 
2007 is as follows: 
Therefore, it is this court's conclusion that, as a matter of 
law, the language of IC. §72-915, in context with the directives of 
other statutes set forth in the Act, the laws of our sister states and the 
decisions of our supreme court, allows the fund manager, with 
approval of the board of directors, to distribute the dividends in the 
manner they have adopted since 2003. 
The defendants' counsel is directed to prepare an order of 
summary judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision. 
That language is amended to read that it is this Court's conclusion that, as a matter oflaw, 
the language ofI.C. §72-915, in context with the directives of other statutes set forth in the Act, the 
laws of our sister states, and the decisions of our Supreme Court, allows the fund manager, with the 
approval of the board of directors, to use his discretion to distribute dividends to policyholders in a 
manner that is consistent with the legislative purpose and directives set forth in Article 72, Chapter 
9, Idaho Code, which establishes the State Insurance Fund. SpecificaIly, to assure that the State 
Insurance Fund is run as an efficient insurance company, remains actuarially sound, and maintains 
the public purposes for which the Fund was created 
The Court will prepare an Order upon motions for summary judgment which conforms to 
the Memorandum Decision and this amendment 
Dated this 11'.#l day of February, 2008. 
AMENDMENT TO THE COURT'S 
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LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Sixtieth Legislature First Regular Session - 2009 
IN THE SENATE 
SENATE BILL NO. 1166, As Amended 
BY STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
1 AN ACT 
2 RELATING TO THE STATE INSURANCE FUND; TO PROVIDE LEGISLATIVE INTENT; 
3 REPEALING SECTION 72-915, IDAHO CODE, RELATING TO DIVIDENDS; 
4 DECLARING AN EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING A RETROACTIVE EFFECTIVE 
5 DATE. 
6 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
7 SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. (1) Historically, the State Insurance Fund has 
8 exercised its discretion, pursuant to Section 72-915, Idaho Code, to determine the annual 
9 amount of dividend, if any, a policyholder would receive. 
10 (2) On March 5, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court filed its opinion in Farber v. Idaho 
11 State Insurance Fund, S. Ct. 35144, in which it interpreted Section 72-915, Idaho Code, and 
12 ruled that the State Insurance Fund cannot exercise its discretion in determining how much of 
13 a dividend to pay to each policyholder because the statute requires a pro rata distribution of 
14 dividends to all policyholders. The result of the decision is to require that the State Insurance 
15 Fund pay dividends on policies that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the fund's 
16 ability to reduce premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders. 
17 (3) In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that, if it has become prudent to alter the 
18 statutory language related to the requirements for distribution of dividends, the Legislature is 
19 the appropriate venue for such change. 
20 (4) It was the intent of the Legislature in passing House Bill No. 774, As Amended of 
21 the Second Regular Session of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislature, effective on April 3, 1998, 
22 that the State Insurance Fund should operate like an efficient insurance company, subject to 
23 regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, including the dividend provisions set forth in Chapter 
24 28, Title 41, Idaho Code. The retroactive repeal of Section 72-915, Idaho Code, to January 
25 1, 2003, will conform with that intent. Section 73-101, Idaho Code, permits such retroactive 
26 repeal as long as it is "expressly so declared" in legislation. 
27 (5) The retroactive repeal of Section 72-915, Idaho Code, will reconcile conflicts in the 
28 existing laws governing the State Insurance Fund and will allow the fund, like other insurance 
29 companies, to issue dividends pursuant to Chapter 28, Title 41, Idaho Code. 
30 (6) It is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this act shall not apply to 
31 any action filed in a state or federal court of law in the state of Idaho on or before December 
32 31, 2008, and the provisions of this act shall not apply to the aforementioned case of Farber 
33 v. Idaho State Insurance Fund as currently pending with respect to those policy holders paying 
34 annual premiums of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500). 
35 SECTION 2. That Section 72-915, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby repealed. 
36 SECTION 3. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby declared to 
37 exist, Section 1 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and after passage and approval, 
38 and Section 2 of this act shall be in full force and effect retroactively to January 1,2003. 
000244 
REVISED REVISED REVISED REVISED REVISED REVISED 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS18877Cl 
Repeal ofIdaho Code Section 72-915 will serve to offset an adverse decision ofthe Idaho Supreme 
Court regarding the interpretation of Idaho Code Section 72-915 which could subject the State 
Insurance Fund to pay dividends on policies that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting 
the Fund's ability to reduce premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders. The proposed 
repeal of Idaho Code 72-915 will clarify the law regarding the payment of dividends by the State 
Insurance Fund by making it clear that in passing House Bill 774aa in 1998, it was the intent of 
the legislature to have the State Insurance Fund operate like an efficient insurance company subject 
to regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, including the dividend provision set forth in Title 41, 
Chapter 28, Idaho Code. Repeal of the law effective April 3, 1998 is necessary because on that 
date laws were enacted which subjected the State Insurance Fund to regulation under the Insurance 
Code, Title 41 of the Idaho Code. This legislation will allow the State Insurance Fund to issue 
dividends in the same manner as other insurance companies operating within the State ofIdaho. 
FISCAL NOTE 
The State of Idaho and public entities, which are insured by the State Insurance Fund, face losing 
all or part of their future dividends and deviations as a result of uncertainties as to the effect of 
a recent Supreme Court decision. Based on dividends and rate reduction deviations provided by 
the State Insurance Fund over the past two years, that number could exceed $5,000,000 annually. 
Private businesses may also, due to the same uncertainties, experience the loss of future dividends 
and deviations since, according to the Court's decision, the Fund has no option when distributing 
dividends, other than to use a pro rata formula. 
Contact: 
Name: Senator John W. Goedde 
Office: 
Phone: (208) 332-1322 
Statement of Purpose I Fiscal Note 
REVISED REVISED REVISED 
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On July 16, 2009, the plaintiffs f1led a renewed request to the Court asking that partial 
summary judgment be entered upon their revised second motion. Specifically, they seek a 
holding as a matter of law that: 
1. I.C. §72-915 clearly and unambiguously expresses a legislative 
intent relative to the calculus to be employed for allocation of 
any amount which the manager, in his discretion, determines 
should be distributed as dividend; 
2. That the legislature intended by the language that it used in I.C, 
§72-915 to provide that, after excluding policyholders who do 
not meet the longevity requirement and who are not within the 
classes of employment sharing in the dividend, any dividend 
which was declared must be distributed among all remaining 
policyholders in direct proportion to the amount of premi1..lIn 
each paid in the dividend period. 
In its opinion filed May S, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court did specifically find that 
"section 72-915 sets forth a specific method for determining how the manager is to distribute 
dividends." Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307,208 P,3d 289, 295 (2009). 
Further, the opinion set forth that "the Legislature viewed section 72-915 as requiring a 
pro rata distribution of dividends." Farber, 208 P.3d at 294. That is "[T]he statute contemplates 
,dividing the aggregate balance proportionately according to the policyholder's prior paid 
premiums relative to aU paid premiums." Id. Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "[f]he 
inclusion of the words 'proportion' of the balance, and 'having regard to' the policyholder's 
'prior paid premiums' can only mean that the distribution of dividends must be done on a pro 
rata basis." Farber, 208 P.3d at 293. 
The plaintiffs argue that the Idaho Supreme Court established that once the manager 
declared a dividend1 the distribution of the dividend to polioyholders shall be in direct proportion 
to the amount of premium each paid in the dividend period. 
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The defendants argue that once each policyholder's account is given credit for it's pro 
rata share of the declared dividend. then the SIF should be able to evaluate each account to 
detennine what amount each policyholder is properly entitled to by taking into account the losses 
and expenses. 
This Court disagrees with SIF's intelpretation that it has the ability to go beyond a simple 
pro rata distribution of the dividend based upon premiums paid. In so fmding. this Court refers 
to the language of the Idaho Supreme Court which stated that "[T]he Manager's discretion is 
therefore limited to the decision of whether or nQt to distribute a. dividend in the first place." 
Farber, 208 P.3d at 294. Also, the language that the "statute contemplates dividing the 
aggregate balance proportionately according to the policyholder's prior paid premiums relative 
to all paid premiums." Id. 
Thus, the proper method of calculation is as set forth in subsection "B" entitled "The 
Applicable Fonnula Governing the Pro Rata. Dividend" contained in pages 4 through 9 of the 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposjtion to Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew Plaintiffs' Revised 
Second Motion for PBl1ial Summary Judgment, or In the Alternative, Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
DATED this tf~ day of November, 2009. 
MEMORANDUM DBCISION UPON PLAINTIFFS' 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN 




THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE 
FUND. JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, 
and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, 
GERALD GEDDES, MILFORD 
TERRELL, JUDI DANIELSON. JOHN 
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN, and MARK 
SNODGRASS in their capacity as member 
of the Board of Directors ,of the State 
Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 
Case ~o. CV06-7877 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO RENEW PLAINTIFFS' 
REVISED SECOND MOTIO~FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW the defendants, Idaho State Insurance Fund, James M. Alcorn, Manager of 
the,State Insurance Fund, and the Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund ("SIF"), by and 
,SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RENEW 
PLAINTIFFS' REVISED SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 1 . 
000252' 
through their counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and, as per the Court's 
request as stated at oral argument on August 20,2009, respectfully submit the following. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Following the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in this matter, the Plaintiffs filed a request to 
renew their Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, specifically seeking a ruling that 
"pursuant to the terms of I.C. §72-915, after excluding policyholders who do not meet the 
longevity requirements and who are not within the classes of employment sharing in the 
dividend, any dividend which was declared must be distributed among all remaining 
. policyholders in direct proportion to the amount of premium each paid in the dividend period." 
The SIP opposed such motion, contending that Plaintiffs' Motion was not a proper summary 
judgment motion, sought an advisory ruling of the Court, and otherwise failed to provide a 
precise equation to calculate such dividends. 
A hearing was held on August 20, 2009, and, at the hearing, the Court requested 
additional briefing on the subject of the appropriate measure of damages, in light of the Idaho 
Supreme Court's decision on appeal. The following is the additional briefing requested by the 
Court. 
As discussed herein, and at the August 20, 2009 hearing, SIF asserts that the Supreme 
Co~' s decision in the appeal did not rule out taking into consideration the losses on a policy or 
expense factor when distributing a dividend. However, if this Court does not agree with SIF's 
position that losses and expenses should be considered when distributing a dividend, then the 
Court must use the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of Idaho Code §72-915 to determine 
the formula that is to be used in the determination of the Plaintiffs' share of the previously 
declared dividends. The formula can be simply stated as follows: 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RENEW 
PLAINTIFFS' REVISED SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
······000253· 
(Total Annual Declared Dividend I All Paid Premiums for the Year) X Individual Policyholder Premium 
ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS 
A. The Idaho Supreme Court Did Not Rule Out the Consideration of Losses and the 
Expense Factor When Distributing Dividends. 
As has previously been explained by defendants, SIP dividends, if any, are distributed 
based upon what the Manager determines to be available surplus that can be safely and properly 
distributed to policyholders that are "properly entitled to," after the Manager evaluates a myriad 
of factors, including, but not limited to, present and future SIP operating expenses, the required 
reserves, investment income, market forces, and industry trends. l The declaration of a dividend 
is a multi-step process that starts with deciding how much surplus is safely available to be 
declared as a dividend, followed by the determination as to how it is to be properly divided, 
taking into account such factors as the costs associated with writing the insurance contract, and 
any losses that may have been incurred on the insurance contract.2 The SIP asserts such is the 
case given the language of Idaho Code Section 72-915 which provides that once the Manager has 
declared the annual dividend, he must then "credit to each individual member . . . such 
proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to, have regard to his prior paid premiums .. 
.. " As such, based on the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in this case, the SIF is to credit to 
each policyholders' account their pro rata share of the declared dividend. Once that occurs, and 
it is the SIF's position that is as far as the Supreme CoUrt's decision goes, each account is 
evaluated to determine what amount each policyholder is properly entitled to by taking into 
account the losses and expenses. 
) See Affidavit of James M. Alcorn ("Alcorn Afl"), orlginiilly filed with this Court on February 13,2007, 1[ 21. 
2 See Alcorn Aff., 1[ 24. 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINT1FFS' MOTION TO RENEW 
PLAINTIFFS' REVISED SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANTS' MOTIQN FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 . 
000254' 
Although SIF maintains that consideration of the losses and expense factor bears on the 
determination of which policyholders are entitled to a dividend, this Court has indicated it feels 
the Idaho Supreme Court does not permit losses and expenses to be considered. As such, 
assuming arguendo that losses and expenses are not to be considered in the distribution of a 
dividend after the dividend amount has been declared, then the Court must use the Idaho 
Supreme Court's interpretation of Idaho Code §72-915 to determine the fonnula that is to be 
used in the determination of the Plaintiffs' share of the declared dividend. The following is how 
Idaho Code §72-915 and the Idaho Supreme Court provide the Plaintiffs' share of the declared 
dividends should be determined: 
(Total Annual Declared Dividend / All Paid Premiums for the Year) X Individual Policyholder Premium 
B. The Applicable Formula Governing the Pro Rata Dividend. 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court has acknowledged on many occasions that the manager 
has the discretion to determine how much of a dividend will be declared each 
year. 
As outlined in Idaho Code Section 72-915, the SIP Manager is afforded discretion in the 
detennination of the dividend when there is an "aggregate balance" which may be safely and 
properly divided: 
At the end of every year, and at such other times as the manager in his discretion 
. may determine, a readjustment of the rate shall be made for each of the several 
classes of employments or industries. If at any time there is an aggregate 
balance remaining to the credit of any class of employment or industry which 
the manager deems may be safely and properly divided, he may in his discretion, 
credit to each individual member of such class who shall have been a subscriber 
to the state insurance fund for a period of six (6) months or more, prior to the time 
of such readjustment, such proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to, 
having regard to his prior paid premiums since the last readjustment of rates. 
Idaho Code §72-915 (emphases added). Dividends, if any, are paid from what the Manager 
determined could be safely and properly divided after taking into consideration a multitude of 
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factors, including present and future SIF operating expenses, the required reserves, investment 
income, market forces, industry trends, and other additional factors which are relevant? Indeed, 
the Idaho Supreme Court has embraced the discretion of the Manager as it pertains to dividends, 
as explained in its recent decision: "the plain language of I.C. §72-915 demonstrates that the 
statute grants the Manager discretion to distribute a dividend where 'there is an aggregate 
balance remaining to the credit of any class of employment or industry,' and the Manager deems 
. that the aggregate balance 'may be safely and properly divided. '" Farber v. The Idaho State 
Insurance Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 208 P.3d 289, 294 (2009); accord, Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. 
v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 392, I II P.3d 73, 77 (2005) ("since 1919 the Manager has had the 
authority to set surplus and reserves without outside approval and to declare dividends in his 
discretion. ")( emphasis added). 4 
2. Once the dividend is declared by the Manager, the Idaho SUPreme Court ruled in 
this case that it must be divided pro rata to every policyholder.s 
On the appeal of this matter, the Idaho Supreme Court indicated that "[t]he inclusion of 
the words 'proportion' of the balance, and 'having regard to' the policyholder's 'prior paid 
premiums' can only mean that the distribution of dividends must be done on a pro rata basis." 
Farber, 208 P.3d at 293. In further elaborating on this, the Court went on to state that: "[t]he 
statute contemplates dividing the aggregate balance proportionately according to the 
policyholder's prior paid premiums relative to all paid premiums." ld at 294 (underlined 
3 See Alcorn Aft'., 1121; see also Affidavit of Michael Camilleri ("Camilleri Aff."), 11 13, originally filed with this 
Court on Febnwy 13, 2007. 
4 Although the Legislature amended the SIF statutes most recently in 1998 to, among other things, create a Board of 
Directors to appoint a manager oCthe SIF, in general, the Legislature left the Manager's power and discretion intact, 
including the authority to set reserve and surplus levels and to declare dividends. Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. 
Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 392, III P.3d 73, 77 (2005). 
S Again, the SIF still strongly believes losses and expenses should be considered but assuming arguendo that this 
court detennines they are not, then the following is a discussion of the formula that must be used . 
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emphasis added). In describing the dividend contemplated under Idaho Code §72-915, the Court 
acknowledged that "[t]his dividend is different from the dividend issued to stockholders of a 
corporation and is instead a refund based upon a rate readjustment." Id at 291. 
As such, a policyholder ("PH") dividend is computed as follows: 
(Total Annual Declared Dividend / All Paid Premiums for the Year) X Individual 
Policyholder Premium 
Accordingly, given such formula, the individual policyholder's dividend is 
comprised of two components - first, determination of the universally-applicable 
Readjustment Rate (Total Annual Declared Dividend/All Paid Premiums for the Year), 
which applies to all eligible policyholders (i.e., those that have held policies for more 
than 6 months); and second, determination of dividend amounts unique to the individual 
policyholder (i.e., application of the Readjustment Rate to paid premiums) that may be 
declared by SIF. 
Based on this formula, the Court can determine, as a matter oflaw, the Plaintiffs' share of 
the declared dividends for the dividend periods at issue in this matter. The following is the 
correct application of the above formula to make such determination. 
a The total annual dividend declared by SIF (the Readjustment Rate 
numerator) 
As established in SIF's responses to discovery requests, SIF declared dividends for each 
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Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew 
Plaintiffs' Revised Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Counsel Aff."), Exh. A, pp. 
5:-11, originally filed on August 6, 2009. 
b. All paid premiums to SIP for the year (the Readjustment Rate 
denominator) 
As established in SIF's responses to discovery requests, SIF received the following total 








Counsel Aff., Exh. A, pp. 5-11. 







c. The Readjustment Rate. per year (Total Declared Annual Dividendi All 
Paid Premiums for the Year). 
Accordingly, based on the above figures, the Readjustment Rate for each oftbe identified 
.. dividend periods is as follows: 
Dividend Period Formula Readjustment Rate 
7/1101-6/30/02 $5,037,2161 $128,529,174 ::;: 3.9191% 
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Thus, by way of example, utilizing this Readjus1ment Rate for the 7/1/01-6/30/02 dividend 
period for a hypothetical policyholder paying $1,000 in premiums, the dividend would be 
$39.19. 
d. Based on the formula established by the Idaho Supreme Court. Plaintiffs' 
share of the declared dividends for the applicable dividend periods is 
$5,392.539. 
Based on information provided to Plaintiffs by way of discovery regarding the premium 
totals paid by policyholders with policies of less than $2,500,6 Plaintiffs' share of the declared 
dividends total for the dividend periods at issue is as follows: 
Dividend Period <$2,500 Premiums Readj. Rate Total Class Dividend 
7/1101-6/30/02 $14,991,392 X 3.9191% = $587,528 
7/1/02-6/30/03 $15,906,348 X 3.9653% = $630,734 
7/1103-6/30/04 $17,296;019 X 4.4533% :;::; $770,244 
7/1/04-6/30/05 $17,371,735 X 7.3052% = $1,269,040 
7/1/05-6/30/06 $17,926,383 X 9.0304% = $1,146,9527 
6 The figures identified in this section are derived from totals identified in the spreadsheets provided to Plaintiffs and 
identified in SIF's recent discovery responses. Counsel Aff., Exh. A (fIled 8/6/09). In total, these spreadsheets are 
3,060 pages long; at the Court's request, SIP will provide a copy of such spreadsheets, either in hard copy or as 
.pdfs, as the Court may prefer. In addition, attached hereto as Exhibit A to Counsel's Affidavit in Support of 
Suwlemental Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion To Renew Plaintiffs' Revised Second Motion For 
Partial Summary Judgment, Or In The Alternative, Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment is a spreadsheet 
summarizing the calculations contained herein. 
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7/1106-6/30/07 $18,481,641 X 6.4759% = $988,041 8 
Total: $5,392,539 
Accordingly, assuming this Court does not permit the application of losses and expenses to the 
distribution of dividends, Plaintiffs' share of the declared dividends is $5,392,539. 
C. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled To Prejudgment Interest. 
It is anticipated that Plaintiffs will make a request for prejudgment interest. However, 
any such argument necessarily fails, as Plaintiffs are not entitled to make a claim for 
prejudgment interest on dividend amounts, as such dividends are not within a category for which 
prejudgment interest is allowed under Idaho law: 
When there is no express contract in writing fixing a different rate of interest, 
interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12¢) on the hundred by the year on: 
1. Money due by express contract. 
2. Money after the same becomes due. 
3. Money lent. 
4. Money received to the use of another and retained beyond a reasonable time 
without the owner's consent, express or implied. 
5. Money due on the settlement of mutual accounts from the date the balance is 
ascertained. 
6. Money due upon open accounts after three (3) months from the date of the last 
item. 
Idaho Code §28-22-104(1). In the present case, the amounts at issue - a readjustment of rates in 
the fonn of dividends - do not fall into any of these categories. As stated previously, the 
7 Dividends were also paid in this year for policies between $1,500 and $2,500. The dividends paid to those policies 
totaled $471,872, which amount bas been deducted from the Total Dividend figure. 
8 Dividends were also paid in this year for policies between $1,500 and $2,500. The dividends paid to those policies 
t.otaled $208,812, which amount has been deducted from the Total Dividend figure. 
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contract of insurance does not provide for the payment of a dividend to the policyholders.9 The 
governing statutes for the SIP do not guarantee payments of dividends to policyholders, nor do 
they set forth that the policyholders have a property interest in the surplus or assets of the SIP. 
See generally Idaho Code §72-901 et seq. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has previously 
concluded that the SIP's statutory framework does not create any property rights in the SIP's 
policyholders. Kelso & Irwin. P.A. v. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 135,997 P.2d 591, 
597 (2000). A SIP policyholder has no vested right in the surplus and assets of the SIP; rather, 
the assets and surplus belong to the SIP in order to meet its statutory purpose provided in Idaho 
Code §72-90 1 (l). ld. Thus, in light of the discretionary nature of the dividend, the dividend 
does not fall into any of the enumerated categories under Idaho Code §28-22-104, and, as such, 
no prejudgment interest can be awarded. See, e.g., Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 712,201 
P.3d 1282, 1289 (2009)(rejecting claim for prejudgment interest on monies placed in revocable 
trust, as the amounts did not '''constitute money due by express contract, or money after the same 
becomes due, or money lent, or money due on the settlement of mutual accounts from the date 
the balance is ascertained, or money due upon open accounts after three months from the date of 
the last item ... Nor did the [Taylors] retain the money without the express or implied consent of 
the [Mailes]. "') 
Moreover, prejudgment interest is not automatic, and "[i]n the area of prejudgment 
interest, equitable principles are emphasized." Chenery v. Am-Lines Com., 115 Idaho 281, 289, 
766 P.2d 751, 759 (1988). Most notably, the decision to award prejudgment interest is a 
discretionary determination by the district court. In light of the Idaho Supreme Court's need to 
9 See Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek filed on Janual)' 6, 2007, Ex. 1 (State Insurance Fund Workers Compensation 
and Employers Liability Insurance Policy). See also Farber, supra and Hayden Lake, supra. 
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resolve a question of first impression, and the pending declaration of additional dividends over 
and above what the Manager had already determined may be "safely and properli' divided, 
prejudgment interest in addition to those additional declared dividends would potentially 
adversely impact the Fund. The SIF should not be additionally penalized with prejudgment 
interest for distributing dividends inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of 
Idaho Code § 72-915. This is especially true given that in response to the Supreme Court's ruling 
on Idaho Code §72-915, the Idaho Legislature immediately went forward and repealed that 
section of law. As such, an award of prejudgment interest is not appropriate and the SIP requests 
a ruling from this Court that prejUdgment interest will not be applied in this case. 
In any event, "prejudgment interest is allowed only where the damages are liquidated or 
readily ascertainable by mathematical process." Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 274, 276, 178 P.3d 
639, 641 (Ct. App. 2007). "This limitation is based upon 'equitable considerations,' which 
presumably include the notion that a person who could not determine the amount owed should 
not be charged interest on the sum that is ultimately found to be due." Id. (internal citation 
omitted). As explained by the Idaho Court of Appeals: 
A claim is liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, makes it 
possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance upon opinion or 
Ws4:retion. Examples are claims upon promises to pay a fixed sum, claims for 
money had and received, claims for money paid out, and claims for goods or 
services to be paid for at an agreed rate. 
Id at 277 (quoting Seubert Excavators. Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 744, 874 P.2d 561 (Ct. 
App. 1993))(emphasis added). In the present matter, the amount of dividends that might be 
declared in favor of the policyholder class at issue was not a liquidated sum capable of being 
determined prior to the Supreme Court's opinion, given both that the detennination of the 
dividend is discretionary in nature, and that the formula applicable to the policyholder class at 
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issue was not established until the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in Farber - a point further borne 
out by the fact that the parties continue to provide argument to this Court regarding the precise 
formula to use in determining what dividends might. be due to the policyholders in the class at 
issue. As such, Plaintiffs cannot characterize any declared dividend for policyholders with 
policies of less than $2,500 in premiums as "liquidated" sums, as the applicable dividend 
amounts have not been ''readily ascertainable by mathematical process." 
For these reasons, this Court should deny any request by Plaintiffs for prejudgment 
interest. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, and for the reasons stated in SIF's previously filed Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew Plaintiffs' Revised Second Motion for Partial 
summary Judgment and oral argument thereon, Plaintiffs'· Motion should be denied. Plaintiffs' 
requested formula for the declaration of dividends in favor of the Plaintiffs fails to properly 
consider the actual process by which the Manager determines the appropriate dividend, which 
includes consideration of losses and expenses. 
However, even if this Court is not inclined to permit consideration oflosses and expenses 
in SIF's determination of the dividends at issue in this matter, then the formula defined by the 
Idaho Supreme Court when it applied Idaho Code Section 72"915 must be used: 
(Total Annual Declared Dividend I All Paid Premiums for the Year) X Individual Policyholder Premium 
Based upon that formula, Plaintiff s' share of the declared dividends for the dividend periods at 
issue is $5,392,539. In conjunction therewith, the Court should reject any request by Plaintiffs 
for prejudgment interest. 
Oral argument is requested. 
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) 
RESPECTUFLL Y SUBMITTED this li day of September, 2009. 
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
By ~~~~~~ 
Richard E:11:a1I- Of the 11ln 'l~ 
. Keely E. Duke - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of September, 2009, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Donald W. Lojek 
Lojek Law Offices, CHID 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Philip Gordon 
Bruce S. Bistline 
Gordon Law Offices 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
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Supreme Court Docket No. 35144-2008 
Canyon County District Court #06-7877 
) 
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, ) 
lAMES M. ALCORN, its manager, and ) 
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER ) 
MARGUERITE MC LAUGHLIN, GERALD ) 
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI ) 
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE ) 
MARTIN, and MARK. SNODGRASS in their ) 
capacity as members of the Board of ) 




TO: THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CANYON. 
The Court having announced its Opinion in this cause March 5, 2009, which was 
withdrawn May S, 2009, ~d having announced its Substitute Opinion May 5, 2009, and having 
denied Respondent's P~tion for Rehearing on May 12.2009; therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District Court shall forthwith comply with the 
directive of the Substitute Opinion, if any action is required; and, 
IT FURTIIER IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellants' memorandum of costs on 
appeal filed March 16,2009 in the amount of $651.00 be and hereby is allowed. 
DATED this 27th day of May, 2009. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge 
REMITTITUR - Docket No. 35144-2008 
Cl~k~!!ec~ 
STATE OF IDAHO. 
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" \ 
fto6 A.k E D Donald W. Lojek ISBN 1395 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD 
623 West Hays Street NOV 3 0 2010 
P.M, 
PO Box 1712 
Boise, ID 83701 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN. DEPUTY 
Telephone: 208-343-7733 
Facsimile: 208-345-0050 
Philip Gordon ISBN 1996 
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988 
GORDON LAW OFFICES 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: 208/345-7100 
Facsimile: 208/345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and DISCOVER 
CARE CENTRE LLC OF SALMON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
JAMES M. ALCORN, in his official capacity as 
its Manager, and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE 
MEYER, GERALD GEDDES, JOHN 
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN, MARK 
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. HIGGINS, 
TERRY GESTRIN AND MAX BLACK AND 
STEVE LANDON in their capacity as 
member's ofthe Board of Directors of the State 
Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV 09-13607-C 
AFFIDAVIT OF PHILIP GORDON RE: 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AFFIDAVIT OF PHILIP GORDON RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss. 
County of ADA ) 
PHILIP GORDON, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiffs in this matter and I make this Affidavit on my own 
personal and direct knowledge, except where otherwise stated. The other counsel for the 
Plaintiffs are Donald W. Lojek and Bruce S. Bistline, a member of my firm. We are the same 
three attorneys who represented the Plaintiffs and the members of the class in the case of 
Farber v. State Insurance Fund (which was assigned Case Number 2006-CV -7877 in the 
above Court), and I am accordingly familiar with what occurred in that litigation. 
2. I am making this Affidavit in Regards to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3. Please see hereto attached Affidavit of James Alcorn in Case Number 2006-CV -7899, Bates 
Stamped Number 000120-000131. 
Dated this 22nd day of November, 2010. 
/ 
I 
Notary P c or I 0 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
Commission expires: .:J /Zl' /2"/..3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of November, 2010, I caused the foregoing document to 
be delivered by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely Duke 
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton 
702 W. State St. Ste. 700 
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Richard E. Hall 
1813 #1253; reh@haIlfarJey.com 
Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com 
v 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECm & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:\3\3-461.2\AJcorn Aff .. doc 
Attorneys for Defendants 
ill THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN 
BECKER and CRITTER CLillIC, an Idaho 
Professional Association, 
Case No. CV06-7877 
AFFIDA VIT OF JAMES M. ALCORN 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, 
and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE :MEYER, 
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, 
GERALD GEDDES, MILFORD 
TERRELL, JUDI DANIELSON, JOHN 
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTill, and MARK 
SNODGRASS in their capacity as member 
of the Board of Directors of the State 
Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 
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) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
I, James M. Alcorn, being first duly sworn, depose and state: 
1. I am the Manager of the SIP and have been since April 1998. 
2. I have had extensive experience with the insurance industry since 1970 as 
a licensed insurance agent and owner of independent property and casualty 
insurance agencies and currently hold the professional designation of Certified 
Insurance Counselor. 
3. I served as the Director of the Idaho Department of Insurance from May 
1994 to January 1995, and as its Deputy Director from January 1995 to December 
1995, and then again served as Director of the Department from December 1995 
until April of 1998. 
4. My past experience as a licensed insurance agent and as Director of the 
Idaho Department of Insurance has caused me to be familiar with the laws 
regulating the insurance industry and insurance industry practices. 
I 
5. As the Manager of the State Insurance Fund (SIP), I am familiar with its 
history and its day to day operations and am required by law to conduct the 
business of the SIP and do all things convenient and necessary to manage the SIP 
so that it is run as an efficient insurance company, remains actuarially sound and 
maintains the public purposes for which it was created. 
6. The SIP was' created by the Idaho Legislature in 1917 for the purpose of 
providing a stable source of worker's compensation insurance for Idaho 
employers and their employees. 
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7. Idaho Law provides that all Idaho employers must maintain worker's 
compensation insurance coverage for their employees. 
8. Since the enactment of 41-1601 et seq. in 1961, Idaho's worker's 
compensation insurance rates have been regulated by the Department of Insurance 
which approves worker's compensation rates based upon the rate filings of an 
authorized rating organization (National Council on Compensation Insurance aka 
NCC!). Idaho is an administered pricing state which means that the rating 
organization files the entire rate. Companies may file with the Department of 
Insurance for approval to deviate from the filed rate by individual rate or for all 
rates. Companies may also use schedule credits on specific policies. Companies 
may not use both a deviation and scheduled credits. 
9. SIP has chosen to deviate 7% from all filed rates. Therefore, the 
premiums for all SIP policyholders are calculated beginning with a rate 7% below 
the rates approved by the Department of Insurance. This deviation is applied 
across the board for all policyholders regardless of premium size or losses 
occurring on an insurance policy. 
10. Idaho is a competitive state which means that the SIP is not a monopoly 
and must compete for business against the private worker's compensation 
insurance carriers. 
11. Idaho also has a worker's compensation assigned risk pool which insures 
employers who cannot otherwise secure workers compensation coverage, but 
employers insuring through the assigned risk pool are subject to rates 30% above 
the standard rate. 
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12. Idaho employers are not required to insure through the SIF, they may 
msure with a private carrier or if they are declined coverage by two private 
carriers and the SIF then coverage can be obtained through the assigned risk pool 
which is the carrier of last resort .. 
13. The SIF has a public purpose to provide worker's compensation insurance 
to Idaho employers and while it is not the insurer of last resort, the SIF maintains 
a liberal underwriting policy that seeks to insure all employers regardless of size 
so that most Idaho employers who could not otherwise obtain coverage through a 
private carrier could obtain coverage with the SIF and avoid the extra costs 
associated with acquiring an insurance policy through the assigned risk pool. 
14. As SJF Manager, I am required to maintain the solvency of the SJF and 
make decisions regarding the level of surplus and reserves needed by the Fund to 
remain actuarially sound so there continues to be a stable and available source of 
worker's compensation insurance coverage. 
15. The maintenance of adequate surplus and reserves is an important aspect 
of managing the SJF because unlike all other worker's compensation carriers 
operating in Idaho the Fund is precluded by statute (I.e. §72-901(4)) from being a 
member of the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association. 
16. The Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association guaranties payment of 
insurance benefits in the event that an insurance carrier cannot pay its insurance 
claims or becomes insolvent. 
17. All insurers in the state belong to the Idaho Insurance Guaranty 
Association except the SIF which is barred by law. 
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18. Since the SIP cannot like other carriers rely on Idaho Insurance Guaranty 
Association to pay benefits in the event of insolvency, the SIP must be managed 
such that it maintains sufficient surplus and reserves to provide a stable ongoing 
source of worker's compensation insurance to protect Idaho workers. 
19. The duty of the Manager and the Board of Directors to maintain the 
financial integrity of the SIP is paramount because if the SIP were to become 
insolvent, the availability of worker's compensation insurance in Idaho would be 
critically jeopardized, since the SIP insures over 39,000 employers which 
comprise approximately 70% of the market. Many of these employers, especially 
the smaller employers, could not obtain coverage from other insurers whose 
underwriting policies are not as liberal as the SIP. 
20. Since its inception the duty to operate and manage the SlF and to decide 
the appropriate level of surplus, reserves and dividends has been the duty of its 
Manager and subject to his or her discretionary authority. 
21. The SIF surplus is an asset of the SIF and dividends, if any, are paid from 
what the Manager determines to be surplus that is safely available after taking 
into consideration various factors including, but not limited to, present and future 
SlF operating expenses, the required reserves, projected investment income, 
market forces, and industry trends. 
22. Dividends paid by the SlF are not the same as dividends paid by to 
stockholders of a company. SlF dividends are not related to ownership or the 
sharing of profits. SlF dividends are the return of unused premium. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES M. ALCORN - 5 
00012~ 
000275 
23. The detennination as to whether to declare a dividend, how much, and 
who will receive one is not a science, but is a decision-making process that is 
based upon experience and knowledge of the insurance business, industry trends, 
and market forces. 
24. The declaration of a dividend is a multi-step process that starts with 
deciding how much surplus is safely available to be declared as a dividend, then 
there is a determination as to how it is to be divided up taking into account the 
cost of writing an insurance policy and considering the losses that may have been 
incurred on the policy. 
25. One other consideration is the marketing effect that a dividend wi]] have 
on retaining good profitable accounts, because it is those large profitable accounts 
that allow the SIF to fulfill its public policy objectives of providing a source of 
insurance for Idaho employers which includes many of the smaller less profitable 
accounts. 
26. Policyholders of the Fund are provided with a contract of insurance that 
sets forth the parameters of their coverage and neither it nor the governing statutes 
of the SIF provide that policyholders are entitled to, or guarantied that they will 
receive a dividend. 
27. The SIF, through three previous managers and the current Manager, has 
issued dividends continuously since at least 1982 using essentially the same 
dividend formula as is used presently, in that the dividends returned as a 
percentage of paid premium have always differentiated by the size of the premium 
taking into account the losses incurred on the insurance policy such that the SIF 
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has always returned back a larger percentage of paid premium to the large policy 
holders, as opposed to the smaller sized policyholders. This is consistent with 
workers compensation insurance industry practices. 
28. One of the reasons for using policy size as a basis for determining the rate 
of return is because dividend is a return of unused premium and a larger policy 
will have proportionately more unused premium than a smaller premium policy 
because certain costs associated with writing a policy are essentially the same 
whether it be for $2,000 or $200,000 policy. 
29. Other considerations for issuing larger dividends as a percentage of 
premium size has to do with the fact that workers compensation rates are 
regulated and as such are the same for all carriers, and because the SIF has a 
public purpose to provide a source of insurance for the Idaho employers including 
the small employers, and because private carriers seek to insure only the large 
profitable policyholders, and because the SIF needs the large policyholders to 
help support the ability to continue to insure the small businesses in the state. The 
SIF has made a business decision to give the larger premium policies a larger 
dividend percentage in order to help retain the business of the larger profitable 
policyholders. Moreover, the SIF looks at the losses incurred on a policy and 
factors that in when determining whether a dividend will be paid; if a 
policyholder has losses that exceed a certain percentage of premium in a policy 
year then a dividend would be reduced or not paid depending on the level of 
losses. 
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30. It is the retention of the large profitable insurance policies that helps the 
SIP maintain its public purpose of providing insurance to Idaho employers. It is 
the large profitable accounts that are subject to being lured away by the private 
insurance carriers with whom the SIP is in competition. 
31. Since workers compensation rates are regulated by the state, the primary 
method used to cause large profitable policyholders to switch workers 
compensation insurance companies is to offer them high scheduled credits. 
32. Since the SIP has chosen to deviate from the regulated rates it cannot use 
scheduled credits so it relies on the return of dividend to retain large profitable 
accounts. (See Paragraph 8 above) This is a good business decision that helps the 
SIP retain the large profitable policyholder and is consistent with workers 
compensation insurance industry practices and the statutory mandates of Idaho 
Code Section 72-901 to run the SIP as an efficient insurance company. 
33. Additionally, a policyholder with a premium of $2,500 could have equal 
or greater losses than a policyholder with a premium of $100,000, and therefore 
the larger policyholders more readily absorb the losses generated by lower 
premium contributors. 
34. Worker's compensation coverage is a unique form of insurance in that it 
provides unlimited coverage to its policyholder regardless of the premium size. 
The SIP provides a $300 policyholder with the same amount of upper coverage as 
a $500,000 policyholder, but either policy can have extensive losses well above 
their premium amount. Losses in excess of a million dollars on a claim are not 
unheard of and have been paid by the SIP. 
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35. The decision to give dividends pursuant to a fonnula that excluded smaller 
policyholders during the policy years in question was made by considering and 
weighing all the factors set forth above and was consistent with the law, and 
industry practice, and was done with the knowledge of the Board of Directors. 
36. The decision to give dividends pursuant to a fonnula that excluded smaller 
policyholders was also infonnally reviewed by the Chief of the Civil Litigation 
Unit of the Idaho Attorney General's Office in a letter dated January 22, 2003, to 
Robert Egusquiza, wherein Deputy Attorney General David IEgh stated that the 
dividend distribution practice was within the discretionary authority of the SIP 
Manager. 
37. Each of the named plaintiffs purchased worker's compensation coverage 
from the SIP with inception dates between July 1, 2001 and June 30, 2004. 
38. None of the plaintiffs have paid premiums over $2,500 on their contracts 
for insurance for the contract years of July 1,2001 to June 30, 2002; July 1,2002 
to June 30, 2003; or July 1, 2003, to June 30,2004 except the Critter Clinic which 
paid premiums in excess of $2,500 for the policy year with an inception date 
between July 1,2003, to June 30, 2004. 
39. Plaintiffs were not offered a dividend for years they did not pay premiums 
over $2,500. 
40. Dividends are declared by the SIP in December and the plaintiffs were 
each sent a letter the January following the declaration of the dividend stating 
they would not be receiving a dividend based on the amount of premium they paid 
for the particular policy year. Plaintiffs have renewed their existing contracts for 
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insurance and paid their respective premiums even though they may not have 
been offered a dividend the prior year. 
41. If the Court were to accept the Plaintiff's interpretation that Idaho Code 
Section 72-915 does not give the SIP Manager the discretion to declare a dividend 
that can be safely and properly divided with regard to prior paid premiums then it 
severely impacts the ability of the Manager to run the SIP as an efficient 
insurance company, remain actuarially sound, and maintain the public purposes 
for which the insurance Fund was created. 
42. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of 
Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes from November 21, 
2002' s Special Meeting. 
43. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of 
Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes from December 10, 2003. 
44. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "c" is a true and cOrrect copy of 
Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes from October 20, 2004. 
45. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "D" is a true and COrrect copy of 
Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes from December 21, 2005. 
46. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "E" is a true and, correct copy of the 
letter sent by David G. High, Chief, Civil Litigation Division of the Idaho 
Attorney General's Office, to Robert Egusquiza on January 22, 2003. 
47. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy of 
Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes from January 22, 2004. 
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) 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETHNAUGHT. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /3t!: day of February, 2007. 
(SEAL) 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES M. ALCORN - 11 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Bo l'.sf:< 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -IJ1!aay of February, 2007, I caused to be 
served a true copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES M. ALCORN, by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Donald W. Lojek 
Lojek Law Offices, CHTD 
1199 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1712 
Boise, ID 83701-1712 
Fax No.: (208) 343-5200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Philip Gordon 
Bruce S. Bistline 
Gordon Law Offices 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Richard E. Hall 
ISB #1253; reh@hallfarley.com 
Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com 
DEC 06 2010 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W;1313-461.9\PLEADlNGS\MSJ-Reply.doc 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and 




THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, in his 
official capacity as its Manager, and 
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
GERALD GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE, 
ELAINE MARTIN, MARK 
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. HIGGINS, 
TERRY GESTRIN and MAX BLACK and 
STEVE LANDON, in their capacity as 
members of the Board of Directors of the 
State Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 09-13607-C 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW the defendants, The Idaho State Insurance Fund, James M. Alcorn in his 
official capacity as its Manager, and William Deal, Wayne Meyer, Gerald Geddes, John Goedde, 
Elaine Martin, Mark Snodgrass, Rodney A. Higgins, Terry Gestrin, Max Black, and Steve 




Landon in their capacity as members of the Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund 
(collectively, "SIF"), by and through their counsel of record Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, 
P.A., and hereby submit their reply to plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs' Opposition") and in support of Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, filed October 26, 2010 ("SIF Motion"). For the reasons stated herein, 
the SIF Motion should be granted. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' Opposition fails to demonstrate that the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 IS 
unconstitutional. 
As an initial matter, plaintiffs' attempts to burden-shift two steps in the Contract Clause 
analysis - whether the State has a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation 
such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem, and whether the 
adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties is based upon reasonable 
conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the legislation's 
adoption - should be rejected by the Court, as burden-shifting only occurs where the State is 
attempting to impair its own contractual obligations. As the SIF is not the State of Idaho, no 
such burden-shifting is appropriate. 
Further, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate how - or even if - the Idaho Constitution's Contract 
Clause is evaluated under any test different from the modem Contract Clause analysis that courts 
now employ. Absent such a showing, and in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding that 
"we seriously consider federal law in determining the parameters of our own constitutional 
provisions, and we may adopt federal precedent under the state constitution but only to the extent 
that we believe the federal law is not inconsistent with the protections afforded by our state 
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constitution" this Court may appropriately apply modem Contract Clause analysis in the 
determination of this matter. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988, 842 P.2d 660,667 (1992). 
Additionally, plaintiffs have failed to establish that the Idaho Legislature has operated a 
substantial impairment of a contractual relationship, given there is neither a contractual right to a 
dividend under the SIF policies of insurance, nor a history of distribution of dividends in pro rata 
fashion that would give rise to an expectation of receiving such dividends. Further, the repeal did 
not impair the policies, which expressly incorporate Idaho law. Moreover, even were an 
impairment to have occurred, it was not a "substantial" impairment simply because it may have 
impacted a claimed financial term, given the size of the dividends at issue and the heavily-
regulated nature of the workers' compensation field. 
Even were plaintiffs to establish a substantial impairment, however, plaintiffs still fail to 
demonstrate that the repeal lacks a significant and legitimate public purpose. Plaintiffs also 
cannot disregard the public purpose of the fund, and cannot ignore the broad purpose of the 
repeal: to avoid the harm effectuated on current and future public and private policyholders by 
way of loss of dividends and deviations if I.C. § 72-915 were not repealed. Plaintiffs also fail to 
recognize that the Legislature is empowered to change laws to avoid windfalls to private parties. 
Finally, plaintiffs cannot show that the repeal is anything other than based upon 
reasonable conditions and is a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the repeal. 
The repeal of I.C. § 72-915 was intended to address the uncertainty arising from the Farber 
decision, and to avoid harm to current and future policyholders as a result thereof. 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, the SIF Motion should be granted. 
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UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
As the Court is aware, plaintiffs currently have their own Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment pending, which will be heard at that same time as the SIF Motion. In the SIF's 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed November 22,2010, at pp. 
4-7 ("SIF MSJ Opposition"), the SIF identified the limited number of undisputed material facts 
this Court must consider in light of the question posed (to wit, the constitutionality of the repeal 
of I.C. § 72-915), which were not - and cannot - be disputed by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' Opposition 
provides no additional challenges to these undisputed material facts as outlined by the SIF. As 
such, in an effort to reduce duplication, the SIF references and incorporates the "Undisputed 
Material Facts" section of the SIF MSJ Opposition (pp. 4-7) as if fully set forth herein, and 
instead only identifies those facts in cursory fashion: 
1) Plaintiffs' claim is predicated on Idaho Code § 72-915. 
2) Idaho Code § 72-915 was repealed on May 6, 2009. 
3) Idaho Code § 72-915 was repealed to a retroactive date of January 1,2003. 
4) Plaintiffs' claims all relate to dividend distributions after January 1,2003. 
5) Plaintiffs' action was not filed until December 24,2010. 
6) Plaintiffs' claim is foreclosed if the repeal is upheld. 
7) The purpose of the SIF is to provide Worker's Compensation coverage to Idaho 
employees. 
Additionally, plaintiffs have not - and cannot - dispute the following facts established in the SIF 
Motion: 
1) The repeal of I.C. § 72-915 was made effective prior to the Idaho Supreme Court 
issuing remittitur in the Farber case. 
2) The repeal of I.C. § 72-915 was expressly made retroactive as expressed in the 
language of the repeal. 
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3) Dividends prior to the Farber decision were paid on a non-pro rata basis. 
4) Dividends after the Farber decision and the repeal ofI.C. § 72-915 were also paid 
on a non-pro rata basis. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The SIF does not bear the burden of proving that the repeal was constitutional, and 
such repeal is generally presumed to be constitutional. 
Plaintiffs concede, as they should, that "they shoulder the initial burden of convincing 
this Court that the challenged enactment is unconstitutional." Plaintiffs' Opposition at p.8; 
Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, _,232 P.3d 813,818 (2010)("There is a presumption in favor of 
the constitutionality of the challenged statute or regulation, and the burden of establishing that 
the statute or regulation is unconstitutional rests upon the challengers.")(quoting Am. Falls 
Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 154 P.3d 443 
(2007»(emphasis added). 
However, plaintiffs then assert that the burden shifts to the defending party "to 
demonstrate the existence of a legitimate and significant public purpose and an impairment 
which is a reasonable means for and of a character appropriate to the furtherance of that public 
interest." Plaintiffs' Opposition at p. 9. Plaintiffs contend this burden shifts simply where "State 
action retroactively terminates the contract rights of a citizen who is a party to a contract with a 
public entity." Id. Plaintiffs cite to S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 
2003) for this proposition. This argument, however, ignores two critical distinctions. 
First, and most importantly, this burden only applies where the State is a party to the 
contract that is impaired. See University of Hawai'i Professional Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 
F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)("Defendants bear the burden of proving that the impairment was 
reasonable and necessary because '[t]he burden is placed on the party asserting the benefit of the 
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statute only when that party is the state. ''')( emphasis added). As the Ninth Circuit previously 
explained: 
When a state statute substantially impairs a private contract, we must next 
determine whether the impairment is both reasonable and necessary to fulfill an 
important public purpose. See Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411-12, 103 S.Ct. at 
704-05. The parties dispute who bears the burden on this issue. We conclude that 
the bankruptcy and district courts properly required the trustee, as the 
objecting party, to carry the burden. See Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 632 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir.1980) ("the 
challenger must demonstrate that legitimate governmental interests do not justify 
the impairment"). The burden is placed on the party asserting the benefit of 
the statute only when that party is the state. See Keating, 903 F.2d at 1228 
(requiring state to prove that legislation impairing public contract is necessary to 
achieve a valid public purpose); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Miller, 795 
F.Supp. 1476, 1487 (D.Nev.l992) (same), affd on other grounds, 10 F.3d 633 
(9th Cir.l993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1033, 114 S.Ct.1543, 128 L.Ed.2d 195 
(1994). 
In re Seltzer, 104 F.3d 234,236 (9th Cir. 1996)(emphases added). That is, the burden only shifts 
where the State itself bears the contractual obligations impacted by the change in the law. See, 
e.g., State of Nev. Employees Ass'n v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1990)(challenge to 
Nevada's change to Nevada's state employees' pension plan which change precluded employees 
from withdrawing pension funds without penalty prior to vesting). 
In the present case, the SIF is not "the State," nor did the State have any contractual 
obligations with the plaintiffs-policyholders. By statutory definition, the SIF is "created as an 
independent body corporate politic" and derives its financial well-being from "premiums and 
penalties received," "property and securities acquired," and "of interest earned" thereon. 
I.C. § 72-901(1). The SIF is to "be administered without liability on the part of the state." Id. 
The money generated by the SIF is deposited with the state treasurer, who acts as custodian for 
the SIF; however, "[t]he money in the fund does not belong to the state ... [the money is held by 
the treasurer] ... for the contributing employers and the beneficiaries of the compensation law, 
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and for the payment of the costs of the operation of the fund." State ex reI. Williams v. 
Musgrave, 84 Idaho 77, 84, 370 P.2d 778, 782 (1962). Notably, the State itself is a policyholder, 
and not the insurer. See Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed October 26, 2010 ("Counsel Aff."), at Exh. C, Fiscal Note ("The State ofIdaho 
and public entities, which are insured by the State Insurance Fund, .... ")(emphasis added). 
As the State has no contractual relationship with the plaintiffs-policyholders, this burden-shifting 
is inapplicable to this matter. 
Second, the question of burden-shifting is not even reached until plaintiffs have first 
demonstrated a substantial impairment of a contract - not simply that the state "retroactively 
terminates the contract rights of a citizen". See Cayetano, 183 F.3d at 1106 ("Defendants bear 
the burden of proving that the impairment was reasonable and necessary because '[t]he burden 
is placed on the party asserting the benefit of the statute only when that party is the 
state."')(emphasis added); accord S. Cal., 336 F.3d at 894 ("Because Santa Ana has 
substantially impaired its own contract, it has the burden of establishing that the trench cut 
ordinance is both reasonable and necessary to an important public purpose.")(emphasis 
added)(citing Cayetano). As discussed in the SIF's Motion, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that 
any contract right has been impaired by the repeal of I. C. § 72-915, nor can plaintiffs 
demonstrate that the impairment is substantial. Even then, however, the precise burden the State 
faces depends upon the degree of the impairment: "[I]f a State undertakes to alter substantially 
the terms of a contract, it must justify the alteration, and the burden that is on the State varies 
directly with the substantiality of the alteration." Equipment Mfrs. Institute v. Janklow, 300 
F.3d 842, 860 (8th Cir. 2002)(quoting White Motor Corp. v. Malone, 599 F.2d 283,287 (8th Cir. 
1979»( emphasis added). 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7 
000289 
In any event, plaintiffs do not dispute that the repeal of I.e. § 72-915 -like all legislative 
acts - is presumed to be constitutional: "[ a] legislative act is presumed to be constitutional and 
all reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality must be resolved in favor of its validity." Oneida 
County Fair Bd. v. Smylie, 86 Idaho 341, 346, 386 P.2d 374,376 (1963). 
Thus, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the SIF bears any burden In proving the 
constitutionality of the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 - to the contrary, the repeal is presumed to be 
constitutional, and plaintiffs themselves bear the burden of establishing that the repeal is 
unconstitutional. 
2. Federal law is applicable in interpreting Idaho's Constitution both generally and in 
this case. 
Plaintiffs next assert that federal law regarding the U.S. Constitution's Contract Clause is 
inapplicable to the evaluation of the Idaho Constitution's Contract Clause. Plaintiffs' attempts to 
downplay the State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 224 P.3d 480 (2009) decision, and to rely upon 
Idaho caselaw without specifying how the Idaho Supreme Court has rejected federal analysis in 
favor of an analysis unique to the Idaho Contract Clause, should be rejected by this Court. 
a. State v. Korn demonstrates that Idaho does not employ a separate analysis. 
As explained by the SIF in its brief-in-chief, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed a federal 
and state constitutional argument in Korn with a single, dispositive analysis. In Korn, the 
defendant argued that a city violated his rights under "the contract clauses found in the Idaho and 
U.S. constitutions." The Korn Court, without making a distinction between the two 
constitutions, engaged in a single analysis, relying on federal law (Allied Structural Steel Co. v. 
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978)) to hold that the city's ordinance did not violate his rights 
under either constitution. Id. at 483. 
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Plaintiffs attempt to downplay Korn by asserting that "[ n ]owhere in its opinion does our 
Supreme court engage in any substantive analysis of whether or not the ordinance Korn 
challenged violated either the State or Federal Contracts Clause." Plaintiffs' Opposition at p. 11. 
While the Court resolved the issue short of the full test as outlined in, e.g., RUT One Corp. v. 
City of Berkeley, 371 FJd 1137, 1147 (9th Cir. 2004), telling is the absence of any discussion of 
how a Contract Clause claim would be treated differently under the Idaho Constitution than 
under the U.S. Constitution. This is consistent with the rule that "we seriously consider federal 
law in determining the parameters of our own constitutional provisions, and we may adopt 
federal precedent under the state constitution but only to the extent that we believe the federal 
law is not inconsistent with the protections afforded by our state constitution." State v. Guzman, 
122 Idaho at 988. 
Further, the Korn Court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Allied Structural 
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, supra, in stating that "[t]he ... contracts clause protects only those 
contractual obligations already in existence at the time the disputed law is enacted." Thus, the 
Idaho Supreme Court expressly relied upon a U.S. Supreme Court case, which evaluated a 
Contract Clause claim under the U.S. Constitution. A review of Allied Structural reflects the 
modern test of the Contract Clause. For example, the Allied Structural Court rejects the literal 
reading of the Contract Clause that plaintiffs seek to employ in this case: "The Clause is not, 
however, the Draconian provision that its words might seem to imply. As the Court has 
recognized, 'literalism in the construction of the contract clause ... would make it destructive of 
the public interest by depriving the State of its prerogative of self-protection." 438 U.S. at 240. 
Further, the Allied Structural Court also, for example, discussed the requirement of 
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substantiality, and evaluation of the nature and purpose of the legislation where a severe 
impairment occurs: 
In applying these principles to the present case, the first inquiry must be whether 
the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual 
relationship. The severity of the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the 
state legislation must clear. Minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end 
the inquiry at its first stage. Severe impairment, on the other hand, will push the 
inquiry to a careful examination of the nature and purpose of the state legislation. 
438 U.S. at 244-45. Thus, the implicit argument by plaintiffs - that Idaho has rejected the 
modem Contract Clause analysis with respect to the Idaho Constitution's own Contract Clause, 
or somehow employs some other test - is unavailing. 
b. Idaho Contract Clause decisions reflect application of the modem Contract Clause 
analysis. 
Plaintiffs cite two Idaho decisions for their contention that Idaho does not utilize modem 
federal Contract Clause analysis: the 1954 decision of Penrose v. Commercial Travelers 
Insurance Company, 75 Idaho 524, 275 P.2d 969 (1954), and the 1933 decision in Straus v. 
Ketchen, 54 Idaho 56, 28 P.2d 824 (1933). 
With respect to Penrose, plaintiffs acknowledge that the lead opinion authored by Justice 
Thomas "demonstrated a strong inclination to apply what is current Federal methodology," but 
that the dissenting opinions of three concurring Justices demonstrates that the Idaho Supreme 
Court has refused to use the modem federal Contract Clause analysis. Plaintiffs' Opposition at 
15. However, the Penrose decision has been reeled in by later decisions, clarifying that 
retroactive legislation, even as applied to existing contracts, is not per se unconstitutional. In 
Eriksen v. Blue Cross of Idaho Health Services, Inc., the Idaho Court of Appeals clarified that 
"[b ]ecause the statute shifted the balance of power between contracting parties, by identifying a 
favored party in the event of litigation, the Supreme Court barred its application to pre-existing 
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contracts." 116 Idaho 693, 696, 778 P.2d 815, 818 (Ct. App. 1989). Thus, the Eriksen Court 
narrowed Penrose to scenarios where a statutory change would have "affected bargaining 
relationships by designating favored parties," characterizing the Penrose decision as resting upon 
a "policy rationale." Id This explanation by the Idaho Court of Appeals was later confirmed by 
the Idaho Supreme Court in Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Authority, 122 Idaho 471, 835 P.2d 1282 
(1992). 
As discussed above, however, the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 did not impact the "bargaining 
relationships" between the parties, but rather maintained the status quo of dividend practices in 
accord with the Idaho Legislature's intent. Further, the policy needs of the repeal of I.e. § 72-
915, outlined in the SIF's brief-in-chief, were not at issue in Penrose, and, applied here, 
demonstrate that the repeal complies with the Contract Clause. Tellingly, this later discussion of 
Penrose by the Idaho appellate courts is not cited by plaintiffs. 
Nor is the 1933 Straus v. Ketchen decision guiding authority on application of the 
modem Contract Clause analysis in Idaho. Not surprisingly, omitted from plaintiffs' discussion 
of Straus is that the Idaho Supreme Court was simultaneously ruling on both the U.S. and Idaho 
Contract Clause provisions: 
Under the federal and state constitutional provisions above quoted, no law 
can ever be passed impairing the obligations of a contract, and no exception 
is made, consequently the contracts of a drainage district stand upon the 
same footing as those of individuals or any other agency. The Legislature 
cannot, under such constitutional prohibitions, authorize, under the police power 
of the state, the creation of a contracting agency and permit the contracting of 
obligations, and by the same power destroy its contracts and abolish its 
obligations. To permit the Legislature to do so would destroy the very essence of 
the constitutional prohibitions. Clearly such was never the intention of the framers 
of the Constitution. Were it otherwise, no person would ever be safe to enter into 
a contract with public or quasi public corporations, creatures of the law. 
For the reasons herein announced, we hold that chapter 183, Session Laws 1933, 
impairs the obligations of the contract, as to the bonds in question, in violation of 
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article 1, § 10, Constitution of the United States, and article 1, § 16, 
Constitution of Idaho. 
28 P.2d at 834 & 835-36. (emphases added). As an initial point, Straus actually supports the 
SIF's position that the Idaho Supreme Court has not enunciated a test different than the federal 
analysis, in that Straus treated the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Constitution Contract Clause 
provisions in the same breath. Further, Straus's contention that under the U.S. Contract Clause 
"no law can ever be passed impairing the obligations of a contract" is, now almost 80 years later, 
no longer even remotely an accurate statement regarding federal Contract Clause law. See, e.g., 
Allied Structural. supra (cited in State v. Korn, supra); RUI, supra. 
In addition, the Straus decision includes reference to Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) 535, 18 L.Ed. 403 (1866). In evaluating a Contract Clause under the New Mexico state 
constitution, the New Mexico Supreme Court explained: "much water has flowed over the dam 
since Von Hoffman, and so we prefer to apply more modem Contract Clause analysis in deciding 
whether or not to invalidate this statute in this case." Los Quatros, Inc. v. State Farm Life Ins. 
Co., 800 P.2d 184, 192 (N.M. 1990). Further, Straus' language as to "public or quasi public 
corporations" is also untenable under more recent Idaho law, given that Idaho appellate courts 
have made clear that laws impacting existing public and quasi-public contracts are not per se 
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Agricultural Products Corp. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 98 Idaho 23, 
29, 557 P.2d 617, 622-23 (l976)(public utilities - "On the other hand, the state has a well 
established right to regulate public utilities .... Pursuant to that power, it has been settled that the 
state may fix rates for a public utility service which will supersede rates previously fixed by 
private contract. ... Private contracts with utilities are regarded as entered into subject to 
reserved authority of the state to modify the contract in the public interest."); City of Hayden v. 
Washington Water Power Co., 108 Idaho 467, 469, 700 P.2d 89, 91 (Ct. App. 
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1985)(municipalities - "We do not suggest, of course, that a municipality never may impose new 
burdens upon an existing franchise grantee. A city has the inherent right to enact valid police 
power regulations, even if contracts are thereby affected."). In short, plaintiffs fail to cite any 
Idaho authority that demonstrates that Idaho employs anything but the modem Contract Clause 
analysis employed by federal courts. 
Accordingly, this Court can correctly utilize the modem Contract Clause test - such as 
that employed in the RUI and Quatros decisions - in evaluating the constitutionality of the repeal 
ofLC. §72-915. 
3. The repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is constitutional, per modern Contract Clause analysis. 
Its prior arguments notwithstanding, plaintiffs next argue that application of the modem 
Contract Clause analysis (as reflected in the RUI decision) demonstrates that the repeal of I.e. 
§72-915 is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs' arguments as to each of the elements outlined in RUI l are 
in error, and plaintiffs' arguments fail. 
a. The Idaho Legislature has not operated a substantial impairment of a contractual 
relationship. 
i. There is no contractual right to dividends in the SIF workers' 
compensation policies. 
Plaintiffs baldly contend that the decisions in Kelso & Irwin v. State Insurance Fund, 134 
Idaho 130, 997 P.2d 591 (2000) and Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 
388, 111 P.3d 73 (2005) demonstrate there is a "contractual agreement between the Fund and its 
I As previously explained in the SIF's brief-in-chief, the RUI Court summarized the modem Contract Clause three-
step analysis as follows: (I) "whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual 
relationship[;]" (2) "whether the State ... [has] a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation, 
such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem[;]" and (3) "whether the adjustment of the 
rights and responsibilities of contracting parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate 
to the public purpose justifying the legislation'S adoption." RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d at 1147 
(internal quotations omitted). Additionally, the first step "itself has three components: 'whether there is a 
contractual relationship, whether a change in law impairs that contractual relationship, and whether the impairment 
is substantial. '" Id. 
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policyholders regarding the specific term before this Court." Plaintiffs' Opposition at 18-19. In 
doing so, however, plaintiffs fail to address two points on this issue raised in the SIF's brief-in-
chief, and, as such, do not appear to contest them. 
First, plaintiffs do not dispute that the SIF policy of insurance is silent as to dividends. 
See Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment ("Lojek Aff."), filed September 22,2010, at Exh. A. 
Second, plaintiffs also do not dispute the SIF's governing statutes do not guarantee 
payments of dividends to policyholders, nor do they set forth that the policyholders have a 
property interest in the surplus or assets of the SIF. See generally I.C. § 72-901 et seq. The 
Idaho Supreme Court previously concluded the SIF's statutory framework does not create any 
property rights in the SIF's policyholders. Kelso, 134 Idaho at 135. Plaintiffs acknowledge this, 
but argue that the policyholders' claimed contract right is simply "a right to share in [a] 
dividend" once declared. Plaintiffs' Opposition at n.4. In doing so, however, plaintiffs also fail 
to address the SIF's argument that plaintiffs cannot characterize a strict pro rata dividend 
distribution as some variety of expected or vested contractual right that has been disrupted by 
retroactive application, because SIF dividends have not previously been paid that way, and, 
indeed, any change in the law created by Farber was promptly remedied by the Idaho legislature 
(via repeal) even before remittitur issued by the Idaho Supreme Court in the Farber matter. See, 
e.g., Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 Idaho 400, 411, 103 S.Ct. 
697, 704 (1983)("[S]tate regulation that restricts a party to gains it reasonably expected from the 
contract does not necessarily constitute a substantial impairment."); Boykin v. Boeing Co., 128 
F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1997)("The proper inquiry in determining the constitutionality of 
retroactive legislation is 'whether a party has changed position in reliance upon the previous law 
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or whether the retroactive law defeats the reasonable expectations of the parties. "'); accord, In 
Re Marriage of Giroux, 704 P.2d 160 (Wash. App. 1985). 
Accordingly, there is no contractual right to dividends, and a legislative change to the 
statute governing the methodology for distribution of dividends does not implicate a term of the 
SIF insurance policy. 
ii. The repeal of LC. § 72-915 was not a change in law that impaired the 
contractual relationship between the SIF and its policyholders. 
Plaintiffs next contend, in conclusory fashion, that the workers' compensation policies 
must be impaired, simply by the fact of the existence of the SIF's summary judgment motion, 
and because plaintiffs' rights "will be rendered nugatory by their inability to enforce them." 
Plaintiffs' Opposition at p. 19. 
The SIF's summary judgment motion is not, and cannot, be construed as some variety of 
admission that the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 constituted an impairment of the SIF-issued workers' 
compensation policies. To the contrary, it was plaintiffs that brought this action, alleging that 
such repeal was unconstitutional under the Contract Clause of the U.S. and Idaho constitutions. 
The SIF's summary judgment motion merely seeks to resolve those claims. The fact that 
plaintiffs cannot sue for a claimed pro rata share of declared dividends because of the repeal of 
I.C. § 72-915 does not mean there has been an impairment. 
To the contrary, as explained in the SIF's brief-in-chief (and unaddressed in plaintiffs' 
Opposition), the policy expressly provides: 
Terms of this insurance that conflict with the workers compensation law are 
changed by this statement to conform to this law. 
(Lojek Aff., Exh. A, at p. 2.) Thus, even to the extent a dividend methodology may be a term of 
the contract by virtue of statute (here, the now-repealed I. C. § 72-915), that term is subject to 
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change at any time by the Legislature, which is expressly outlined in the policy. Changes in the 
law are automatically incorporated into the policy, and no "impairment" would exist because the 
terms of the policy are changed when the law is changed, a fact that all policyholders are 
apprised of in the express language of their policy. 
iii. The SIF policies were not "substantially impaired." 
Plaintiffs' Opposition then asserts that the workers' compensation policies were, in fact, 
substantially impaired, given that a financial term was altered. Plaintiffs' Opposition at p. 20 
(citing S. Cal, supra, and its underlying District Court decision at 202 F. Supp. 1129 (2002)). 
Plaintiffs' argument on this point fails for two key reasons. 
First, plaintiffs are dismissive of the value of the dividends at issue, effectively 
contending that any financial term that is altered constitutes a substantial impairment. In doing 
so, however, they disregard S. Cal.'s explanation that "[w]hen assessing substantial impairment, 
we need not resolve the 'question of valuation' in terms of dollars if an important financial 
provision is impaired." 336 F.3d at 891 (emphasis added). In discussing this, the S. Cal. court 
cited two decisions, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 1505 (1977) 
and Cayetano, supra. The S.Cal. court pointed out that in U.S. Trust, the change in the law 
effected "an 'outright repeal' of 'an important security provision'" - to wit, diversion of 
"revenues and reserves earmarked as security for privately held bonds." 336 F.3d at 889. The S. 
Cal. court also noted that in Cayetano, the statute at issue allowed the state "to delay employees' 
pay by one to three days on no more than six occasions over one year." Id. Plaintiffs fail to 
explain how the pro rata share of a discretionary declared dividend is an "important financial 
provision" comparable to a bond security or a paycheck. 
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Perhaps even more incredibly, plaintiffs appear to suggest a right to a dividend 
declaration itself: "[i]t bears directly upon the cost of that contract or the consideration for the 
issuance of the policy." Plaintiffs' Opposition at p. 20. However, as explained above, and 
uncontested by plaintiffs,2 the SIF's policyholders have no contractual right to a dividend or even 
a property interest in the assets of the SIF, per the terms of the policy, the SIF's governing 
statutes, and the Kelso decision. Thus, the SIF Manager is entitled, in his discretion, to forgo the 
declaration of dividends for particular dividend periods or even declare a nominal amount, and, 
absent an abuse of such discretion, the SIF's policyholders cannot challenge such 
determinations; thus, the SIF's policyholders have no inherent right to rely upon dividends as 
"consideration" for a workers' compensation policy or that a particular amount be declared as 
dividends. Thus, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the potential for a dividend - the existence 
and amount thereof purely in the discretion of the SIF Manager - constitutes an "important 
financial provision" of a workers' compensation policy. 
Second, plaintiffs then argue that "[t]his is a class action and the damages are an 
aggregate of the individual damages, which in this case are expected to be in excess of one 
million dollars." Plaintiffs' Opposition at p. 21. 3 Plaintiffs cite no authority for this proposition, 
nor otherwise highlight any differential analysis employed by courts depending on whether the 
challenged legislative action impacts one contract (e.g., the municipal franchise agreement in 
City of Hayden, supra) or potentially hundreds of contracts (e.g., attorney fee agreements in Curr 
2 "Plaintiffs are not claiming in the case at bar, just as they never claimed in Farber, that they have an absolute 
'contractual right to a dividend.'" Plaintiffs' Opposition at nA. 
3 It is worth noting, of course, that this action is not yet actually certified as a class action. As noted in the SIF's 
brief-in-chief, as well, not all policyholders with more than $2,500 in paid premiums for the years at issue would be 
class members as some policyholders benefit from the SIF's dividend practices, a point that plaintiffs do not dispute. 
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V. CUIT, 124 Idaho 686, 691, 864 P.2d 132, 137 (1993))4 or even potentially thousands of 
contracts (e.g., utility customers' private contracts in Agricultural Products COrp.).5 
Finally, plaintiffs do not challenge the SIF's argument that the workers' compensation 
policies exist in a "heavily regulated industry," such that "expectations of further regulation that 
industry may lessen the severity of a subsequent impairment of that party's contractual rights and 
obligations." State v. All Property and Cas. Ins. Carriers Authorized and Licensed To Do 
Business In State, 937 So.2d 313, 324 (La. 2006). Indeed, in the context of insurance 
agreements, "public interest is so affected by the insurance business carried on in the state that 
private right of contract must be subjected to the police power." U.S. for Use and Benefit of 
Midwest Steel & Iron Words Co. v. Henly, 117 F. Supp. 928, 930-31 (D. Idaho 1954)(quoting 
Intermountain Lloyds v. Diefendorf, 51 Idaho 304, 5 P.2d 730 (1931)). Given that Idaho's 
workers' compensation law exists as an express exercise of the police power (I.C. §72-201), and 
also given that the Idaho Supreme Court has expressly recognized that an exercise of the police 
power is an exception to the application of the Contract Clause prohibition,6 there should be no 
doubt that the Legislature's repeal of a statute relating to an insurer in a heavily-regulated 
industry created as a result of an exercise of the Legislature's police power would not constitute 
a 'substantial' impairment of contracts (that is, workers' compensation insurance policies). 
4 Although addressing only four fee agreements in particular, the Idaho Supreme Court spoke generally as to the 
right of the Idaho Industrial Commission to modify attorney fee agreements: "In order to justifiably modify 
attorney fee agreements in the interest of public welfare, the Commission must afford due process to the 
contracting parties, i.e., notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time." 124 Idaho at 696 (emphasis 
added). 
5 Although addressing only one customer's rate increase, the Idaho Supreme Court spoke generally as to the right of 
the Public Utility Commission's right to allow rate changes: "On the other hand, the state has a well established 
right to regulate public utilities ... , Pursuant to that power, it has been settled that the state may fix rates for a public 
utility service which will supersede rates previously fixed by private contract. ... Private contracts with utilities are 
regarded as entered into subject to reserved authority of the state to modifY the contract in the public interest." 98 
Idaho at 29. 
6 City of Hayden, 108 Idaho at 469 (stating that "[a] city has the inherent right to enact valid police power 
regulations, even if contracts are thereby affected," but holding, as to specific facts in case, "the police power 
exception to the constitutional proscription against impairing contracts does not apply."). 
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b. The State has a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the repeal of I.C. 
§ 72-915. 
Plaintiffs next address the requirement that, in demonstrating a violation of the Contract 
Clause, the regulation lacked a significant and legitimate public purpose. In doing so, however, 
they attempt to equate the SIF with the State of Idaho, and further fail to demonstrate that the 
repeal lacked a legitimate and significant public purpose. 
i. The SIF does not have the burden of proof, as it is not "the state. " 
Plaintiffs first reiterate their argument that the SIF, as a "public entity," carries the burden 
of proof in demonstrating whether there is a sIgnificant and legitimate public purpose behind the 
regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem. Plaintiffs' 
Opposition at 22. As addressed earlier on pages 5-8 above, this is incorrect, as the SIF is not 
"the state." 
Plaintiffs' error lies in the application of caselaw which looks to whether a State or state 
entity interferes "with their own obligations." S. Cal., 336 F.3d at 894 ("Because Santa Ana has 
substantially impaired its own contract, .... ")(emphasis added); accord Allied Structural, 438 
U.S. at 244, n.15 ("The Court indicated that impairments of a State's own contracts would face 
more stringent examination under the Contract Clause than would laws regulating contractual 
relationships between private parties.")(emphasis added); Cayetano, 183 FJd at 1106 (9th Cir. 
1999)("Defendants bear the burden of proving that the impairment was reasonable and necessary 
because '[t]he burden is placed on the party asserting the benefit of the statute only when that 
party is the state."')(emphasis added). Plaintiffs' flaw lies in the inherent conclusion that the 
SIF is the State. 
The SIF does not dispute that, by law, it is "created as an independent body corporate 
politic." I.C. § 72-901(1). However, it is not "state managed," as plaintiffs contend. Plaintiffs' 
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Opposition at p. 22. Rather, the SIF is managed by the SIF Manager. I.C. § 72-902.7 The SIF 
is, by express statute, to "be administered without liability on the part of the state." I.C. § 72-
901(1). The money generated by the SIF is deposited with the state treasurer, who acts as 
custodian for the SIF; however, "[t]he money in the fund does not belong to the state ... [the 
money is held by the treasurer] ... for the contributing employers and the beneficiaries of the 
compensation law, and for the payment of the costs of the operation of the fund." State ex reI. 
Williams v. Musgrave, 84 Idaho 77, 84, 370 P.2d 778, 782 (1962). Thus, when the SIF issues a 
workers' compensation policy to a policyholder, no relationship between the State and the 
policyholder is created,8 and the State bears no liability whatsoever for that policy of insurance. 
Thus, a legislative act by the Idaho State Legislature applicable to the SIF - such as the repeal of 
I.C. § 72-915 - does not constitute an impairment of the State's own contractual obligations. 
Accordingly, the burden remains on plaintiffs to demonstrate that there is no significant 
and legitimate public purpose behind the repeal ofl.C. § 72-915. 
ii. The applicable standard is not "strict scrutiny. " 
Even were the Court to find that the SIF was equivalent to the State, which it should not, 
the Court should reject plaintiffs' demanded "strict scrutiny" standard. Plaintiffs' Opposition at 
pp. 22 & 24. 
7 "72-902 .STATE INSURANCE MANAGER -- POWERS AND DUTIES OF STATE INSURANCE 
MANAGER. The board of directors of the state insurance fund shall appoint a manager of the state insurance fund, 
whose duties, subject to the direction and supervision of the board, shall be to conduct the business of the state 
insurance fund, and do any and all things which are necessary and convenient in the administration thereof, or in 
connection with the insurance business to be carried on under the provisions of this chapter. The manager shall have 
skill and expertise in managing and administering within the insurance industry, shall be of good moral character 
and shall be bonded in the time, form and manner as prescribed by chapter 8, title 59, Idaho Code." 
8 Again, the State itself is a policyholder. See Counsel Aff., Exh. C, Fiscal Note ("The State of Idaho and public 
entities, which are insured by the State Insurance Fund, .... ")(emphasis added). 
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"Strict scrutiny" is, of course, a different constitutional standard employed in other 
constitutional law matters. For example, in the context of alleged First Amendment violations, 
"any restriction based on the content of speech [in traditionally public forums] must satisfy strict 
scrutiny, that is, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest." Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, l30 S. Ct. 2971, 2984, n.l1 (U.S. 2010). This is 
inapplicable in the Contract Clause analysis. 
The requirement is simply that there be "a significant and legitimate public purpose 
behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic 
problem." RUI, 371 F.3d at 1147. Caselaw discussing the scenario of a State's impairment of 
its own contractual obligations does not impose a new "strict scrutiny" standard, but rather 
simply directs courts to more closely scrutinize legislative assessments of reasonableness and 
necessity where the State is attempting to alter its own contractual obligations. Energy Reserves 
Group v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. at n.14. Even in that scenario, however, the 
burden is not a static test, but depends on the degree of impairment: "[I]f a State undertakes to 
alter substantially the terms of a contract, it must justify the alteration, and the burden that is on 
the State varies directly with the substantiality of the alteration." Equipment Mfrs. Institute 
v. Janklow, 300 F.3d at 860 (quoting White Motor Corp. v. Malone, 599 F.2d 283, 287 (8th Cir. 
1979))( emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the Court should reject any contention by plaintiffs that a "strict scrutiny" 
standard applies to this action. 
iii. Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that the repeal of I.e. § 72-915 lacks a 
significant and legitimate public purpose. 
Plaintiffs contend that the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is "nothing more than an amnesty 
provision for the illegal conduct of the fund." Plaintiffs' Opposition at 27. Plaintiffs further 
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contend that the repeal is "very narrow and specific and only designed to benefit a single entity." 
Id at 24. Thereby, plaintiffs argue, there lacks a significant and legitimate public purpose 
behind the repeal ofLe. § 72-915. 
Plaintiffs' first error in arguing such a position is that plaintiffs attempt to argue what 
they contend is the motivation ("reward the Fund for having ignored the clear and unambiguous 
language of a law" and "amnesty ... for the illegal conduct") behind the repeal, rather than 
looking to the text of the repeal. Plaintiffs' Opposition at 25 & 27. This is, of course, 
inappropriate. As the RUI court explained, in rejecting a dissenting opinion's efforts to 
characterize the motives for an amendment: 
Although the dissent cites additional facts that it states "reveal why the Marina 
Amendment is an improper exercise of municipal authority," post, at 1158, these 
facts are introduced solely to establish a supposed nefarious motive on behalf of 
the City Council. Such facts are wholly irrelevant, however, as our analysis of the 
constitutionality of an ordinance must proceed from the text of the ordinance, not 
the alleged motives behind it. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los 
Angeles, 686 F.2d 758, 761 (9th Cir.l982) ("It is well settled that a reviewing 
court 'will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of 
an allegedly illicit legislative motive.' " (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 
U.S. 367,383,88 S.Ct. 1673,20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968))). 
371 F.3d at 1146, n.7 (emphasis added).9 
Plaintiffs' next error lies in characterizing the Legislature's act as one of "very narrow 
focus ... aimed at specific" parties. Plaintiffs' Opposition at 24. Plaintiffs' citation to Allied 
Structural is of little benefit to this Court, given its lack of factual similarity to this matter. In 
9 Plaintiffs also err in attempting to attribute some deficiency in the constitutionality of the repeal by noting that it 
was passed in response to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Farber. Not only did the Idaho Supreme Court 
expressly contemplate that the law would be changed, but even the U.S. Congress' efforts to pass legislation in 
direct response to a U.S. Supreme Court holding has been upheld. See Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 147 
Idaho 307, 313, 208 P.3d 289,295 (2009)("The arguments, evidence, and testimony provided to this Court would be 
better targeted at the Legislature, which is empowered to change existing law .... If, in the intervening time, it has 
become prudent to alter the statutory language related to the requirements for distribution of dividends, the proper 
remedy is to approach the Legislature to change the law."); In Re Marriage of Giroux, 704 P.2d 160 (Wash. App. 
1984)(approving retroactivity of military pay-related community property statute passed in response to U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981)). 
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that matter, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the effort of the Minnesota Legislature to "grossly 
distort[] the company's existing contractual relationships with its employees" by imposing new, 
onerous requirements for pension funding in the event an employer attempted to close up shop in 
Minnesota or terminate a pension: 
Moreover, the retroactive state-imposed vesting requirement was applied only to 
those employers who terminated their pension plans or who, like the company, 
closed their Minnesota offices. The company was thus forced to make all the 
retroactive changes in its contractual obligations at one time. By simply 
proceeding to close its office in Minnesota, a move that had been planned before 
the passage of the Act, the company was assessed an immediate pension funding 
charge of approximately $185,000. 
Thus, the statute in question here nullifies express terms of the company's 
contractual obligations and imposes a completely unexpected liability in 
potentially disabling amounts. There is not even any provision for gradual 
applicability or grace periods. Cf. the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1061(b)(2), 1086(b), and 1144 (1976 ed.). See n. 
23, infra. Yet there is no showing in the record before us that this severe 
disruption of contractual expectations was necessary to meet an important general 
social problem. The presumption favoring "legislative judgment as to the 
necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure," United States Trust Co., 
431 U.S., at 23,97 S.Ct., at 1518, simply cannot stand in this case. 
The only indication of legislative intent in the record before us is to be found in a 
statement in the District Court's opinion: 
"It seems clear that the problem of plant closure and pension plan termination was 
brought to the attention of the Minnesota legislature when the Minneapolis-
Moline Division of White Motor Corporation closed one of its Minnesota plants 
and attempted to terminate its pension plan." 449 F.Supp., at 651. 
But whether or not the legislation was aimed largely at a single employer, it 
clearly has an extremely narrow focus. It applies only to private employers who 
have at least 100 employees, at least one of whom works in Minnesota, and who 
have established voluntary private pension plans, qualified under § 401 of the 
Internal Revenue Code. And it applies only when such an employer closes his 
Minnesota office or terminates his pension plan. Thus, this law can hardly be 
characterized, like the law at issue in the Blaisdell case, as one enacted to protect 
a broad societal interest rather than a narrow class. 
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438 U.S. at 247-49. The repeal of I.C. §72-915 was not an effort by the Idaho Legislature to 
disrupt the business decision of a company by suddenly imposing new, onerous financial 
conditions and "grossly distorting" extant contracts. Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit has 
explained, the reach of Allied Structural has been pulled back: "The Court retreated from its 
holding in Spannaus [in later cases]. In these cases, the Court indicated a renewed willingness to 
defer to the decisions of state legislatures regarding the impairment of private contracts." 
Keating, 903 F.2d at 1226. 
In the present case, the Legislature appropriately explained the 'significant and legitimate 
public purpose' of the repeal by the Legislature'S Statement of Purpose and Fiscal Note to S.B. 
1166, as amended. Counsel Aff., Exh. C. There, the Legislature stated: 
Repeal of Idaho Code Section 72-915 will serve to offset an adverse decision of 
the Idaho Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of Idaho Code Section 72-
915 which could subject the State Insurance Fund to pay dividends on policies 
that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the Fund's ability to reduce 
premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders. The proposed repeal of 
Idaho Code 72-915 will clarify the law regarding the payment of dividends by the 
State Insurance Fund by making it clear that in passing House Bill 774aa in 1998, 
it was the intent of the legislature to have the State Insurance Fund operate like an 
efficient insurance company subject to regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, 
including the dividend provision set forth in Title 41, Chapter 28, Idaho Code. 
Repeal of the law effective April 3, 1998 is necessary because on that date laws 
were enacted which subjected the State Insurance Fund to regulation under the 
Insurance Code, Title 41 of the Idaho Code. This legislation will allow the State 
Insurance Fund to issue dividends in the same manner as other insurance 
companies operating within the State of Idaho. 
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Id 10 In turn, the repeal's Fiscal Note emphasized the financial uncertainly faced by the SIF in 
light of the Court's ruling: 
The State of Idaho and public entities, which are insured by the State Insurance 
Fund, face losing all or part of their future dividends and deviations as a result of 
uncertainties as to the effect of a recent Supreme Court decision. Based on 
dividends and rate reduction deviations provided by the State Insurance Fund over 
the past two years, that number could exceed $5,000,000 annually. Private 
businesses may also, due to the same uncertainties, experience the loss of future 
dividends and deviations since, according to the Court's decision, the Fund has no 
option when distributing dividends, other than to use a pro rata formula. 
Id Plaintiffs attempt to assert that the stated intent is only prospective in nature, but the repeal 
itself squarely addresses the Legislature's concern that the Farber decision "require[s] the State 
Insurance Fund pay dividend on policies that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the 
fund's ability to reduce premiums and pay dividend to profitable policyholders." Counsel Aff., 
Exh. C. The Legislature, in so doing and with the rule that "the Legislature was aware of the 
prevailing judicial interpretation of that statute and specifically chose to change that 
interpretation," clearly recognized that the Farber court's interpretation of I.C. § 72-915 would 
apply not only to future policies, but also to existing policies and policies no longer in force -
Farber itself was addressing a class of "Idaho employers who paid annual premiums of $2,500.00 
or less to the Fund for worker's compensation insurance from the policy year beginning in 2001 
onward." 147 Idaho at 310. Thus, the Legislature was acutely cognizant that additional claims 
might be brought pursuant to I.C. § 72-915 if not retroactively appealed, which would have 
precisely the harmful impact the Legislature sought to avoid: the loss of future dividends and 
10 Of course, even in the absence of such a legislative statement as to a particular decision by the Idaho Supreme 
Court: "[s]tatutes are construed under the assumption that the legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal 
preceden[t] at the time the statute was passed." State, ex reI. Wasden v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, __ , 224 PJd 
1109, 1118 (Idaho 201O)(quoting Druffel v. State, Dep't of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002)); accord 
Smith v. Washington County, _ Idaho _, _ PJd __ ,2010 WL 3895341 (Idaho, October 6,2010) ("We 
presume that when it amended § 12-117 (1), the Legislature was aware of the prevailing judicial interpretation of that 
statute and specifically chose to change that interpretation."). 
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deviations. Given the SIF's public purpose 1 1 and the potential impact upon thousands of 
policyholders (present and future) of such a result, the' significant and legitimate public purpose' 
is amply demonstrated. 
Finally, plaintiffs fail to recognize, again, the history of dividend payments by the SIF. 
Plaintiffs have not, and cannot, demonstrate that SIF dividends were previously paid pro rata, 
either before 12 or after the Farber decision. Indeed, any change in the law created by Farber was 
promptly remedied by the Idaho legislature even before any remittitur in Farber issued. The end 
result of the Farber decision, then, was to suddenly mandate a particular dividend distribution 
methodology which had not previously been employed, and could not have been expected or 
relied upon by policyholders, resulting in a windfall to policyholders still within the applicable 
statute of limitations. However, as the Ninth Circuit has explained, avoidance of windfall is a 
perfectly appropriate basis for a Legislature to act: "if a statute causes unforeseen and unintended 
consequences such that private parties would obtain windfalls they never expected, later 
amendment to realign a statute with the parties' expected bargain may be reasonable." S. Cal., 
336 F.3d at 895. Here, the Idaho Legislature has made clear its belief that the Farber court 
wrongly interpreted its intent (Counsel Aff., Exh. C, Section 1(4)), and the plaintiffs cannot 
demonstrate any existing "expected bargain" given that dividends were never paid in a strict pro 
rata fashion. 
Thus, as the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, "unless the State is itself a contracting 
party, courts should 'properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and 
I I Plaintiffs do not appear to contend that the SIF itself lacks a public purpose, as was previously outlined by the SIF 
in its brief-in-chief. See generally Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp.33-
36. 
12 Affidavit of Jim Alcorn in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 26, 2010 at , ~ 
25. 
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reasonableness of a particular measure." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 
480 U.S. 470, 505, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1252 (1982)(emphasis added). In the present case, the Idaho 
State Legislature appropriately stated the reasons for the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 and the 
retroactive nature therefor, and plaintiffs are thus unable to demonstrate that the repeal lacked a 
significant and legitimate public purpose. 
c. The adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of the SIF and its policyholders, 
if any, is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the 
public purpose justifying the repeal of I.C. § 72-915. 
Finally, plaintiffs assert, with little specific explanation, that the retroactive repeal of I.C. 
§ 72-915 is not of an appropriate character to the public purpose justifying the repeal. 
Plaintiffs first misstate the test, asserting that "the Court is to to [sic] examine the 
availability of alternative measures which the legislature could have taken which would have 
addressed its legitimate concerns without producing a concomitant impairment of the Fund's 
contractual obligations to the Plaintiffs and the members of the class." Plaintiffs' Opposition at 
p. 28. More correctly, the burden falls upon plaintiffs to disprove that "the adjustment of the 
rights and responsibilities of contracting parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a 
character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the legislation'S adoption." RUI One Corp. 
v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d at 1147 (9th Cir. 2004).). This is the final step of the RUI analysis, 
where a court has already identified a contractual impairment of some kind, but also found that 
the legislation addressing that impairment serves a significant and legitimate public purpose: 
"[o]nce a legitimate public purpose has been identified, the next inquiry is whether the 
adjustment of 'the rights and responsibilities of the contracting party [is based] upon reasonable 
conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation'S] 
adoption." Energy Reserves Group, Inc., 459 U.S. at 413. Thus, the Court need not find that 
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legislation should avoid "concomitant impairment," as at this stage in the analysis, impairment 
will have already been found but also justified by a public purpose. 
Even were the Court to reach this stage of the analysis, plaintiffs have failed to expressly 
indicate what is inappropriate as to the character of the repeal of I.C. § 72-915, or to otherwise 
overcome the deference afforded the Legislature in making such repeal. See, e.g., Energy 
Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412-13 ("Unless the State itself is a contracting party, ... '[a]s is customary 
in reviewing economic and social regulation, ... courts properly defer to legislative judgment as 
to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure.'''). The Legislature has identified 
the potential harm caused by the Farber ruling: the loss of future dividends and deviations both to 
public and private entities insured by the SIF. The Legislature, in seeking to avoid such harm, 
repealed I.C. § 72-915 (the only source from which the SIF could be required to distribute under 
a particular methodology) and made it retroactive. The retroactive nature of the statute both 
ensured that no such harm could be brought on present and future policyholders by claims 
related to past dividend periods, and prevented policyholders from gaining a windfall that was 
neither reflective of any past dividend practice of the SIF nor which policyholders could have 
claimed an expectation in. S. Cal., 336 F.3d at 895 ("if a statute causes unforeseen and 
unintended consequences such that private parties would obtain windfalls they never expected, 
later amendment to realign a statute with the parties' expected bargain may be reasonable."). 
In doing so, the Legislature cut off the risk of unknown claims adversely harming present 
and future policyholders. Counsel Aff., Exh. C, Fiscal Note ("The State of Idaho and public 
entities, which are insured by the State Insurance fund, face losing all or part of their future 
dividends and deviations as a result of uncertainties as to the effect of a recent Supreme Court 
Decision .... Private businesses may also, due to the same uncertainties, experience the loss of 
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future dividends and deviations[.]". However, the Legislature, in its judgment, also saw fit to 
actually preserve claims by policyholders who had already initiated litigation as of December 31, 
2008, including the Farber plaintiffs. Thus, the retroactive repeal of the newly-interpreted I.C. § 
72-915 to eliminate the risk of unknown additional claims impacting present and future 
policyholders, while preserving existing litigated claims, was legislation of a wholly appropriate 
character to address the Legislature's concerns at hand. 
Finally, plaintiffs again raise the SIF's purported 'surplus,' but fail to explain the 
relevance to this particular question. While certainly a consideration in explaining how 
dividends are determined, the Legislative repeal is not predicated on the assertion that a lack of 
repeal will result in the insolvency of the Fund - rather, the Legislature expressly states that 
"[t]he result of the [Farber] decision is to require that the State Insurance Fund pay premiums on 
policies that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the fund's ability to reduce 
premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders." Counsel Aff., Exh. C, Section 1(2). 
Further, even were the repeal based, in whole or in part, on concerns about the solvency of the 
SIF, this would still not render the repeal unconstitutional for being of an inappropriate character, 
especially given the public purpose of the SIF, its lack of State monetary support, and its lack of 
a safety net in the form of the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is not based 
upon reasonable conditions and is of not a character appropriate to its public purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the repeal of Idaho Code § 72-915 is 
constitutional and forecloses Plaintiffs' claims, and the Court should grant summary judgment in 
favor of the SIF on all of plaintiffs' claims in this case. 
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COME NOW THE PLAINTIFFS, and the members of the class, by and through 
undersigned counsel, and hereby provide the Court with the following Reply Memorandum in 
Support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
I. CURRENT PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
Currently pending before this Court are four Motions, 
A. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Filed September 23,2010. This Motion asks the Court to find and declare that making 
the 2009 repeal ofldaho Code §72-915 retroactive to January 15" 2003, is clearly 
unconstitutional, in that it violates Article I, Section 16 of the Constitution of Idaho. In Support 
of this Motion, the Plaintiffs filed the Affidavit of Philip Gordon to which was attached a number 
of documents, which were either culled from the public record (including the complete 
legislative history of 2009 Session Law, Ch. 294 (hereinafter "SB 1166aa") which is at issue in 
this matter) or supplied by the Defendants (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Fund") in 
Randolph Farber, et. al. v. The Idaho State Insurance Fund, CV06-7877, Canyon County (herein 
after "Farber v. Fund" to differentiate from citations to the Supreme Court decision in the 
matter), and the Affidavit of Donald Lojek to which was attached a copy of the policy form used 
by the State Insurance Fund. Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Support of that Motion on the 
same day (hereinafter "PlfMemo."), and the Fund filed its Opposition on November 22nd, 2010 
(hereafter "Def. Opp"). 
B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Filed October 26th, 2010. This Motion asks the Court to find and declare that the 
retroactivity aspect of the repeal of Idaho Code §72-915 offends neither Article 1, Section 16 of 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [I.R.C.P. 
56 (a), (c) and (d)] - Page 2 
00031.4 
the Idaho Constitution, nor Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution. 
(Each of these provisions is generally known as the "Contracts Clause" of its respective 
Constitution.) In Support of this Motion, the Fund filed the Affidavit of James Alcorn, the 
Fund's Manager, which consists largely of self-serving conclusory claims regarding "facts" and 
seeks to introduce a purported internal document of the Fund. The Fund also filed the Affidavit 
of Bryan A. Nickels, to which is attached several pleadings and decisions from Farber v. Fund, 
and a portion of the legislative history of SB 1166aa. The Fund filed a Memorandum in Support 
of that Motion on the same day (hereinafter "DefMemo"), and Plaintiffs filed their Opposition 
on November 22nd, 2010 (hereinafter PIPs Opp.). 
C. Plaintiffs' Motion pursuant to Rule 56 (t). 
Filed on November 22,2010, this Motion asks the Court to proceed on the Plaintiffs' 
independently determinable Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, if granted, which would 
moot the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and, to the extent that the Court finds it 
necessary to consider and rely upon any of the claims made in the Affidavit of James Alcorn or 
many of the documents attached to the Affidavit of Bryan Nickels, asks the Court to stay 
proceedings on the Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment until relevant discovery can be 
conducted by Plaintiffs. In support of this Motion, the Plaintiffs filed the Affidavit of Philip 
Gordon which, among other things, identifies some of the discovery which would need to be 
conducted if the Court considers the Alcorn Affidavit relevant and admissible. The Plaintiffs 
filed a Memorandum in support of that Motion on the same day, and Fund filed their Opposition 
on or about December 3, 2010. 
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D. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike. 
Filed on November 22,2010, this Motion asks the Court to Strike many of the documents 
attached to the Affidavit of Bryan Nickels and to Strike the entire Affidavit of James Alcorn on 
the basis that they are wholly irrelevant to these proceedings and therefor not properly filed 
affidavits. Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in support of that Motion on the same day, and the 
Fund filed its Opposition on or about December 3, 2010. 
TI. INTRODUCTION 
The Fund's 36 page memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment consists almost entirely of arguments and analyses which were set forth 
verbatim (or virtually verbatim) in their memorandum in support of their own Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs have already replied to most of these arguments in their 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motionfor Summary Judgment and do not wish to 
burden the Court with reading those arguments again. For this reason, Plaintiffs are intending to 
generally use summaries of arguments and provide references as appropriate to earlier 
memoranda. 
TIL UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
The indisputable and material facts are that Plaintiffs and the putative class members all 
entered into contracts with the Fund, an entity created and regulated by the State of Idaho. All of 
those contracts included a clear and unambiguous provision mandated by the Idaho Legislature 
which required any dividends to be allocated pro rata among all time-qualified policyholders. 
This term had been part of every policy issued by the Fund since 1917. The Manager of the Fund 
considered that dividend allocation requirement to be inconvenient to his vison of how the Fund 
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should be operated. Rather than going to the Legislature to secure a change in the legislatively 
mandated contract provision, LC. § 72-915, he simply breached the contracts between the Fund 
and its policyholders by ignoring that contract provision. In every year relevant to this action, he 
exercised his discretion to declare a dividend (ranging between 5 million and 24 million dollars) 
and then proceeded to arbitrarily allocate the dividend without the benefit of any rule, regulation, 
or statute to suppoI1 his conduct. The approach he took caused Plaintiffs and the other putative 
class members to receive either no dividend or less than they should have received. l After the 
Manager was shown the error of his ways by the Supreme Court in Farber, et al. v. Idaho State 
Insurance Fund,et ai., 147 Idaho 307, 208 P.3d 289 (2009) rather than taking action to remedy 
the multiple breaches and to appropriately compensate all of the policyholders who had been 
denied the full benefit of their contract with the Fund, representatives of the Fund went to the 
Idaho Legislature and advocated for the passage ofa bill which removed LC. § 72-915 from the 
contracts between the Fund and its policyholders, retroactive to a date prior to the earliest claim 
that Plaintiffs can assert, consistent with existing statutes of limitation. 
The Fund attempts to obscure these facts with several erroneous, inapposite or distorted 
claims about these undisputed facts. First, it asserts that Plaintiffs' claims are predicated on 
Idaho Code § 72-915 and not upon the contract. De/Opp., pp 4-5. This assertion is premised 
upon the fact that the language ofLC. § 72-915 is not part of the printed specimen policy which 
1 It should be noted that this conduct, as carried out, is contrary to the law in another respect. The fonnula 
implemented by the Manager works to reduce(in many cases to $0.00) the dividend allocable to policyholders who have 
suffered insured losses. This action works as an assessment against them which causes them to pay more premiums on 
their policy then were paid by insureds who did not sufferer covered losses. Prior to 1951, the Manager had the power 
to assess policyholders within a particular industry on an equal basis.I.C. §72-916. In 1951 ,the Legislature repealed I.C. 
§72-916. Since that date the Manager has had no power to assess any policyholders. In either event, causing the net 
cost of insurance to be higher for policyholders who suffered losses than for those who do not suffer losses is illegal 
conduct and itself a breach of the contract. See Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek dated December December 6, 2010. 
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is issued by the Fund. This claim ignores undisputed facts. First, without a contract between the 
Plaintiffs and the Fund there would be no right to seek the required dividend allocation. LC.§72-
915, by itself, confers no generalized rights on any person or entity- only those in contract with 
the Fund. Second, the Idaho Supreme Court has already expressly ruled that I.C. § 72-915 is a 
provision of the contract between the Fund and its policyholders. Hayden Lake Fire Protection 
Dist v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 399 (2005). 
Second, the Fund claims that it is undisputed and material that I.C. §72-915 was repealed 
on May 6,2009. De! Opp. pp. 5-6. The Fund is apparently not reading SB 1166aa very 
carefully. SB 1166aa provides that there was an emergency such that Section 1 of the act (the 
statement of purpose section) was effective immediately upon the Governor's signature or May 
6,2009. SB 1166aa provides that Section 2 (the language repealing I.C. §72-915) is 
retroactively effective as of January 1,2003. Based solely upon the language ofSB 1166aa it is 
not possible to conclude that the actual repeal ofLC. § 72-915 was itself an emergency 
enactment and, therefore, if it is not effective retroactively (because it is constitutionally 
defective) then it is not effective until other general laws become effective, i.e., on July 1,2009. 
Third, the Fund claims that it is an undisputed fact that Idaho Code § 72-915 was 
repealed retroactive to January 1,2003 (Opp. pp.6). The Plaintiffs do not dispute that SB 
1166aa states that the repeal ofLC. § 72-915 is retroactive to January 1, 2003. However, by 
claiming that the statute is retroactively repealed the Fund is jumping the gun. Until it is 
determined if this action is constitutional it is not correct to say that it is an undisputed fact that 
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I.C. § 72-915 was repealed retroactive to January 1,2003.2 
Fourth, the Fund claims that Plaintiff s claim is foreclosed if the repeal is upheld. De! 
Opp. p.6 This assertion confounds the effect of a retroactive repeal and a prospective repeal. 
Plaintiffs' claim is foreclosed if the retroactive repeal is deemed to be constitutional. If the 
retroactive repeal is unconstitutional then the repeal ofLC. § 72-915 will only apply 
prospectively as of the actual effective date ofthe bill and will not foreclose Plaintiffs' claims. 
Fifth, the Fund engages in a lengthy discussion of the purposes for which it was created. 
Whether this discussion is accurate or not, it is wholly immaterial to the decision to be made by 
the Court. It appears to be offered to give the Fund some justification for filing the Mfidavit of 
James Alcorn. The same can be said for the Fund's continued efforts, under the guise of 
providing "Background" to continue to try to induce the Court to concern itself with a plethora 
of irrelevant information which does little other than to attempt to justify the Manager's repeated 
breaches of the contract. This case does not turn upon whether there is a justifiable breach of 
contract, and consequently the Fund's recitation of the "facts" underlying the Manager's conduct 
are no more relevant here, and should be no more persuasive to this Court than they were to the 
Idaho Supreme Court. 
2 At this point the numbering of the points set out in the memorandum will diverge from the numbering set out 
in the Fund's opposition memorandum. This is because Plaintiff agrees that their claims all relate to dividend 
distributions which occurred after 1, 2003 (Fund's point #4) and that this action was not filed until 24, 2009 (Fund's 
point 5), assuming there is a typographical error in the caption of that point. 
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N. ARGUMENT 
A. Summary of Argument 
Plaintiffs maintain that a retroactive application of the repeal of I.C. §72-915 is a 
violation of the Idaho Contract Clause and as such SB 1 166aa cannot work as a bar to Plaintiffs' 
breach of contract claims. In 1917, the legislature imposed a term into the Funds' contracts.3 
The Plaintiffs and every member of the putative class accepted those contracts and proceeded to 
pay premiums pursuant to those contracts. Idaho decisional law makes clear that the Idaho 
Contracts clause works to prohibit the Legislature from retroactively favoring an entity which it 
created by removing terms from contracts which it mandated in the first place. Straus v. 
Ketchen, 54 Idaho 56 (1933). 
The Fund's response to this argument seeks to dodge controlling Idaho case law and 
proceeds instead on the demonstrably false premise that "Federal law is applicable in interpreting 
Idaho's Constitution both generally and in this case." Del Opp. p.10. Launching from this 
unsupported notion, the Fund's argument proceeds by placing excessive reliance upon a single 
Ninth Circuit case, which discusses but does not employ (because the matter is resolved on a 
threshold issue) a number of factors employed in Federal decisional law analysis relative to the 
Federal Contracts Clause. To support its claim that Federal Contracts Clause analysis applies, 
the Fund also exalts a smattering of cases from other states. Apparently the Fund is suggesting 
that this Court should rely on these decisions in order to overrule the long line of decisions of the 
3 It should be noted that this term remained in place for 92 years and that during that time there was at least 
one overhaul of the law controlling the operations of the Fund. In 1998 the Legislature considered and enacted a 
substantial reorganization of the Fund. During that process, despite the benefit of testimony by the Fund manager and 
several other knowledgeable persons, there is no record that the Fund manager or his supporters made any attempt to 
have the Legislature consider or change I.C. § 72-915 specifically or the dividend allocation process generally. 
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Idaho Supreme Court. However, the Fund fails to cite to a single authority which would support 
this Court in proceeding to disregard the long-standing and controlling Idaho precedent on the 
basis that it is not "modern" or "refmed". De! Opp. pp. 3-4. 
B. Reliance upon Federal Contracts Clause analysis for the purpose of determining 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is unwarranted. 
Plaintiffs contend that this matter can be resolved by looking only to the Idaho Contracts 
Clause. IfSB 1166aa impairs the Plaintiffs' contracts then it is unconstitutional under Idaho law 
and it does not matter if the Fund can demonstrate (which it cannot) that SB 1166aa is not 
unconstitutional under the Federal Contracts Clause. The Federal Contracts Clause imposes a 
floor below which state conduct cannot dip, but, as a provision of the Federal Constitution which 
infringes upon the power of the States who joined the Union, it is understandable that the Courts 
have read into that infringement a limited willingness to defer to an exercise of police power by a 
state legislature. The Federal Contracts Clause does not however impose a ceiling upon the 
rights that the citizens of a state may impose upon their state government in the Constitution they 
adopt. This means of course that the Idaho Supreme Court could, as it has done in other 
instances, properly determine that the Idaho Contracts Clause is intolerant of State action which 
impairs contracts, especially when the contract right at issue was mandated by the legislature in 
the flrst instance. Indeed, considering Idaho Decisional Law, this is exactly what has happened 
with respect to the Courts' application of the Idaho Contracts Clause. The Fund seeks to avoid 
the clear result of applying Idaho Contracts Clause analysis in this case in several ways which 
will be addressed below. 
1. The contents of the pleadings do not control the issues which must be 
proven in order for the Plaintiff to prevail. 
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The Fund suggests, without any supporting authority, that because the Plaintiffs have 
alleged in their Amended Complaint that SB 1166aa violates both the Federal and the State 
contracts clause, they cannot prevail in this action unless the they prove that the Bill violates both 
provisions. De! Opp. p 10. This assertion places undue weight upon the pleadings in this action 
which are intended only to give notice of the claims being made but which have never been held 
under modem procedural rules to set the standard of what must be proven to prevail upon those 
claims. In making this assertion Defendants fail to address the fact that all Idaho precedent 
supports a conclusion that if SB 1166aa violates the protection afforded by the Idaho Contracts 
Clause, it cannot eliminate the contractual rights at issue in this matter. There is no reason why 
Plaintiffs cannot proceed and prevail solely upon the Idaho Contracts Clause claim. Plaintiffs 
have the absolute right to determine the basis for their motion. 
2. Federal law is not applicable in interpreting Idaho's Constitution both 
generally and in the context of the Contracts Clause. 
Placing unfounded reliance upon State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 224 P. 3d 480 (2009), the 
Fund asserts that "Federal law is applicable in interpreting Idaho's Constitution both generally 
and in this case." De! Opp. pp. 10. While it may be argued that the Korn Court employed a 
"single, dispositive analysis," it is specious to conclude or assert that the Court conducted any 
analysis whatsoever as to whether the challenged ordinance "impaired the obligations" of any 
contract or even got close to deciding that the constitutional analysis would be the same 
regardless of whether the Federal Contract Clause claim or the Idaho Contracts Clause claim was 
being evaluated. The Court's ruling that no Contract Clause violation occurred resulted entirely 
from its threshold evidentiary determination that " ... Korn simply failed to meet his burden of 
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establishing the existence of a contract or contracts that were affected by adoption of the 
ordinance." 224 P. 3d 480, 483. Having detennined that no contract existed, the Korn Court 
never even reached the question of whether or not an impainnent had occurred, and it certainly 
did not reach the question of whether Federal decisional law relative to the Federal Contracts 
Clause had any bearing at all upon how the Idaho Contracts Clause should be applied. 
In a similar vein, while it may be asserted that our Supreme Court "has not indicated it has 
(or will) differentiate its analysis ofIdaho's Contract Clause versus that of the federal 
constitution" De! Opp. p 11, such an assertion is meaningless in view of the fact that Idaho 
Courts have repeatedly employed an analysis which, unlike the analysis applied by Federal Courts 
to the Federal Contracts Clause, shows no tolerance for Legislative action which impairs contracts 
involving State-created entities or which arise from attempts to retroactively remove tenns 
mandated by the Legislature in the first instance. This groundless assertion is being employed 
because the Fund is unable to cite a single case in which the Idaho Supreme Court has held that 
Idaho Contract Clause claims will be analyzed by recourse to Federal Contract Clause 
jurisprudence. Indeed, the Fund's assertion ignores the conclusion compelled by juxtaposing the 
decision of District Judge Chase Clark's (United States District Court for the District of Idaho) 
decision in United States for Use and Benefit of Midwest Stell & Iron Works Co. v. Henlyet 
al. 117 F. Supp. 928 (D.Idaho,1954) which found an Idaho statute constitutional applying Federal 
Contracts Clause analysis against the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Penrose v Commercial 
Travelers Insurance Company, 75 Idaho 85, 753 P.3d 969 (1954) which a few months later and 
with full awareness of Judge Clark's ruling, found the same statute unconstitutional applying 
Idaho Contracts Clause analysis. When these cases are considered together it is certain that the 
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Idaho Supreme Court has manifested a clear intention to " differentiate its analysis of Idaho's 
Contract Clause versus that of the federal constitution." 
Despite being aware that Judge Clark's determination that the Idaho statute was a 
reasonable exercise of the State's police power and therefor not a violation of the Federal 
Contracts Clause, the Penrose Court refused to reach the same conclusion with reference to the 
Idaho Contracts Clause. The juxtaposition of these two cases, so close in time and involving the 
exact same Idaho statute, provides a compelling demonstration that our Supreme Court 
consciously considers the Idaho Contracts Clause as imposing a greater limit upon the Legislature 
than is imposed by the Federal Contracts Clause, and that it will therefore employ a different 
analysis when dealing with Idaho Contracts Clause claims than is applied by Federal Courts 
construing challenges based on the Federal Contracts Clause. 
3. The Fund erroneously claims that in the context of the facts of this case, 
both the Idaho and United States' Contract Clauses are not to be read 
literally and that this Court should utilize the three-step analysis employed 
by some Federal Courts to determine whether state action is 
unconstitutional under the Idaho provision. 
The Fund argues that the Idaho Contracts clause should be interpreted using the three step 
analysis set out in RUI One Corp. v. City o/Berkeley, 371 F. 3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2004). Del Opp. p 
11.-14.4 This assertion is belied by every Idaho Supreme Court decision interpreting our State 
Contracts Clause. In every case which the Plaintiffs have cited, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
used a consistent pattern of analysis which is based upon a long line ofIdaho precedent and which 
does not utilize the three step approach described in the majority and dissenting opinions in RUI. 
4 This argument is raised previously raised by the Fund, See De! Memo, pp. 18-19 and rebutted by the 
Plaintiffs. See Plf Opp., pp.9-16. 
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Lacking any supportive Idaho cases the Fund is left to rely upon Federal decisions and a 
single decision from New Mexico. De! Opp. 11-12. The Fund does not provide this Court with 
any authority upon which this Court could rely to jettison long standing Idaho precedent. Instead 
the Fund seems inclined to justify ignoring the entire body of Idaho Contracts Clause 
jurisprudence on the basis that "the modern law" pertaining to the Federal Contracts Clause is 
somehow a better way to apply the State Contracts Clause. De! Opp. p 14. The Fund does not 
explain how or why the analysis employed in Idaho Supreme Court decisions involving the Idaho 
Contracts Clause should be treated as outmoded when it has been consistently applied in cases 
decided as recently as 1993. Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 850 P.2d 749 (1993) and Curr v. 
Curr, 124 Idaho 686. (1993). In addition, almost all of the Idaho case which are relied upon by 
Plaintiffs post date the earliest U.S. Supreme Court cases which holds that the Federal Contract 
Clause will, in limited circumstances, give way to reasonable exercises of police power. See, 
Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). Despite the fact that 
Federal decisional law has, since as early as 1934, interpreted the Federal Contracts Clause as 
allowing, in limited circumstances, for contracts to be impaired by exercises of the state's police 
power, the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently not adopted this approach. Indeed, it did not do 
so even when the choice was clearly before it in Penrose. This Court should clearly reject the 
suggestion that it should defer not only to the Federal Courts, but to the highest Court of a sister 
state. This is especially true when Idaho precedent is so clear and consistent. 
4. The Idaho Cases cited and discussed by the Fund lend no support to its 
argument that Federal Law analysis or something akin to it should be 
applied in this case. 
Defendants' dismissive characterization of the whole line ofIdaho appellate cases 
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interpreting Article 1, Section 16 of the Idaho Constitution as well as their attempts to distinguish 
the individual cases can only be understood in the context of their prefatory remarks: 
Plaintiffs ultimately fail to make discussion of how these cases interact with the correct 
test under the Contract Clause, or that Idaho courts employ a Contract Clause analysis 
different from that employed by the federal courts regarding the U.S. Constitution's 
Contract Clause. See, e.g., State v. Korn, 148 Idaho at 413 ... 
There are numerous problems with this formulation which carry over into and plague Defendants' 
discussion of the individual Idaho cases. 
Primary among those problems is the Fund's failure to appreciate the high level of 
intolerance the Idaho Supreme Court has shown for legislative attempts to retroactively remove 
terms which it mandated be included in contracts between Idaho citizens and entities created by 
legislative action. In Straus v. Ketchen, 54 Idaho 56, 83 (1933), the Court established the 
foundational understanding on which its Contract Clause cases have rested -and wisely so- for the 
intervening 77 years. It is against this background of wisdom and restraint, rather than against 
Defendant's assertion that our Court has yet to discover the "correct test" that this Court should 
review each cited Idaho case. 
The relevant facts of Straus can be readily summarized. Drainage Districts had been 
formed by legislative action and they were allowed to issue bonds for development purposes. A 
particular process for repaying these bonds was established by the laws in place at the time that 
the bonds were issued and sold by the Drainage District. Later the legislature changed the law and 
allowed for a different manner of repayment, which, under the circumstances, could have lead to 
some of the real property securing the extant bonds to be released from the liens before those 
bonds were fully paid off. The Defendants contended that this would unduly compromise the 
security ofthe bond holders. Id 54 Idaho at 59-63. 
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The Court refused to allow the change in the statute to be applied retroactively to bonds 
purchased before the passage of the statute at issue. Specifically the Court stated: 
It is conceded by the parties that the bonds in question are contracts existing as 
between the land owners and the bondholders. Under the federal and state 
constitutional provisions above quoted, no law can ever be passed impairing the 
obligations of a contract, and no exception is made, consequently the contracts of a 
drainage district stand upon the same footing as those of individuals or any other 
agency. The legislature cannot, under such constitutional prohibitions, authorize 
under the police power of the state the creation of a contracting agency and permit 
the contracting of obligations, and by the same power destroy its contracts and 
abolish its obligations. To permit the legislature to do so would destroy the very 
essence of the constitutional prohibitions. Clearly such was never the intention of 
the framers of the Constitution. Were it otherwise no person would ever be safe to 
enter into a contract with public or quasi-public corporations, creatures of the law. 
fd 83 (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently employed such strong 
language when, on the authority of a provision which is included in the Article of the State 
Constitution titled "Declaration of Rights", it strikes down legislation which impairs existing 
contracts, especially on a retroactive basis. 
Plaintiffs decline Defendants' tacit suggestion that they should defend each of the Idaho 
cases whose reasoning Defendants attack and whose holdings they seek to narrow or distinguish. 
These cases each speak for themselves, and each represents an important milestone in the history 
of how Idaho's Contracts Clause has been interpreted by Idaho Courts. Instead, Plaintiffs will 
discuss each of the Idaho cases cited by Defendants which are making their first appearance in any 
briefmg in this case, along with other Idaho decisions mentioned in Defendants' cases: 
a. Eriksen v. Blue Cross, 116 Idaho 693 (Ct. App. 1989). Eriksen involved an attorney 
fee award in a case involving an insurance policy filed after the Legislature amended I.C. § 12-
120(3) allowing fees to a prevailing party in a contracts case. The policy had been issued before 
the effective date of the amendment but the commencement of the litigation was after the effective 
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date. The actual language of Eriksen is instructive: 
.... Penrose is inapposite here. It involved an insurance statute which authorized 
attorney fee awards only to policyholders. Because the statute shifted the balance 
of power between contracting parties, by identifying a favored party in the event of 
litigation, the Supreme Court barred its application to pre-existing contracts. 
Penrose, 75 Idaho at 540, 275 P.2d at 979 (Keeton, J., concurring). Idaho Code § 
12-120(3) is different. That statute is party-neutral. It mandates fee awards to 
prevailing parties but does not affect bargaining relationships by designating 
favored parties. Therefore, the policy rationale of Penrose does not apply to this 
case. 
We also believe the reasoning of Myers is inapplicable here. In Myers, we drew a 
line against application of IC § 12-120(3) to suits filed prior to the 1986 
amendment because the parties in such cases had no opportunity to weigh the risk 
of exposure to mandatory fee awards before deciding to litigate. That is not so 
here. Although the insurance policy was issued prior to the 1986 amendment, the 
application of the attorney fee provision was triggered only by the commencement 
of litigation after the amendment had become effective. Thus, unlike the parties in 
Myers, the parties in this case were aware of the attorney fee risk when they chose 
to litigate. 116 Idaho 693, 695. (Emphasis in original) 
This court of appeals case neither mentions the Contracts Clause nor characterizes Penrose 
as "resting" upon a policy rationale. Although the analysis in Penrose is very brief, it is 
unmistakable that the decision rests upon the conclusion that the Idaho Contracts Clause is clear 
that it means what its says and that there is no mere "policy rationale" as argued by the 
Defendants. De! Opp. p. 32. 
What can be drawn from Eriksen is that there are compelling differences between the 
circumstances presented in Eriksen and Idaho precedent. First, in Eriksen the change imposed on 
the contract was "party neutral" in that it applied to and impacted both parties to the contract 
equally. The same cannot be said about the circumstances presented in this case. SB 1166aa 
works to impose a burden upon the Plaintiffs by taking away their contractual right to receive 
back a part of the consideration which they gave for their insurance policies, while simultaneously 
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conferring a benefit on the Fund by releasing it from paying damages caused to Plaintiffs by the 
Fund's breach of contract. The Fund is not penalized or burdened one whit. SB 1166aa not only 
shifts the balance of power, it removes the Plaintiffs' power to enforce their contractual right 
retroactively and completely. This is exactly the type of governmental vice which the Contracts 
Clause was intended to prevent. 
Second, as they are applied, the attorney fees statutes are not "strictly" retroactive. While 
they are sometimes interpreted as applying to contracts which existed before the passage of the 
statute they are only triggered when a lawsuit is filed by one of the parties after the passage of the 
statute. While it is true that the parties to the contract were having an attorney's fee provision 
imposed upon their contracts after the contract was formed, they each had the power to decide 
whether to trigger the impact of that statute by failing to resolve their differences before a lawsuit 
was filed. As the Court noted in Eriksen, the decision to litigate is a volitional one, one which the 
parties make knowing of the state of the law at the time they do so. 
The Statute at issue in the case at bar bears no relationship to an attorneys fees statute 
which, at most, may shift the balance of power between the parties. This enactment eliminates all 
remedies available to one of the parties, which impairs the very core of the contract -
consideration. Thus, the statute herein challenged, by contrast to the statute at issue in Eriksen, 
features virtually every vice which has historically caused our Supreme Court to find a law 
unconstitutional under our Idaho Contracts Clause. 
Almost identical considerations animated the Supreme Court decision in Bott v. Idaho 
State Building Authority, 122 Idaho 471, 835 P. 2d 1282 (1992). In deciding the case the Court 
stated: 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [I.R.C.P. 
56 (a), (c) and (d)] - Page 17 
000329 
We are not persuaded that Penrose v. Commercial Travelers Ins. Co., 75 Idaho 
524, 275 P.2d 969 (1954), cited by the Authority, controls our decision. Penrose 
involved an insurance statute which authorized attorney fee awards to 
policyholders only. This Court barred its application to pre-existing contracts 
because, in the words of a concurring justice, it "would create a new liability and 
impose a burden not covered by the terms of the insurance policy." Id. at 540, 275 
P.2d at 979 (Keeton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Our Court of Appeals has aptly distinguished that statute in Penrose from L C. § 
12-120(3): "Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is different. That statute is party-neutral. It 
mandates fee awards to prevailing parties but does not affect bargaining 
relationships by designating favored parties. Therefore, the policy rationale of 
Penrose does not apply to this case." Eriksen v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 116 Idaho 
693, 695, 778 P.2d 815,817 (Ct.App.1989). As in this case, Eriksen involved a 
contract entered into before the applicable amendment, but where the lawsuit was 
filed after the amendment. Accordingly, an award of attorney fees under L C. § 12-
120(3) to the prevailing party below is appropriate regardless of the fact that the 
Agreement was formed prior to the amendments. 
Id 480-81. Given that there is nothing "party neutral" about SB 1166aa, Bott lends no support to 
a claim that Penrose should not be controlling in this case. SB 1166aa simultaneously imposes on 
the Plaintiffs, without any recourse, an assessment because they are smaller policyholders or 
because they suffered covered losses and also the burden of subsidizing favored policyholders 
who benefit from the Manager's arbitrary decision to breach the contract. SB 1166aa does not 
limit itself to changing future contracts but attempts instead to take away vested contractual rights 
which bear directly upon the cost of the insurance - the consideration for the policy. 
Agricultural Products Corp. v. Utah Power and Light Co., 98 Idaho 23, 557 P. 2d 617 
(1976), also fails to lend support to the Fund's position. Rather, after recognizing the vitality of 
the State Contract Clause, the Court acknowledges, through reference to its own decisions rather 
than Federal authority, that the contracts of public utilities command a special place within the 
law, due in large measure to the extensive regulation of their rates by the Public Utilities 
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Commission. Of significance, here, is that the rate adjustments in question were all prospective, 
and no retroactive tinkering was involved, unlike the case at bar. Hence the only lesson to be 
derived from this case is the importance the Court gives to role of the Contracts Clause in 
preventing Idaho contracts from being retroactively impaired by governmental action. 
City a/Hayden v. Washington Water Power Co., 108 Idaho 467; 700 P. 2d 89 (1985), 
holds that notwithstanding decisions such as Agricultural Products Corp. supra., legislative 
enactments can be found to impair the contracts of even those entities regulated by the Public 
Utilities Commission. The Court did observe that, in the context of public utility law, 
governmental entities do have an "inherent right to enact valid police power regulations, even if 
contracts are thereby affected." 108 Idaho 467, 469, but at the same time imposed a critical limit 
to that right by stating " ... the police power is limited to governmental acts promoting the health, 
comfort, safety and general welfare of society ....... It does not embrace revenue measures." 
Jd.( emphasis added) Here, as Plaintiffs have demonstrated in prior briefing, the retroactive repeal 
of the dividend statute not only fails to promote the health, comfort, safety and general welfare of 
society at large, but serves solely to provide post hoc validation for the Manager's disregard for 
the contractual obligations of the Fund which have resulted in fmancialloss to tens of thousands 
of Idaho businesses. SB 1166aa is nothing if it is not a measure intended to protect the Fund 
from paying damages - it is all about revenue. 
Steward v. Nelson, 54 Idaho 437,32 P.2d 843(1934); Tanner v. Shearmire, 115 Idaho 
1060, 772 P.2d 267 (1987), and Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 850 P.2d 749(1993). Defendants 
depict this trio of cases as being "easy" Contracts Clause cases given that in each instance the 
unconstitutional legislative action operated to retroactively deprive a party of a legislatively 
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created remedy (Steward-limiting right to foreclose, Tanner - terminating the right to foreclose 
after a period shorter than provided for in the mortgage and Curtis- eliminating the right to sue on 
a note secured by property) which was available to them under their respective contracts prior to 
the passage of the challenged law. In commenting on the latter two cases, Defendants observe 
that: 
"The effect of the amendment, however was to effectively strip the right to act on 
the note, requiring note-holders to seek foreclosure as a primary recovery 
mechanism instead. Such a change would obviously be a 'substantial' impairment 
of the notes, as the note-holders would largely be left with a right without a 
remedy ... " 
De! Opp. p.34. Ironically Defendants accurately describe the net effect on Plaintiffs and the 
members of the class herein of allowing the repeal ofI.C. § 72-915 to be applied retroactively. 
Unless this Court fmds and rules that the retroactivity aspect of SB 1166aa is unconstitutional, the 
"net effect of the amendment" would be to totally leave the Plaintiffs with a right without any 
remedy other than to seek the protection of the Contracts Clause.5 • If Steward, Tanner, and 
Curtis are "easy" cases, the case at bar may be the easiest of all cases to be brought before the 
Courts of this State, for it not only seeks to retroactively excuse the Fund's years-long egregious 
breaches of its contractual obligtions, but also would operate to deprive Plaintiffs of the ability to 
utilize the Courts of this State to redress those wrongs. The vices inherent in making the repeal of 
I.e. § 72-915 retroactive are readily apparent. Any constitutionally acceptable virtue is non-
existent. 
5 It should be noted in all three cases the legislative action did not leave the protesting contract party with no 
remedy at all but rather worked to deprive that party of 
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C. Even if it were appropriate to apply Federal decisional law analysis in determining 
a SB 1166aa. the Fund wrongfully concludes that SB 1166aa is constitutional 
under either the Idaho or the U.S. Constitutions. 
The Fund at no point explains how 1166aa can be held to be constitutional utilizing the 
analysis articulated and used in Idaho decisions. Instead, the Fund wants to divert the 
consideration of the issue onto a side track which the Fund considers to be more favorable to its 
position. The siding selected by the Fund is an analysis set out in RUI One Corp. v. City of 
Berkely, 317 F 3d at 1147. The majority and dissenting opinions set out a multiple part analysis 
unlike anything ever employed by an Idaho Court. The Fund's arguments with respect to how the 
case at bar should be resolved in its favor applying the analysis described in RUI One as they 
appear in the Fund's Memorandum opposing Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment are 
virtually identical to the arguments set out in the Fund's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Compare, De! Memo. pp 21-37 with De! Opp. pp 14-30. Plaintiffs have 
already responded to most of these arguments, Plf Opp. 16-30, and will not cut and paste those 
responses into this memorandum. Instead the Plaintiffs will summarize those responses and go 
beyond summary only where they deem it appropriate to expand upon or add to arguments 
previously stated. 
1. The Idaho Legislature has caused a substantial impairment of a contractual 
relationship. 
The Court in R UI One would begin its analysis of this issue with an inquiry into whether 
there was in the contract at issue an agreement as to the matter subject to the legislation. To 
satisfy this requirement it should be sufficient for the Plaintiffs to show that SB 1166aa, in 
attempting to repeal I.C. § 72-915 retroactive to January 1,2003, undertakes to remove a term 
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from their contracts with the Fund. Given the Supreme Court's holdings in Kelso, supra, and 
Hayden Lake, supra, it is apparent that the Supreme Court ofldaho considers I. C.§ 72-915 to be 
an express term of the agreement between Fund and its policyholders. See also Farber v. State 
Insurance Fund, supra,andPlf Opp. pp. 18-19. 
One of the Fund's arguments is that Farber changed the law and, as a consequence, the 
enactment ofSB 1166aa was merely an act to restore the law to its pre-Farber state. De! Opp. p. 
16. That is absolutely untrue. The Fund appears to be laboring under the misapprehension that 
the Manager's conduct and not the Legislative enactment determines the law of the state and, in 
this case, the terms of the contract. Farber did no more than to recognize that the long-standing 
existing law, incorporated as a contract provision, was clear and unambiguous. It changed no 
part of that law, and rendered no "new" interpretation of the law. The "remedy" then adopted by 
the Idaho Legislature was not a remedy in response to a change in the law or a shift in judicial 
interpretation; it was a renege, pure and simple. To give it any more weight than that would be to 
suggest that the Legislature has the power to overrule the Supreme Court. In legal terms, that 
renege was an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of the Fund to pay and the right of 
the Fund policyholder to receive a pro rata share of the dividend corpus for each of the years 
within the class period. 
In its effort to avoid the clear import of the applicable Supreme Court holdings (one of 
which, Hayden Lake, the Fund does not even acknowledge) the Fund makes a curious effort to 
use the doctrine of "reasonable expectations" as both a sword and a shield. 
Using it as a shield the Fund argues that the doctrine has been discredited and rejected in 
Idaho. The Fund appears to perceive that this helps it because, in its view, the Plaintiffs' claims 
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are premised not upon an actual right to receive a dividend but rather upon an expectation that 
they will get a dividend. De! Opp. p.1S:"16. This perception is based upon the Fund's half-
accurate claim that there is no absolute, contractual right to a dividend under the contract of 
worker's compensation insurance with the Fund. This claim is true up to a point but it is 
irrelevant in the circumstances presented in this case where a dividend has been declared and 
illegally distributed every year relevant to this action. Until the Manager decides to declare and to 
distribute a dividend, no policyholder has any right to receive any dividend. However, as has 
been established in Farber, supra, once the Manager of the Fund decides in his discretion that 
there is ample surplus to safely declare a dividend (generally between five and twenty million 
dollars), that contract,per Farber, clearly and unambiguously requires that the dividend corpus 
must then be divided among all of the Funds time-qualified (held policy for more than 6 months) 
policyholders on a pro rata basis. That is a contractual right, and the Fund's duty to pay those 
dividends to all policyholders in the manner mandated by Farber is a contractual obligation. The 
concept of "reasonable expectations" has nothing at all to do with Plaintiffs' claim that they have, 
as long as they do so within the statue of limitations, a right to sue the Fund for breach of contract 
as a result of the illegal dividend allocation policy utilized by the Manager which constitutes a 
breach of contract. 
Next. the Fund attempts to use the discredited doctrine of reasonable expectations as a 
shield. In this regard, the Fund asserts that because the Manager consistently broke the law and 
breached the contract the Plaintiffs "cannot paint a right to a strict pro rata dividend distribution as 
some variety of expected or vested contractual right that has been disrupted by retroactive 
application." De! Opp. pp. 16 -19. This assertion is premised upon several cases from other 
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jurisdictions which must apparently give more credit to the doctrine of reasonable expectations 
than is afforded to that doctrine by the Idaho Court. Throughout the whole discussion what the 
Fund never attempts to deal with is the fact that as to breach of contract claims made within the 
period of a statute of limitations (asserted defense here), and absent a (waiver -not a basis for the 
current motion) a contracting party always has the right to sue the other party to the contract for 
breaches of that contract (single or repetitive) and thus always has a very reasonable expectation 
of a right to recover in the event of a breach. 
The Fund begins by suggesting reliance upon Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utility 
Commission of Texas, 615 S.W.2d 947,956-57 (Texas Civ. App. 1981) but this case is not 
helpful to the Fund's position. At issue there was a retroactive adjustment of utility rates. The 
decision in that case turned upon the court's conclusion that" ... no person can have a vested 
right in any rate other than the last legal or official rate promulgated by the Commission." In the 
context of this case, the last legal right given to the Fund's policyholders was that right conferred 
in 1917 and unchanged until the tinkering 2009 Idaho Legislature attempted the unconstitutional 
repeal. 
The Fund cites three tests which were identified in Southwestern Bell as appropriate tests in 
determining of a legislative change generates an impermissible impairment. De! Opp. p. 17. It 
must be noted that until I.C. § 72-915 was repealed it was never changed. It was broken 
repeatedly by the Manager but when the Supreme Court was asked by the Fund, in Farber, to 
declare the law ambiguous and give it an interpretation which would validate the Manager it 
refused to do so and found instead that the law has clearly and unambiguously provided from the 
day of its enactment for a pro rata allocation of each declared dividend. Under these 
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circumstances the analysis in Southwestern Bell is inapposite. 
Even if this were not true, the tests articulated have no bearing upon this case. 
The third test, "whether the statute surprises persons who have long relied on a contrary state of 
the law" is surely not applicable here. Here again, the Fund confuses the illegal conduct of the 
Manager of the Fund in ignoring I.C. § 72-915 with the existence or creation of "a contrary state 
of the law." Here, though, the law did not change. I.C. § 72-915 was since its enactment constant, 
clear and unambiguous. Farber did nothing to change this. The second test: "whether the 
retroactive provision gives effect to or defeats bona fide intentions or reasonable expectations of 
affected persons" similarly provides the Fund with no help. Policyholders had, until the passage 
of 1166aa (the retroac~ive provision) a contractual right to a pro rata share of allocated dividend 
and a bona fide right to sue to enforce their contract and to collect damages. Perforce they had a 
reasonable expectation that, if they chose to act to recover on the contract, the Fund would be 
compelled to honor that right. If the retroactive repeal ofI.C. § 72-915 were permitted to be 
effective, this contractual right and the right to seek recovery would be taken away completely. It 
follows that Southwestern Bell, as it deals with a change in the law, does not provide a helpful 
evaluation. 
Similarly, the cases cited by SIP, Boykin v. Boeing Co., 128 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 1997) and 
In re Marriage o/Giroux, 704 P.2d 160 (Wash. App. 1984) give no succor to the Fund as they are 
wholly inapposite. In both instances there was an actual "change of law" situation as opposed to a 
situation, as presented in this case, where the law had always been clear and all that changed was 
one contracting party's attempts to ignore the law and, when caught violating it, a furtherattempt 
to justify that conduct by claiming that the law was not clear. 
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In the Giroux situation, the law in Washington was that a military pension was community 
property. The U.S. Supreme Court, in a case styled McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981), 
held that federal law prohibits state courts from dividing military retirement pay pursuant to state 
community property laws. That decision completely changed Washington law relative to the 
division of property in a divorce proceeding. 
Congress did not like the McCarty decision, however, and enacted a statute effectively 
reversing the McCarty holding and providing for the retroactive change to the date of the 
McCarty decision. The Senate Report explained the intent as: "The purpose of this provision is 
to place the Courts in the same position that they were in on June 26, 1981, the date of the 
McCarty decision, with respect to treatment of non-disability military retired or retainer pay .... " 
In the context of the case, the serviceman thought that he had squeaked through a narrow window 
of time between the McCarty decision and the remedial legislation passed by Congress which was 
retroactive to the date of McCarty. He wanted to keep all of the retirement monies for himself. 
The Court of Appeals of Washington did not allow this. 
It is important to note that there is no analysis in this decision of any contractual language 
or contract between Giroux and his spouse. Nor is there any analysis under the Contracts Clause. 
The case is clearly decided based on due process grounds and under the separation of powers 
clause in the Constitution. It is hardly applicable here. "Settled expectations" or "reasonable 
expectations" might have some applicability in Washington in situation involving a change of 
law in a non-contractual situation. However, where there is a contract, as here, then Idaho law is 
very clear - Idaho courts must look to "traditional rules of contract construction" and reasonable 
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expectations have no part in that process. Ryals v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 134 Idaho 302, 1 
P.3d 80~ (2000). 
Similarly, in the Boykin case the matter revolved around a wage dispute. This was a 
class action brought by salaried engineers, management, professional and administrative 
employees who were allegedly not receiving legally appropriate overtime compensation 
for hours worked in excess of a 40 hour work week. This Ninth Circuit case is decided on 
the separation of powers clause in the Washington Constitution; there is neither any 
analysis of the Contract Clause nor even a citation to the Contracts Clause of either the 
Washington State or Federal Constitutions. 
The salaried employees had a collective bargaining agreement with Boeing which 
allowed them some overtime payment but not at the 1.5 multiplier required for non-
exempt employees. Both the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act and the Washington 
Minimum Wage Act exempted the class of employees bringing the lawsuit from the 1.5 
multiplier for overtime work. However, in 1995, the Washington Court of Appeals had 
determined in a case styled Tift v. Professional Nursing Services, 886 P.2d 1158(1995) 
that under State law a payment of any overtime on an hourly basis (as provided in the 
collective bargaining agreement) defeats an the "salary" exemption which would otherwise 
prohibit the employee from receiving overtime with a multiplier of 1.5. This changed the 
applicable law. In direct response, the Washington legislature amended the Washington 
Minimum Wage Act by stating "the payment of compensation or provision of 
compensatory time off in addition to a salary shall not be a factor in determining whether a 
person is exempted under RCW 49.46.010(5)(c)." Wash. Rev. Code Section 
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49.46. 130(2)(a). The law was intended to apply retroactively and negated the Tift 
decision. 
This sequence of events brought the employees back to their contract with Boeing 
and erased the change in the law created by Tift. They then argued that the Tift decision 
gave them "rights" which could not be taken away by the subsequent Washington 
legislature'S retroactive enactment which effectively cancelled Tift. They argued that they 
had a "reasonable expectation" that Tift would continue to act in their favor and that it 
could not be erased by a subsequent retroactive legislative act by the Washington 
legislature. 
The Fund has taken this Boykin case out of context and wants to equate Tift with 
Farber. The difference between the two is immediately apparent, however, and the 
comparison is an apples and oranges approach. Farber did not change the law. Farber 
stated what the clear and plain meaning of the law was and essentially construed the 
contract between the Fund and its policyholders to reach the conclusion that the 
contractual obligation of the Fund was unambiguous and required a pro rata distribution 
of the dividend corpus, once such corpus was created by the Manager. Tift, on the other 
hand, did not interpret a contract or a contractual term but, rather, interpreted an 
ambiguous Washington statute which was not a part of the contract either between the 
Plaintiff/employees in that case or the Plaintiffs/employees at Boeing. Thus, there was no 
interference with any contractual obligation which, of course, explains why there is no 
Contract Clause analysis in the case. Boykin, accordingly, is not helpful to the Court's 
analysis here, and it is of no avail to the Fund. 
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All conditions precedent applicable to the policyholders, Plaintiffs here, have been 
fulfilled. The policyholders paid their premiums. The Fund accepted those premiums. 
The Fund also accepted its duties to comply with the terms and conditions of its contract 
of insurance with its policyholders which include the existing Idaho statutes creating and 
governing the Fund. See Kelso and Hayden Lake, supra. The rights of the policyholders 
to receive the amount of dividend justly due them on a pro rata basis depends solely on 
the clear and unambiguous language of the Funds contract with them. This is not a matter 
of any "reasonable expectation" but an express contractual right. The Fund's argument 
ignores contract law, mounts an offense based on a discredited and, in the context of this 
case, wholly inapplicable legal principle and its mistaken view that the Manager has the 
power to establish the law of the State and unilateral alter the terms of existing 
policyholder contracts. But the Fund cannot avoid, ostrich-like, the clear, contractual right 
of the Fund's policyholders to receive a pro rata portion of the dividend corpus. The 
legislative abrogation of that right on a retroactive basis clearly is offensive to 
constitutional principles. 
2. The retroactive repeal on.c. § 72-915 is a change in law that 
impairs the contractual relationship between SIF and its 
policyholders. 
In framing its argument that there is no impairment of the contractual relationship 
between the Fund and its policyholders, the Fund appears to seek to ignore the fact that 
what Plaintiffs claim to be unconstitutional is not the fact that the Legislature elected to 
repeall.C. § 72-915, but that it made the repeal retroactive, thereby completely eliminating 
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the already fully accrued rights to receive apro rata share of the dividends that were 
declared and distributed. De! Opp. p. 21. The Fund aggravates this oversight by 
contending that what must be impaired is the "contractual relationship", when, in fact, the 
wording of the Idaho Contracts Clause addresses and prohibits laws which impair "the 
obligations of contracts." While this difference may seem insignificant at first blush, it 
plainly is not, given that what Plaintiffs are asking this Court to do, in essence, is to go 
back during each of the years of the class period, and order the Fund to pay to the 
Plaintiffs the difference between what they did pay to them as dividends, and the amount 
that they were obligated to pay to them out of each dividend that was distributed. This 
case does not implicate the larger "contractual relationship" between the parties, but is 
directed only at this one obligation of the Fund. 
Nor does it avail Defendants to point out that the policy of insurance provides that: 
"Terms of this insurance that conflict with the workers compensation law are changed by 
this statement to conform to this law." De! Opp. p. 21. This provision is irrelevant to the 
circumstances presented by this case. The term "workers compensation law" has no 
application to any provision contained in Title 72, Chapter 9 of the Idaho Code, as that 
term only applies to Chapters 1 through and including 8 of that Title. See 1 e. § 72-101 
(1), and Statutory Notes to Ie. 72-101. 6 Chapter 9, which included I.C. § 72-915 is not 
part of the ''workers compensation law" of Idaho. It is titled "State Insurance Fund" and 
6 In 1971 the Legislature engaged in a "comprehensive recodification of the workmen's compensation law and 
occupational disease law of the state ofIdaho." As part of that process it repealed Chapters 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,11 and 
12ofTitle72. Clearly, while the creation of the State Insurance Fund was part of the process of adopting a Worker's 
Compensation system, the statutes establishing and regulating the Fund are not themselves part of the Workers's 
Compensation law. 
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consists of a specialized set of provisions creating and governing the Fund. None of its 
provisions has any bearing upon the substantive law pertaining to worker's compensation. 
Therefore, considering the plain language of the policy, the cited policy provision to 
changes in the law regulating the conduct of the State Insurance Fund are inapposite 
If it could be said that the phrase "worker's compensation law" intends to include 
the statutes regulating the State Insurance Fund, the provision only has application if the 
retroactive repeal is constitutional but it cannot work to render the retroactive repeal 
constitutional. If the term of the contract at issue is "allocate any dividends distributed on 
apro rata basis, it is not in conflict with I.C. §72-915 because it is I.C. §72-915. Thus, 
there is nothing to change to create conformity with the law. If an attempt is made to 
remove I.C. §72-915 in an unconstitutional retroactive manner, then that attempt will fail 
and the terms of the contract will need no change to be in conformity with the law. It is 
preposterous to suggest that some how an apparently unconstitutional retroactive repeal of 
I.C. §72-915 could be rendered magically constitutional because at the instant of its 
passage the contract was changed so that the pro rata allocation term disappeared leaving 
no right to impair. 
The truest test, however, of whether or not making the repeal ofI.C. § 72-915 
retroactive impairs the obligations that the Fund owes to its policyholders for all of the 
years in question lies in what the Fund is asking the Court to do. It is important to note that 
all of the dividends which were paid by the Fund in the class period stated in this action 
pertain to policies which were issued and held for at least 6 months prior to January 1, 
2009, or several months prior to the issuance of the decision in Farber and the 
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introduction ofSB 1166aa.7 This being true, when the Fund asks the this Court to grant it 
Summary Judgment based on the passage of 1166aa, its goal is to cause the claims of the 
Plaintiffs 
and the members of the class validated by Farber to be rendered unenforceable. 
3. Retroactive repeal ofI.C. 72 § 915"substantially impairs" the 
contractual rights of the Plaintiffs and the putative class members. 
The Fund claims that the retroactive removal of a term of the contract which bears 
directly upon the cost of the coverage conferred by the contract is not substantial for 
several reasons. First, the Fund claims that the core purpose of the policy is to provide 
coverage for workers compensation claims and to not create circumstances in which a 
policyholder might get a "fractional return on paid premiums." De! Opp. p. 23. This 
argument ignores the fact that what insurance costs is critically important to people. What 
is paid is the policyholders' portion of the consideration and consideration is at the very 
heart of every contract. The Fund asserts that everyone gets the same coverage regardless 
of how much they pay but what this ignores is that everyone pays the same premium 
amount per dollar of payroll per class of employee. Which means that everyone gets the 
same coverage per dollar of payroll per class of employee. What changes when the Fund 
manipulates the dividend allocation is that some people end up paying more for per dollar 
of payroll per class of employee despite the fact that they are getting no more coverage. 
7 Given that the Fund pays dividends approximately 18 months after the end of a dividend period, the dividend 
of over $14 million which was paid in 2010 actually applied to the policy year 7/117 to 6/30/8. Hence the rights of 
Plaintiffs' to the receipt of a pro rata share of the dividend paid in 20 10 would have vested approximately 9 months prior 
to the Supreme Court's initial Farber opinion, and almost 11 months prior to the repeal of the statute. 
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This is in effect an illegal assessment being imposed on some policyholders.8 No matter 
I 
how this is twisted and turned the contract term at issue is a fmancial term and alterations 
offmancial terms are inherently substantial. Plf. Memo. p.20. 
Next the Fund argues that the retroactive repeal ofLC. §72-915 is not substantial 
because Plaintiffs cannot prove that all policyholders received less than their pro rata 
share of any dividend being allocated and corollary to this Plaintiffs' action, if permitted, 
might lead to some disadvantage to those policyholders who got substantially more then 
their "pro rata" share of any dividend being allocated. The Fund cites no authority for the 
proposition that a certain percentage of the contracts of a State agency must be impaired by 
a legislative enactment for that State action to be an unconstitutional impairment of 
contract. In essence the Fund is asking the Court to allow the legislature to deprive some 
of the Funds' policyholders of their contract rights because the Fund did not breach all of 
its contracts. It is not at all clear how this is a rational justification for ignoring the Idaho 
Contracts Clause nor how it renders the damage to the Plaintiffs and the other members of 
the class any less substantial. Nor does the Fund cite any authority that suggests the Court 
should concern itself with the possibility (absent a retroactive repeal ofLC. § 72-915) that 
the Fund might have a right to collect overpayments from some of its policyholders or by 
depriving them of the opportunity to receive more then a pro rata share of the dividend. 
While it is not at all clear that the Fund could ever recover voluntary overpayments or even 
if they could, why that should be this Court's concer? While some policyholders were 
8 I.C.§72-916 which permitted class wide assessments was repealed in 1951. See Doc Nos. 000132 and 
000133, Second Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment hereinafter 2nd Aff. 
Lojek. 
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overpaid and while they may like being overpaid, this does nothing to lessen the 
substantiality of the impairment of the rights of the Plaintiffs. 
What the Fund cannot escape is that it is a legislatively created entity that had 
contracts with its insureds and that those contracts by legislative mandate included a 
provision which bears inexorably upon the cost of the insurance. The Fund, as to many of 
its policyholders, ignored that provision and as a consequence the total cost of coverage 
provided to many of its insureds exceeded by as much as 10% what was paid for the same 
coverage by other insureds. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that it could not say a 
contract price adjustment of 5% was insubstantial. City of Hayden v. Washington Water 
Power Co., 108 Idaho 467,468; 700 P. 2d (Ct. App. 1985). There can be little doubt that 
for those who have been deprived of their share of the adjustment to their policy costs, the 
loss is substantia1.9 The loss becomes even more substantial when it is understood that 
Mr. Alcorn has acknowledge that the amount at issue could be millions of dollars. 10 
4. SB 1166aa is not based upon a significant and legitimate public 
purpose which would support a retroactive repeal of LC. § 72-915. 
As some length the Fund argues that there is a legitimate and significant public 
purpose which is served by releasing the Fund, with its nearly $200 million in surplus and 
its total financial separation from the State ofIdaho, from the liability that its Manager 
and Board have created for it by choosing to ignore the clear unambigous language ofLC. 
90ne of the Plaintiffs here has received nothing at all from the declared dividend surplus. See Doc N~OOO 134, 
2nd Aff. Lojek. 
10 Lest the Court be shocked by the numbers involved it should be noted that the amount at issue is not likely 
to be more than 10% of the Fund's existing surplus nor substantially more than the dividends it has been distributing for 
the past several years. 
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§ 72-915. The arguments made in this regard are substantially identical to what is argued 
in the Funds Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment. Compare, De! Memo. p.32 
to 36 with Del Opp. p.25 to 29. 
These arguments seek to distract the Court's attention from the fact that there is no 
basis upon which to conclude that the Legislature either did or could conclude that 
relieving the Fund from its obligations to its policyholders benefitted the public health, 
comfort, safety or general welfare. More significantly, they do not deal with the fact it is 
presumptively unconstitutional under established Idaho precedent for the Legislature to act 
to retroactively change or remove contract provisions which it mandated be included in 
contracts with legislatively created entities. Straus v.Ketchen, supra. Beyond these brief 
responses, Plaintiffs will rely upon and incorporate their responses to these arguments in 
prior briefing. See Plf Opp. p. 21-28. 
This Fund has also argued that the 2009 Idaho Legislature may state what the intent 
of the 1998 Legislature was in passing House Bill 774aa in 1998. Del Opp. p. 25. It 
seems to be hornbook law that " ... the view of a later Congress cannot control the 
interpretation of an earlier enacted statute." 0 'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 90, 
117 S.Ct.452, 458 (1996) citing U.S. v. Price, 361 U.S.304, 80 S.Ct. 326 (1960) and 
Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 60 S.Ct. 355 (1940). 
In Schrader, Schrader v. Idaho Dept. O/Health and Welfare, 768 F.2d 1107, 1114 
(9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit stated: "It is well settled that the views of a later 
Congress regarding the legislative intent of a previous Congress do not deserve much 
weight." Similarly, the 9th Circuit earlier held: "Subsequent legislation, while not always 
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without significance, usually is not entitled to much weight in construing earlier statutes." 
State o/Idaho v. Andrus, 720 F.2d 1491,1468 (9th Cir. 1983). The same may be said here. 
The Legislature'S Statement of Public Purpose as it concerns a legislative intent 11 years 
past, should not be recognized by this Court. 
5. SB 1166aa is not an action which is based upon reasonable 
conditions and of a character appropriate to any significant or 
legitimate public purpose. 
Finally, the Fund argues that retroactive repeal ofLC.§ 72-915 is an action which 
is reasonable and appropriate to a significant and legitimate public purpose. The 
arguments made in this regard are identical to what is argued in the Fund's Memorandum 
in Support of Summary Judgment. Compare, De! Memo. p. 36 to 37 with De! Opp. p.30. 
While the Fund may well be able to establish that a prospective repeal ofLC. §72-915 
makes sense, what the Fund has not done and cannot do is to demonstrate how a 
retroactive repeal of a law which has been clear and unambiguous since its passage in 
1917 in order to save the Fund from the financial consequences of its failure to follow that 
law is a reasonable response to a Supreme Court decision which makes clear that the Fund 
has no excuse for its conduct. Beyond this the Plaintiffs have already responded to the 
Fund's arguments and rather than repeat those arguments here will incorporate them 
herein. See Plf. Opp. pp. 28-31. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Court is obliged to apply Idaho decisional law to resolve Plaintiffs' Idaho 
Contracts Clause challenge to making the repeal ofI.C. § 72-915 retroactive, as our 
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Supreme Court has consistently done since at least the 1922 case of In re Fidelity State 
Bank. Application of the body ofIdaho decisional law to the case at bar clearly results in a 
finding that the retroactivity provision of SB 1166aa unconstitutionally impairs a 
legislatively mandated obligation of the contracts of insurance between the Plaintiffs and 
the members of the class on the one hand, and the Idaho State Insurance Fund on the other. 
For these reasons, the Court should declare SB 1166aa unconstitutional, as being in 
violation of Article 1, Section 16 of the Idaho Constitution. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of December, 2010. 
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CARE CENTRE LLC OF SALMON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
JAMES M. ALCORN, in his official capacity as 
its Manager, and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE 
MEYER, GERALD GEDDES, JOHN 
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN, MARK 
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. HIGGINS, 
TERRY GESTRIN AND MAX BLACK AND 
STEVE LANDON in their capacity as 
member's ofthe Board of Directors of the State 
Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV 09-13607-C 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD W. 
LOJEK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Second Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 




County of Ada ) 
DONALD W. LOJEK, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled matter, and I make this 
Affidavit based upon my personal and direct knowledge, unless otherwise stated herein. 
2. Attached hereto as Doc. # 000132 is a true and correct of 1917 Session Laws, Chapter 81, 
Section 93 and as Doc # 000133 is true and correct copy ofthe "Statutory Notes" from the 
current Annotated Idaho Code which reflect that Section 93, after several recodifications and 
no amendments became Idaho Code §72-9l6 and then was repealed in 1951. 
3. Attached hereto as Doc #000134 is a true and correct copy of a Loss Experience Analysis 
Report which was supplied by the Idaho State Insurance Fund to Plaintiff Discovery Care 
Centre LLC of Salmon. 
-14 
DATED: December £,2010. LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
Donald W. Lojek 
•••••••• ,." ../1.., 
SUB~,~1¥1.~~ .. :vORN to before me this L day of December,20 1 O. 
~ - ...... .. 
I~' • ~ 
I~ O'tARY \,.\ 11!~ . ~ . 
• T.# • • , c.. : \i< . PUll"'" oj NO~rldahO 
\~ .r ~ ::'1 Residing at Boise, Idaho . 
.... ###~-i ta Otl ~""" My Commission Expires: :5/2 'i /2 () /.3 
............. , iI 7 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the t~ay of December, 2010, I caused the fo~egoing document 
to be delivered by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely Duke 
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton 
702 W. Idaho St. Ste. 700 




__ ,FACSIMILE 208-395-8585 
Donald W. Lojek 






72-915 WORKER'S COMPENSATION AND RELATED LAWS 582 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
Cited in: Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 747,242 243 P. 654 (1926); Flynn v. Carson, 42 Idaho 
P. 314 (1925); Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 753, 141, 243 P. 818 (1926). 
72-915. Dividends. - At the end of every year, and at such other times 
as the manager in his discretion may determine, a readjustment of the rate 
shall be made for each of the several classes 9f employments or industries. 
If at any time there is an aggregate balance remaining to the credit of any 
class of'employment or industry which the manager deems may be safely 
and properly divided, he may in his discretion, credit to each individual 
member of such class who shall have been a subscriber to the state 
insurance fund for a period of six (6) months or more, prior to the time of 
such readjustment, such proportion of such balance as he is properly 
entitled to, having regard to his prior paid premiums since the last 
readjustment of rates. [1917, ch. 81, § 92, p. 252; reen. C.L. 256:92; C.S., 
§ 630.3; I.C.A., § 43-1715; am. 1939, ch. 251, § 15, p. 617; am. 1941, ch. 20., 
§ 13,p. 37.] 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
Cited in: Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. 
Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 997 P.2d 591 (2000). 
72-916. Assessments. [Repealed.] 
STATUTORY NOTES 
Compiler's Notes. - This section, which 
comprised S.L. 1917, ch. 81, § 93, p. 252; C.L. 
256:93; C.S., § 6304; I.e.A., § 43-1716; 1939, 
ch. 251,§ 16,p.617; 1941,ch. 20,§ 14,p.37, 
was repealed by S.L. 1951, ch. 269, § I, p. 
570. 
72-917. Readjustment of payrolls. - If the amount of premium 
collected from any employer at the beginning of any period is ascertained by 
I using the estimated expenditure ofwagesior the period of time covered py 
such premium payment as a basis, and adjustment of the amount of such i 
premium shall be made at the end of such periO"d and the acturu amount of ! 
such premium shall be determined in accordance with the amount of the 
actual expenditure of wages for such period; and if such wage expenditure 
for such period is less than the amount of which' such estimated premium 
was collected, such employer shall be entitled to receive a refund from the 
state insurance fund of the difference between the amount so paid by him 
and the amount so found to be actually due, or to have the amount of such 
difference credited on succeeding premium payments at his option; and if 
such actual premium, when so ascertained, exceeds in amount a premium so 
paid by such employer at the beginning of such period, such employer shall 
immediately upon being advised of the true amount of such premium due 
forthwith pay to the manager an amount equal to the difference between the 
amount actually found to be due and the amount paid by him at the 
beginning of such period, for deposit in the state insurance fund. [1917, ch. 
81, § 94, p. 252; reen. C.L. 256:94; C.s., § 630.5; I.C.A., § 43-1717; am. 
1939, ch. 251, § 17, p. 617; am. 1941, ch. 20., § 15, p. 37.] 
0001.32 
2:-::-1 111;\ 11 II SESSlI.11' LAW::; 
State lnsurance Ma nager, \V ith the consent of thc Slate Audi-
tor. may sell any ,If such securities. the pruceeds thereof to 
l)e paid uver to the: Slate Treasurer for said State Insurance 
Fnnd. 
"'1 dill iwis Ira tivJ! lixpcJlscs. 
SEC. 89. The entire expense of administering: the State 
] Ilsnr::lIJce Fund shall be paid in the first instance by the State, 
{Jut uf moneys appropriated therefor. In the month of July, 
Nilllt'en Humlred Eighteen, and semi-annually thereafter in 
S\1ch month, the State Insurance Manager shall ascertain the 
juSt a1l1ount of expense incurred by him during the preceding 
calelldar year, in the administration of the State Insurance 
Fund. including expense incurred for the examination, deter-
minatiun, and payment of losses anti claims, ::l11d shall refund 
snch amount to the St:l!e Treasury. 
Classification of Risl?s and Adjlls/ment of PrcIJI£u.ms. 
SEC. 90. Employments insured in the State Insurance Fund 
;hall be divided by the State Insurance Manager, for the pur-
)05('5 of the said fund. into classes. Separate accounts shall 
Ie kept of the 3111(lllllts collected :lllll expended ill respect to 
<tcll s11eh class for convenience in determining equitable 
ate:;; but for the pnrpose of paying compensation the State 
i
sunll1ce fund shall be deemed one and indivisible. The State 
. mallce Manager shall have power to rearrange any of the 
'ses by withdrawing any employment embraced .in it and 
~
Sferring it wholly or in part to any other class, and from 
I employments to set up new classes in his direction. The 
e Insurance Manager shall determine the hazards of the 
en'llt classes and fix the rates of premiums therefor based 
lOll the total payroll and number of employees in each of 
ch classes of employment at the lowest possible rate COI1-
tent with the maintenance of a soh'eot State Insurance 
mil and the creation of a reasoJlaule surplus and reserve; 
:1 for stich purpose may adopt a system of schedule rating 
sllch a manner as tn take account of the pecnliar hazard 
eacll ilJdividual risk. 
ACCOHllts. 
;rx. 91. The State Insnrallce M:lnager shall' keep an :lC-
nt of the money paid in premil1111S by each of the sevel'al 





1I1:\110 SF.SSIUN 1.1\\\'5 28~ 
State insurance [uud and the disbursel11ents 011 acc.)\ll1t 'jf in-
juries alld deaths of employees ill each of said classes. il1dud-
ing the setting up of reser\"t~S adcquate to 11ll.'et anticipated 
:llld unexpected losses and to carry the claims to ll1aluritv: and 
also an account of the money received fro\11 each individual 
employer: and of the amount disbursed frol11 the State Insur-
ance Fund for expenses. and 011 account of injuries and death 
of the employees of such employer. inclmling the reSl'r\'cs so 
set np. 
Dt"idel/tis. 
SEC. 92. At the end of everY 'year, <\l1d at !'-llch other times 
as the State Insurance Manager 'in his discretion may tleter-
mine. a readjustment of the rate shall be made for each of tl,e 
several classes of employments or ind\1stries. If at any time 
there is an aggregate balance remaining to the credit (If ally 
class of employment or inr!nstry' which the State Insurance 
Manager deems may he safely amI properly divide(1, he may 
in his !liscretion credit to cach inc1ividualmember of such class 
who shall ha\'e been a suhscriber to the State Insurance Fund 
for a period of six months or more, prior to the time of such 
read justment. such propl)fl ion of stich balance as he is prop-
erly entitle,l to. having regard to his prior paid premitll11s 
sitKe the last readjustment of rates. 
Assessments. 
SI~C. 93. If the premiums fixetl for any class q;ld cullected 
frum its members are subsequently fonnd by the State Insur-
ance i\lanager to have been too small for any period, he may 
determine what additional premiums are required f r0111 said 
cb!'>~ for saill period, and may make assessments accurdingly, 
and each of the memhers of sl1ch c1a!'-s sh:lll be liable to the 
said l\lanager to pay Stich :lssessment su made upon hill1 within 
thiny (lays after notice thereof. 
Readjust/II"lIt of Po),rllils. 
St.:\.'. 1)-\. ] { the amoUtlt IIi prell1iU111 col1ected from any 
employer at the beginning IIf an)' perilld is ascertained by \.Ising 
the estilll;1led expendit11n~ oi wages il)r the period of time 
cO\'ered hy Stich premium paYltlent as a \):tsis. an adjtl51111ent at 
the ;UWHlII( of slIch premium shall he made at the end of such 
period and thl' arttl:!1 anl(llll1t of such premiul11 shall lIe detcr-
STATE INSURANCE FUND 
1215 W. STATE STREET P.O. BOX 83720 BOISE, IDAHO 83720 
PHONE (208)332-2100 (800)334-2370 
WWW.IDAHOSIF.ORG 
LOSS EXPERIENCE ANALYSIS REPORT 
DISCOVERY CARE CENTRE LLC OF SALMON 
1475 N COLE RD 
Policy Number: 575180 
BOISE, ID 83704 
AGENCY: POST INSURANCE SERVICES INC 
Effective 
Oate(s) Exp Mod Billed Premium 
01/01/2004 1.10 $70,629.00 
01/01/2005 0.86 $59,078.00 
01/01/2006 1.03 $78,476.00 
01/01/2007 1.27 $101,264.00 
01/01/2008 1.39 $107,507.00 
Totals: $416,954.00 
Current Year Estimated 
01/01/2009 1.23 $111,280.00 
Renewal Year Estimated 
01/01/2010 1.09 $105,309.00 
Loss 
Losses Ratio Dividend 
$144,448.20 204.52 $0.00 
$208,081.26 352.21 $0.00 
$64,460.06 82.14 $0.00 
$67,261.51 66.42 $0.00 
$18,434.44 17.15 







Report Date: 12/29/2009 
Dividend Open Total 
Ratio Claims Claims 
0.00 0 7 
0.00 0 10 
0.00 0 9 
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CANYf:)N COUNTY CLERK 






IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 'TH.t 
I 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIffi COUNTY OF CANYON 
CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and 




THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN. in his 
official capacity as its Manager, and 
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
GERALD GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE, 
ELAINE MARTIN, MARK 
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. HIGGINS, 
TERRY GESTRIN and MAX BLACK and 
STEVE LANDON, in their capacity as 
members of the Board of Directors of the 
State Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 






BASED UPON written motions and oral argument thereon, and for the teaso~ as stated 
on the record at the time of the hearing held on December 15,2010, 
ORDER-l 
000357 
12~20/ 10 09:39 FAX 208 395 8 __ ._HA_LL_F_AR_LE_ Y ___ ._-.,,-.... ------- ------.-
i 
I 
141 003 1004 
THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that the Legislature's retroactive repeal of Idaho Code 
I 
I 




IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary JJgment is 
I 
DENIED; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' 





Motion for Summary Judgment is 
i 
! 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion, Pursuant to Ru1e 56(t), Ito Vacate 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and to Continue that Motion Pending Di~OVery by 
I 
Plaintiffs is DENIED; I 
I 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of James M. 
I 
I 
Alcorn and Selected. Exhibits Attached to the Affidavit of Counsel Both of Which wete Filed in 
I 
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary judgment is GRANTED. 
I 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this ~_ day of December, 2010. ~---
ORDER-l 
00035 8 
· 12</20/10 09: 40 FAX 208 395 HALL FARLEY ---,------ .. _-----------, 













I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the :2J& day of December, 2010, I caused to b~ served a 
true copy of the foregoing ORDER, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following; i 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely E. Duke 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRBCHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West ldaho~ Suite 700 
P. O. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701 
Fax: (208) 395-8585 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Donald W. Lojek 
Lojek Law Offices, Chtd. 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax No.; (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for PlaintiffS 
Philip Gordon 
Bruce S. Bistline 
Gordon Law Offices 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, 10 83702 
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
ORDER-3 
ff U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid o Hand Delivered o Ovenrlght Mail o Telecopy 
rr U.S. Mai~ Postage Prepaid o Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail o Telecopy 
B U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid o Hand Delivered o Overnight Mail o Telecopy 




12/29/10 HALL FARLEY ---- ~~.----~ ~002/004 
JAN 04 2011 
GANYON ~OUNTY CLERK 
:~.DEPl1rY 
I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
COA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and 




THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, in his 
official capacity as its Manager, and 
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
GERALD GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE, 
ELAINE MARTIN, MARK 
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A HIGGINS, 
TERRY GESTRlN and MAX BLACK and 
STEVE LANDON, in their capacity as 
members of the Board of Directors of the 
State Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 09-13607-C 
JUDGMENT 
I 











1?,/29/10 HALL FARLEY --.. --- .. --
, , 
1410031004 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that plainttlfs CDA 
, 
DAIRY QUEEN, INC.) and DISCOVERY CARE CENTRE, LLC OF SALMON tak.~ nothing 
i 
on their claims against defendants THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, JAMES M. 
, 
ALCORN, WILLIAM DEAL" WAYNE MEYER, GERALD GEDDES, JOHN OOEDDE, 
i 
ELAINE MARTIN, MARK SNODGRASS. RODNEY A. HIGGINS, TERRY GESTRlN, MAX 
i 
: 1 
BLACK and STEVE LANDON, that those claims are dismissed with prejudice, I and that 
judgment be entered in favor of defendants. 





















JAN - 3 2011 





CLEIiK,s CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE , 
,"I O. , 
:1: JAN . L. 1,Olb I 
I HEREBY CERTIFY tJ¥it on the _ (lay Ob e,ember, 201 0, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT, by the method indicated below~ and addressed to each 
of the following: "il , 
Richard E. Hall 






HALL, FARLEY, OSERRECHT & II 
BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
P. O. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701 
Fax: (208) 395-8585 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Donald W. Lojek 
Lojek Law Offices, Chtd. 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintijft 
Philip Gordon 
Bruce S. Bistline 
Gordon Law Offices 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax No,; (208) 345-0050 
































































.ff U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid o Hand Delivered 
'0 Overnight Mail o Telecopy 
Wu.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid o Hand Delivered o Overnight Mail o Telecopy 
f2r U.S. Maill Postage Prepaid o Hand Delivered o Overnight Mail o Telecopy 
CLERK OF 
By __ ~~~+-__________ ~ ____ __ 
00036 
Donald W. Lojek ISBN 1395 
LOJEK LAw OFFICES, CHTD 
623 West Hays Street 
PO Box 1712 
Boise, 10 83701 
Telephone: 208-343-7733 
Facsimile: 208-345-0050 
Philip Gordon ISBN 1996 
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988 
GORDON LAW OFFICES 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, 10 83702 
Telephone: 208/345-7100 
Facsimile: 208/345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class 
F --' A.k ,~ 9.M. 
JAN 2 7 2011 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN. DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and 




THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
JAMES M. ALCORN, in his official 
capacity as its Manager, and WILLIAM 
DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, GERALD 
GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE 
MARTIN, MARK SNODGRASS, 
RODNEY A. HIGGINS, TERRY 
GESTRIN AND MAX BLACK AND 
STEVE LANDON in their capacity as 
members of the Board of Directors of the 
State Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 
APPELLANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
CASE NO. CV 09-13607-C 
APPELLANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Filing Fee: $86.00 Idaho Supreme Court 
$15.00 Canyon County 
OG~\(J\'~AL 
000363 
TO: THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, et al., AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF 
RECORD, HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT AND BLANTON. NOTICE IS HEREBY 
GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellants, CDA Dairy Queen and Discovery Care Centre, 
LLC of Salmon, acting on behalf of themselves and the putative Class, appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment which was entered by the Honorable Renae Hoff 
and filed on December 28, 2010 and from the Judgment of January 4, 2011 following that 
Order. 
The claims arising from the Plaintiffs' Complaint pertain to a series of dividend 
distributions made or approved by the Defendants near the first of every year beginning in 
January 2005 and continuing through January of 2010 (and potentially January 2011). The trial 
court dismissed all of the claims of the Plaintiffs and the putative Class and there is a final 
Order and a final Judgment in this regard. The Idaho Supreme Court will be asked to review, 
de novo, the constitutionality of the Idaho Legislature's retroactive appeal of I.C. § 72-915. 
2. Appellants have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court pursuant to 
1.A.R.11(a)(1). 
3. Appellants intend to assert on appeal that the aforesaid Order and Judgment 
constitute errors of law and should be reversed on appeal and remanded with instructions to the 
District Court to allow the case to proceed which would include, inter alia, certification of a Class 
and the determination of damages for each Class member. 
4. A reporter's hard copy transcript of the arguments of counsel and the spoken 
decision of Judge Hoff rendered on December 15, 2010 at the conclusion of the hearing on 
cross-motions for summary judgment on December 15, 2010 has been requested. This will 
constitute the reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25(c)(5), I.A.R. 
5. Documents to be included in the record in addition to those documents 
APPELLANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
000364 
automatically included pursuant to I.A.R. 28 are: 
a. All Motions for Summary Judgment. 
b. All Affidavits supporting all Motions for Summary Judgment. 
c. All memoranda in support of or opposing the cross-motions for 
summary judgment. 
6. The undersigned certifies: 
a. That the clerk of the court has been paid the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the clerk's record pursuant to I.A.R. 27(c), i.e., in the 
amount of $100.00; 
b. That the reporter's estimated fee for preparation of the transcript has 
been paid to the Reporter in the amount of $399.75; 
c. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter at 
the address set out below: 
Carole Bull 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell,lD 
d. That all appellate filing fees have been paid; and 
e. That service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant 
to I.A.R. 20 and the Idaho Attorney General without, however, admitting 
that the Idaho Attorney General must be served under I.C. § 10-1211 or 
any other statute. 
APPELLANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
000365 
~ 
~::#~.IF¥=~~1..l ED this 25 day of January, 2011. 
S.~K-
Bruce S. Bistline, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
By (j:JdL' 
Donald W. Lojek, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the2 6lrday of January, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing instrument was served on the following by the method indicated below, and 
addressed as follows: 
[] Hand Delivery 
[~···U.S. Mail, postage paid 
[] Overnight Express Mail 






U.S. Mail, postage paid 
Overnight Express Mail 
Facsimile Copy: 
APPELLANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely Duke 
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton PA 
702 West Idaho Street, Ste. 700 
Boise, 10 83702 
Attorney for State Insurance Fund 
Lawrence Wasden 
Idaho Attorney General 
Attorney General's Office 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, 10 83720-0010 
0.1L-
Donald W. Lojek 
000366 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 






THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, etc., ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
Case No. CV-09-13607*C 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following 
is being sent as an exhibit: 
NONE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
tio!'! 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ~ day of Mareh, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and the of Canyon. 
I 
By: 1\ Deputy 
~ 
000367 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 






THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, etc., ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
Case No. CV-09-13607*C 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, including documents requested. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
lL, I 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this day ofM~~Cft, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
~~~ .... ,,~~~ the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
000368 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 






THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, etc., ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
Supreme Court No. 38492 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to the attorney of record to each 
party as follows: 
Donald W. Lojek, Lojek Law Offices, POBox 1712, Boise ID 83701 
Richard E. Hall and Keely E. Duke, POBox 1271, Boise, ID 83701 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
l> j 
HDt' \ 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this _~_ day of~, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
In the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
000369 
